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Foreword
by Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, President, Republic of Liberia
As we clearly articulated in our Lift Liberia Poverty Reduction Strategy, economic revitalization 
remains one of our four strategic pillars for poverty reduction.  Consistent with our commitment 
to poverty reduction and in line with our economic growth and sustained development efforts, 
we announced at the onset of our administration a national policy to review all major concession 
agreements in the country.  We made clear that this policy of review would apply to all sectors of 
our economy and was not an exercise to target speciﬁc industries or companies.  Our policy of 
concession contract review was further supported by Liberia’s international partners and donor 
community under the Governance and Economic Management Assistance Program for Liberia 
signed by the former National Transition Government of Liberia.
Among many competing demands, and with uncertainty in some quarters about the likelihood of 
success for our efforts, we dedicated ourselves to a critical examination of our largest investment 
contracts, and undertook the process of renegotiating those agreements we believed could be 
revised to better serve our country.  In the contracts covered by this report we were able, through 
our negotiation efforts, to secure stronger ﬁscal terms, increased revenues to the government, 
and additional employment opportunities for our people.  In one contract, we were able to nego-
tiate the transfer of ownership of the Buchanan port, an important piece of our national infra-
structure, back to government while retaining investor commitment to rehabilitate the port. 
Our constructive engagement with private sector partners in these renegotiations has success-
fully secured a better deal for our nation and people, while also bolstering trust and building 
investor conﬁdence in our administration.  We aggressively pursued a better deal for Liberia, 
but we were also careful to make certain that the renegotiations did not threaten the viability 
of the companies’ investments and, represented an opportunity for a better long-term working 
relationship between the companies and government. 
The renegotiation process was not without its challenges, and offered us an opportunity to take 
a critical look at processes we use for negotiating major concession agreements.  It provided 
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us a chance to examine the legal and policy frameworks supporting the negotiation and the 
implementation of concession agreements in Liberia.  The process also allowed us to look at the 
policy and institutional linkages between increased revenues from concession contracts and our 
commitment under our poverty reduction strategy to pro-poor policies and sustained economic 
development at the community level.  In this regard we were able to successfully increase 
revenue commitments for local communities in both contracts studied by the report.  These 
revenue commitments came in the way of local community funds, support to local industry, and 
increased investor spending on social beneﬁts and infrastructure for the affected communities. 
Our challenge, going forward, will be to ensure compliance with the terms of the renegotiated 
agreements through effective monitoring of both the ﬁscal and non-ﬁscal aspects of the contracts. 
We also want to make certain that the lessons learned during this process become institutional-
ized through our capacity development and legal reform efforts so that similar beneﬁts can be 
achieved through all future negotiations.  Through the generous support of the Revenue Watch 
Institute, this report was undertaken and comprehensively documents and examines the rene-
gotiation processes we used, and offers some useful recommendations for institutionalizing the 
gains we experienced.
The report has served to further discussions within the government on the concession negotia-
tion process.  We are also using it to support of our efforts to, among other things, institution-
alize the gains from our renegotiation activities through the revision of our Public Procurement 
Concessions Act.  As we pursue our reform agenda, work to revitalize our economy and bring 
economic growth to our people, it remains important that we document and analyze the processes 
we use so that we leave a legacy of increased institutional capacity and best practices geared to 




by George Soros, Chairman, Open Society Institute
Liberia’s natural resources played a central role in the civil war that devastated the country 
between 1989 and 2003. The trade in conﬂict diamonds worsened a period of “development in 
reverse,” marked by a 90 percent collapse in GDP over less than two decades. To succeed in its 
postwar reconstruction, Liberia will now need to convert its vast natural resource wealth into 
sustainable economic and human development. 
Revenue Watch Institute’s report, “Getting a Better Deal from the Extractive Sector,” highlights 
one critical aspect of Liberia’s strategy for economic recovery: the creation of more equitable 
terms in natural resource contracts. The report analyzes the review process for Liberia’s contracts 
with Firestone and ArcelorMittal. Liberia’s experience offers at least four important lessons for 
other resource-rich countries. 
Countries require long-term vision for the role of extractive industries in development, which 
in turn demands clear objectives and assessment measures for contracts. The model agenda in 
Liberia’s Poverty Reduction Strategy offers a comprehensive revitalization plan for the natural 
resource-based economy, including rebuilt infrastructure, social services and employment gener-
ation. This strategy reaches well beyond the short-term interest in better ﬁscal terms to increase 
domestic resource mobilization. The example of the Buchanan port rehabilitation under the 
revised terms of Liberia’s ArcelorMittal agreement illustrates the close link between develop-
ment the contract review process. 
When approached pragmatically, contract reviews and concession negotiation can beneﬁt both 
government and industry. The amended Liberian contracts offer signiﬁcant gains for the state 
and for the communities where Firestone and ArcelorMittal operate. The new agreements also 
pose no threat to the companies’ proﬁtability, and pave the way for a more stable partnership 
between the companies and the Liberian government. ArcelorMittal’s decision to increase invest-
ment in Liberia by half a billion dollars shows plainly that better contractual terms and height-
ened investor interest can in fact go hand in hand.
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To prevent the asymmetries of information and power that result in unbalanced contracts, 
governments and companies must meet on a level playing ﬁeld. Therefore, it is imperative that 
resource rich counties mobilize the human and institutional capacity necessary for successful 
negotiation. The Open Society Institute helped assemble a team of legal, economic and industry 
experts to support the Government of Liberia in this effort. However, strengthening the long-
term capacity of Liberia’s civil and professional sector for complex transactions and negotiations 
remains a signiﬁcant challenge. If Liberia hopes to enforce its agreements and negotiate new 
investments that will support its reconstruction, it will require innovative approaches to capacity 
development. 
Lastly, the leadership of President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf was central to Liberia’s concession 
negotiation process over the years covered in this report. She articulated the key objectives of 
the negotiations, ensured their integrity and directly intervened to overcome critical deadlocks 
in the process.
The report is based on in-person interviews with the main actors in the Firestone and 
ArcelorMittal negotiations. It offers detailed and insightful perspectives on key aspects of natural 
resource contract negotiation. I strongly recommend the report to civil society activists, journal-
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The Government of President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf faced extraordinary expectations, and enor-
mous security and economic challenges when it came into ofﬁce on January 16, 2006.  As part 
of the Government’s larger plans to ensure Liberia’s transition to democracy, reduce poverty and 
spur economic growth, President Sirleaf announced soon after taking ofﬁce that her Government 
would review all of the country’s concession agreements.  
Her announcement was supported by the Governance and Economic Management Assistance 
Program for Liberia (“GEMAP”)4; an agreement the National Transitional Government of Liberia 
(“NTGL”) signed in September 2005 with Liberia’s international partners and donors to, among 
other things, review all contracts signed by the NTGL between 2003 and 2006.  Under GEMAP, 
the Mittal Steel Holdings N.V. (“ArcelorMittal”) and Firestone Natural Rubber Company LLC 
(“Firestone”) concession agreements, signed in 2005 by the NTGL, were both subject to review 
by Liberia’s Public Procurement and Concessions Commission (“PPCC”).  
By mid-2006, given the slow start to the GEMAP mandated contract review by the PPCC and, 
driven by a desire to respond quickly to the high expectations and immense needs of a post-conﬂict 
Liberia, the Government began a separate and independent fast track review of the ArcelorMittal 
and Firestone contracts; the country’s two largest concession agreements.  The fast track review 
and negotiating practice adopted by the Government resulted in amended agreements with both 
ArcelorMittal and Firestone that provided signiﬁcant gains for Liberia over the original conces-
sion agreements signed by the NTGL.
The ArcelorMittal amended agreement had some 30 improvements over the original contract; 
the Firestone amendment had nearly 40 improvements.  These improvements covered gains in 
transfer pricing, taxes, duties, the agreement term, corporate governance, infrastructure owner-
ship, value-added manufacturing, sovereignty issues, environmental matters and, most impor-
tant, gains in social beneﬁts (e.g., housing, water and sanitation, education, requirements for 
Liberian employment and training, and community obligations beyond the concession area). 
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Both amended agreements resulted in increased investment in Liberia and created new and/or 
additional jobs for the country.
The ArcelorMittal and Firestone amendments were generally accepted by the Liberian public, 
ratiﬁed by the Liberian National Legislature and have received the support of donor nations, 
the WorldBank/IMF and international civil society.  ArcelorMittal and Firestone have both 
expressed satisfaction with the outcome of the negotiation process and, following the signing 
of its amended agreement, the Chairman of ArcelorMittal increased the company’s invest-
ment in Liberia to $1.5 billion from $1.0 billion citing a renewed partnership with the Liberian 
Government.  The Government has widely cited the re-negotiations of the ArcelorMittal and 
Firestone contracts as proof of investor conﬁdence that Liberia is “re-opened for business.” 
Liberia’s successful negotiations with ArcelorMittal and Firestone have caught the attention of 
other African governments seeking to maximize value from concession agreements covering 
their natural resources.
The practice used in the ArcelorMittal and Firestone negotiations is generally understood within 
the Government, but it has not been studied and documented. In order to develop a more 
consistently followed negotiating process made up of best practices, the Ofﬁce of the President, 
through the Liberian Reconstruction and Development Committee (“LRDC”), asked the Report 
Team headed by the Senior Legal Advisor, Ofﬁce of the President and funded by Revenue Watch 
Institute (“RWI”), to prepare a Report documenting and analyzing the process the Government 
used to re-negotiate the ArcelorMittal and Firestone agreements.
The LRDC asked the Report Team to identify the factors that led to successful re-negotia-
tions and to examine the practice’s transparency and consultative characteristics.  The Report 
Team was also asked to make recommendations on harmonizing the practice used in the 
ArcelorMittal and Firestone negotiations to the concession negotiating process required by 
Liberia’s Public Procurement and Concessions Act of 2005 (“PPCA”).  The LRDC asked the 
Report Team to comment on the negotiating practice used by Government, speciﬁcally the 
Ministry of Lands, Mines and Energy (“MLME”) and the Ministry of Agriculture (“MOA”) 
in negotiations following those with ArcelorMittal and Firestone in order to determine what 
lessons from these negotiations could be learned.  Lastly, the LRDC asked the Report Team 
for recommendations to further the Government’s post-signature concession/investment 
contract monitoring and compliance efforts.
The Report Team gathered in Monrovia and, starting on May 17, 2008, met with a wide range 
of people, both in and outside Government, to further its understanding of these questions. 
(A complete list of all the persons the Report Team interviewed is attached as Appendix I to the 
full Report.)
The full Report documents what the Report Team learned and includes analyses and recommen-
dations for institutionalizing, harmonizing, and strengthening the practice the Government 
employed in the ArcelorMittal and Firestone negotiations.  The Report Team has organized the 
full Report in the following manner: In Section 2, the Report Team provides the historical back-
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ground that inﬂuenced the negotiating practice the Government used in the ArcelorMittal and 
Firestone negotiations.  Sections 3 and 4 describe the ArcelorMittal and Firestone negotiations 
and their outcomes.  Section 5 analyzes the factors that made the negotiating practice used in 
the ArcelorMittal and Firestone negotiations successful and makes recommendations for insti-
tutionalizing those factors.  In Section 6, the full Report examines the transparency and consul-
tative nature of the negotiating process used in the ArcelorMittal and Firestone negotiations 
and makes recommendations for improvements.  In Section 7 the negotiating practice used in 
the ArcelorMittal and Firestone negotiations is compared to the concession negotiation process 
under the PPCA.  In this Section, the current concession negotiating practice at the Ministry of 
Lands, Mines and Energy and the Ministry of Agriculture are reviewed and recommendations 
are made to harmonize the negotiating practice used in the ArcelorMittal and Firestone nego-
tiations with the PPCA.  Section 8 suggests steps the Government can take to strengthen its 
ability to monitor and ensure compliance with the terms of its concession agreements.  Section 
9 concludes the Report.
2. The GEMAP Contract Review Process and the 
 Government’s Negotiations with ArcelorMittal and Firestone: 
 Background and History
This section of the full Report explores how the Government’s negotiating practice and success 
in the negotiations with ArcelorMittal and Firestone was inﬂuenced by the GEMAP review of 
concession agreements signed by the NTGL.  It also provides the historical context and back-
ground for GEMAP and takes a look at the contract review process it mandated. 
In June 2006, President Sirleaf launched a separate and independent contract review and 
negotiating process concurrent with the GEMAP-mandated Contracts and Concessions Review 
Committee (“CCRC”) to fast track review and renegotiation of the ArcelorMittal and Firestone 
agreements. At that time the CCRC review process was still in the early stages of being deployed. 
Unlike the CCRC contract review process under GEMAP, the Government’s fast track process 
involved only Government ofﬁcials and their technical advisors and did not formally include 
representatives from Liberia’s International Partners and civil society.  The fast track process, 
through the creation of an Inter-Ministerial Concession Committee (“IMCC”) 2and negotiating 
team reporting directly to the President and her Cabinet, was led by Government Ministers and 
took place in parallel with the separate GEMAP- mandated CCRC review of the ArcelorMittal 
and Firestone agreements and other NTGL signed concession contracts.
The CCRC process yielded consensus among Liberia’s International Partners, civil society and 
Government that the Government should re-negotiate the ArcelorMittal and Firestone contracts. 
This consensus helped to insulate from international pressure the Government’s decision to 
move forward with its own review and renegotiation of the ArcelorMittal and Firestone agree-
ments.  Investor acceptance and international support for the Liberian Government’s decision to 
re-negotiate the ArcelorMittal and Firestone concession agreements was linked to, and beneﬁted 
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from, the international support for the GEMAP mandated review process of concession agree-
ments signed by the NTGL.
It is important to note that the GEMAP-mandated review of contracts was not primarily driven 
by the Government’s attempt to beneﬁt from windfall proﬁts received by investors as a result 
of record high global prices for natural commodities produced by Liberia.  Instead the CCRC’s 
review of NTGL contracts was largely driven by Government and international concern at the 
mismanagement of public ﬁnances under the NTGL.  The Government’s fast track review of the 
ArcelorMittal and Firestone contracts not only sought to address concerns over the mismanage-
ment of public ﬁnances under the NTGL, but also to address the immense social and economic 
needs of Liberia’s post-conﬂict society.
3. The ArcelorMittal Negotiations
The Government’s decision in early 2006 to review and renegotiate the ArcelorMittal conces-
sion was risky.  The company operating then as Mittal Steel Holdings NV had less than a year 
earlier—on August 17, 2005—signed a Mineral Development Agreement (“MDA”) with the 
NTGL for the exclusive right and license to explore, develop, produce and market iron ore and 
associated minerals in the concession area formerly granted to the Liberia American-Swedish 
Minerals Company (“LAMCO”) in a Mining Concessions Agreement dating back to 1960.  The 
ArcelorMittal MDA was the ﬁrst signiﬁcant foreign investment in Liberia in more than 20 years 
and ArcelorMittal’s promise of almost $900 million in new investment was badly needed in 
post-conﬂict Liberia and signiﬁed hope for a better future.
The Government’s preparation for review of the ArcelorMittal MDA began in earnest in June 
2006 when the President convened an IMCC to review the agreement separately from the 
ongoing but slower moving CCRC review process.  The IMCC was tasked with conducting the 
review of the ArcelorMittal contract and preparing a report for the President recommending 
necessary changes.  During its review the IMCC received technical assistance from a number of 
advisors both inside and outside the Government.  Unlike the CCRC review process there was 
no formal mechanism for including the views of non-governmental stakeholders. Largely due 
to the accessibility of the President, the Government, however, did engage in informal consulta-
tions with non-government actors during the IMCC contract review process.
By the ﬁrst week of August 2006, the IMCC had delivered its report on the MDA to the 
President.  While the report was not speciﬁcally marked conﬁdential, it was not viewed as a 
public document but as a negotiation tool setting out the Government’s concerns with the MDA. 
On August 28, 2006 the CCRC delivered its report on the MDA.  The CCRC report supported 
the Government’s decision to renegotiate the ArcelorMittal MDA and concluded, among other 
things, that the contract ArcelorMittal signed with the NTGL did not conform to Liberian law 
(e.g., PPCA) at the time of its execution and was not in the country’s best interest.  The report 
recommended that the Government consider renegotiating the agreement instead of canceling 
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it—as cancellation would likely lead to lengthy and costly arbitration.  With the CCRC report in 
hand and the IMCC contract review completed, the President appointed the Government’s team 
for negotiations with ArcelorMittal.
As the Government team readied itself for its initial negotiation with ArcelorMittal, there was 
signiﬁcant discussion within the team and among its advisors (e.g., ISLP, LRDC) on the appro-
priate strategy to use.  There were differing views on how aggressive the Government should be 
in seeking changes to the ArcelorMittal MDA.  The team and its advisors were concerned that if 
the Government pushed too hard or appeared unreasonable in its demands for changes in the 
MDA, ArcelorMittal would choose to arbitrate instead of negotiate.
The parties agreed to meet in New York in September to begin substantive negotiations.  Two 
factors drove the Government’s choice of New York as the venue for the ArcelorMittal nego-
tiations: 1) it was felt that the negotiating team would contend with fewer interruptions in New 
York and so negotiations would be more efﬁcient; and, 2) the Government’s advisors, primarily 
the legal team from Cravath, was only available in New York.  Having the discussions in New 
York also increased the Government’s chances of maintaining a shield of conﬁdentiality around 
the negotiations.  The Government and its technical advisors felt that negotiations conducted 
through the press would make it harder if not impossible for the Government to reach agreement 
with ArcelorMittal.
The Government and its advisors decided as a matter of strategy to force the conversation on all 
Term Sheet issues to be between the Government’s lead negotiator and ArcelorMittal’s business 
representatives.  Even when ArcelorMittal’s lawyers asked a question, the Government’s response 
was to be directed to the company’s business people. This was done to avoid getting bogged 
down in technical legal discussions and allow the parties to reach broad understanding necessary 
to complete an amended contract.  This strategy worked very well because ArcelorMittal had a 
strong and experienced business team that did not simply defer to the company’s lawyers.
Consensus-building within the negotiating team was also an important strategy used by the 
Government’s team to handle critical decisions at various points during the negotiations with 
ArcelorMittal.  To accomplish this, the team agreed that none of its members would speak during 
the negotiation sessions without ﬁrst obtaining the permission of the person acting as Chairman 
of the team for that session.  When it became clear during a negotiation session that there might 
be differing views on the appropriate Government response to a position adopted by ArcelorMittal 
the Chairman of the negotiating team requested a break and the Government team retreated to 
a separate room to sort out its position.  The negotiating team’s discussions were aided by input 
from its technical advisors.  Eventually a decision was reached that all members of the team felt 
they could support.  At that point, the team returned to the negotiations with ArcelorMittal.
Escalation was also used effectively by the Government’s negotiating team to break through 
negotiation deadlock with ArcelorMittal or to ﬁnalize internal consensus on a strategic 
compromise point.  The Government team escalated a number of issues to the President for her 
input and direction.
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There were three negotiation rounds between the Government’s team and ArcelorMittal in New 
York.  A ﬁnal round of negotiations was held in Monrovia at the end of December.  On December 
8, 2006, the parties signed a ﬁnal conﬁdential Non-Binding Protocol, which provided that the 
draft amendment to the MDA attached to the Protocol reﬂected the ﬁnal agreement between the 
parties on all issues raised in connection with the Government’s review of the MDA.  The parties 
also agreed to meet in Monrovia on December 18, 2006 to ﬁnalize the applicable tables for rates 
associated with ArcelorMittal’s custom and duty obligations and to sign the amended MDA. 
The parties met in Monrovia to ﬁnalize appendices to the Agreement.  That was quickly done 
but then ArcelorMittal raised a concern about the withholding tax provisions on contractors and 
consultants in the proposed draft MDA amendment.
On December 23, 2006, ArcelorMittal’s Chairman, Lakshmi Mittal, sent the President an email 
to try and close a growing gap on the withholding tax provisions between the company and the 
Government.  After direct discussion between the President and Mittal’s Chairman on this issue 
and advice from the Government’s technical advisors, the parties settled the withholding tax 
matter.  The Amended ArcelorMittal MDA was signed by both parties on December 28, 2006. 
The Government subsequently submitted the Agreement to the Legislature. It was ratiﬁed by 
both the House and Senate on April 27, 2007 and subsequently signed by the President.
As part of the ratiﬁcation process, the Amended MDA was printed into handbills and made 
a public document.  The amended contract was also presented to the National Legislature 
by the negotiating team in a public hearing that was broadcast on live radio.  At the hearing, 
the Legislature heard from a wide range of stakeholders including company representatives 
and civil society.  The Amended MDA was also the subject of signiﬁcant media coverage both 
domestic and international.  After several months of debate, the National Legislature ratiﬁed the 
Amended MDA.  While the Agreement is indeed public, it is not easily accessible (e.g. posted 
on a website) like the document, Summary of the Main Changes Brought About by the Review of the 
Mittal Mineral Development Agreement (“Mittal Summary of Changes”3); which is posted on the 
Executive Mansion’s website and highlights the gains the Government made in the Amended 
MDA over the 2005 MDA.
The Mittal Summary of Changes highlights the gains the Government achieved in infrastructure 
ownership, transfer pricing, debt to equity ratio, withholding taxes, royalty calculation, income 
taxation, import duties, corporate governance, upfront payment to the Government, sovereignty, 
social beneﬁts, and environmental protections.
4. The Firestone (Firestone Liberia, Inc.)  Negotiations
On April 12, 2005 the NTGL signed a new Concession Agreement with the Firestone Natural 
Rubber Company, LLC (the “2005 Concession Agreement”).  The Sirleaf Government’s deci-
sion to review this Agreement presented different challenges from its decision to review the 
ArcelorMittal contract.  
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Unlike ArcelorMittal, Firestone was an ongoing and fully operational concern with nearly 80 
years of doing business in Liberia.  It was not a new investor, like ArcelorMittal, motivated to 
reach agreement to lock-up a much sought-after natural resource in light of climbing commodity 
prices on the world market.  Adding to the challenges the Government faced in its decision to 
review the 2005 Concession Agreement was the fact that, next to the Government, Firestone is 
Liberia’s largest employer providing nearly 4000 jobs to Liberians—employment critical to main-
taining peace and stability in the post-conﬂict country.  The Government recognized that, even 
with international support for its decision to review the 2005 Concession Agreement, Firestone 
had little incentive to agree to signiﬁcant changes to the contract.  
In mid-2006, the President convened an IMCC to review the 2005 Concession Agreement and 
report back to her with recommendations.  The review by the Firestone IMCC, like the one 
conducted by the ArcelorMittal IMCC, was done in parallel with the separate CCRC review of 
the 2005 Concession Agreement.  As in the case with ArcelorMittal, the Government’s goal was 
to fast track review of the Agreement in order to meet critical timelines of the Government’s 
national economic recovery program.  The IMCC completed its review and submitted its report 
to the President.  Like the report by the ArcelorMittal IMCC, the report from the Firestone 
IMCC, while not speciﬁcally marked conﬁdential, was viewed as a negotiation tool setting out 
the Government’s concerns with the 2005 Concession Agreement and was not a public docu-
ment.  When the CCRC submitted its report, it also recommended that the Government re-nego-
tiate the contract with Firestone.  
In January 2007, with the ArcelorMittal negotiations done, the President constituted the 
Government’s team for the Firestone negotiations.  On February 9 and 10, 2007 the negoti-
ating team met with its advisors in Washington, D.C. to ﬁnalize the draft Summary of Principal 
Terms.  At this stage, the Government and its technical advisors felt that strict conﬁdentiality 
was absolutely necessary if the Government was to succeed in its bid to re-negotiate the 2005 
Concession Agreement.  Given the complex relationship with Firestone, everyone acknowledged 
that negotiations conducted through the press would make it harder if not impossible for the 
Government to achieve its objectives.  
While Firestone agreed to participate in the meetings, the company was holding to its position 
that the 2005 Concession Agreement was valid and not subject to review outside the terms 
of the contract.  The negotiating team decided to counter Firestone’s position by arguing that 
the Government had the right, beyond its broad mandate under GEMAP to review all NTGL 
contracts, to seek changes to the 2005 Concession Agreement under the terms of the Agreement 
itself. 
During the negotiations the Government’s team used the same strategy employed in the 
ArcelorMittal negotiations to build consensus. The team agreed that when it became clear 
during a negotiation session that there might be differing views on the appropriate response to 
a position adopted by Firestone, the Chairman of the team would request a break in the negotia-
tions and the Government would retreat to sort out its position.  The team also used escalation 
as negotiating strategy much like the team that negotiated with ArcelorMittal.  For example, 
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on several occasions the negotiating team briefed the President and sought her advice on their 
discussions with Firestone on ﬁscal and value-added manufacturing matters. 
The Government and Firestone held six formal rounds of negotiations and on November 14, 
2007, the parties reached ﬁnal agreement on all substantive issues that had emerged in connec-
tion with the Government’s review of the Firestone 2005 Concession Agreement.  The agree-
ment and all of its appendices were submitted for ﬁnal review and approval to the Cabinet and 
to Firestone’s Board for similar review and approval.  Those reviews produced a number of 
additional changes that were later incorporated.  
The Government and Firestone signed the Amended & Restated Concession Agreement on 
February 22, 2008 (“2008 Concession Agreement”) at a signing ceremony in Monrovia at the 
Ministry of Agriculture. 
Like the Amended ArcelorMittal MDA, the 2008 Concession Agreement with Firestone was 
presented to the National Legislature by the negotiating team in a public hearing that was broad-
cast on live radio.  At the hearing, the Legislature heard from a wide range of stakeholders 
including company representatives and civil society.  The amended contract was also the subject 
of signiﬁcant domestic and international media coverage. As part of the ratiﬁcation process, the 
2008 Concession Agreement was printed into handbills and made a public document.  After 
several months of public and closed-door debates, the amended agreement was ratiﬁed by the 
National Legislature and signed by the President into law on March 31, 2008.
While the 2008 Concession Agreement is public, it is not easily accessible (e.g. posted on a 
website) like the document, Summary of the Main Changes Brought About by the Government of 
Liberia’s Review of the 2005 Concession Agreement with Firestone Liberia, Inc. (“Firestone Summary 
of Changes”4); which is posted on the Executive Mansion’s website and highlights the gains the 
Government made in the 2008 Concession Agreement over the 2005 Concession Agreement. 
The Firestone Summary of Changes document highlights the Government’s contract gains in 
the general applicability of Liberian tax laws to Firestone under the 2008 Concession Agreement, 
other taxes and duties, transfer pricing, value-added manufacturing, social beneﬁts, and, length 
of the contract term.
5. The Negotiating Practice used in ArcelorMittal and Firestone: 
 Analysis and Recommendations
Liberia’s success in recent re-negotiations of the ArcelorMittal and Firestone contracts can be 
attributed to several factors: 1) engaged leadership that managed the negotiation process and 
permitted a clear and direct reporting line from the negotiating teams to the ultimate decision 
maker; 2) negotiating strategies that supported collaborative and consensus-building efforts of 
the core negotiating team; and, 3) technical capacity and resources available to the negotiating 
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team through the integration of world-class advisors at every signiﬁcant stage of the negotiation 
process.
To ensure that the Government’s negotiating practice produces similar gains in ongoing and 
future concession negotiations, the Government should institutionalize these factors by: 1) 
maintaining a clear and direct reporting line to the ultimate decision maker from all negoti-
ating teams; and, 2) strengthening its efforts to grow and scale its own capacity to lead, manage 
and negotiate complex investment agreements through professional development and training; 
recruitment; and, education.
The Government can also improve the practice used in the ArcelorMittal and Firestone negotia-
tions by increasing its transparency through the development of formal: 1) mechanisms that 
require the negotiating team to gather input from non-government stakeholders affected by 
concession activity; and, 2) policies and regulations governing the public’s right to access conces-
sion agreements.  
Engaged Leadership: President Sirleaf’s leadership in the ArcelorMittal and Firestone negotia-
tions was key to the success Liberia achieved.  From the beginning of the process, the President 
managed the negotiating process and allowed a direct reporting line from the Chairman of the 
negotiating team to herself.  Among other things, President Sirleaf: 1) clearly communicated 
a vision of national priorities to the nation and investors; 2) prioritized concession review by 
demonstrating an understanding of the national interests and how the operation of a given 
concession ﬁts into Liberia’s national framework (i.e., political, economic and social needs); 
3) selected a negotiating team composed of individuals with diverse skills and knowledge; 4) 
permitted a clear and direct reporting line between herself and the negotiating team; 5) adjusted 
the size of the core negotiating team as necessary to maintain the integrity and pace of the nego-
tiations; and, 6) empowered and supported the negotiating team by attracting and soliciting 
technical assistance from appropriate world-class experts in a manner that nurtured a personal 
commitment by these advisors to the success of the Government’s negotiations
The President’s leadership in the ArcelorMittal and Firestone negotiations displayed her consis-
tency, integrity (the negotiation team knew they could count on her backing if needed); and 
involvement. She sought updates, listened to the negotiating team and its advisors, was acces-
sible, was a consensus builder, held people accountable, had substantive knowledge of the issues 
being negotiated, and was decisive.  These leadership characteristics allowed the President to 
both lead and manage the many players, issues and dynamics during the politically charged 
atmosphere surrounding the ArcelorMittal and Firestone negotiations. 
Collaborative Teamwork:  The teamwork of the Government’s teams in the ArcelorMittal and 
Firestone negotiations was an essential element to the success of the negotiation process.  The 
negotiating teams represented a broad cross-section of professional and experiential viewpoints 
and consensus-building often required the negotiating team to do the hard work of bringing 
their diverse views, skills and experience together to forge uniﬁed Government positions.  In 
both the ArcelorMittal and Firestone negotiations, the team members felt a personal need to 
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“get it right,” driven by a sense that they were going to be held accountable for their positions on 
the issues by the President, and were ultimately answerable to the Legislature and the people of 
Liberia.  The negotiating team’s consensus- building and collaborative efforts involved: 1) initial 
intense discourse, at times difﬁcult, but essential to the process of building communication 
and trust; 2) recognition by members of the team that they had been picked by the President to 
bring particular expertise to the table; 3) development of a clear understanding of each  other’s 
positions, strengths, and value to accomplishing the Government’s negotiating objectives; and, 
4) understanding that issues on which no consensus could be reached on certain key compro-
mises were to be raised to the President with the team’s recommendations for ﬁnal decision.
This process of consensus building and collaboration by the ArcelorMittal and Firestone nego-
tiating teams was aided by the strategies the teams employed during negotiations. For example, 
none of the members of the negotiating team would speak during the negotiation sessions without 
ﬁrst obtaining the permission of the person acting as Chairman of the team for that session. 
When it became clear during a negotiation session that there might be differing views among 
members of the negotiating team on the appropriate Government response, the Chairman of 
the negotiating team requested a break in the negotiations and the Government team retreated 
to a separate room to sort out its position.  This focus on consensus-building and collaboration 
resulted in shared ownership of the ﬁnal contract terms by team members, enabling the negoti-
ating team to defend the contracting positions they had adopted before all stakeholders (i.e., the 
President, Legislature, and Liberian public).
World-class Technical Assistance:  The Government’s use of top technical advisors in the 
ArcelorMittal and Firestone negotiations was essential to the gains Liberia experienced.  During 
the negotiations, these advisors prepared and empowered the IMCC negotiating team.  Liberia’s 
advisors armed the Government’s negotiating team by educating them on the issues, providing 
recommendations on negotiation strategy, and suggesting options and drafting language for 
resolving conﬂicts. Using the latest tools and technologies, and with the resources of some of 
Americas best law ﬁrms (e.g., Cravath in ArcelorMittal and Hogan & Hartson in Firestone) at 
their disposal, the Government’s advisors were able to provide the negotiating team a 24 by 7 
support infrastructure.  
Throughout the process in both the ArcelorMittal and Firestone negotiations, the role of the 
Government’s technical advisors was clear.  They were advisors to the Government’s negoti-
ating teams; they were not on the Government’s negotiating teams nor were they negotiators 
for the Government.  The advisors limited themselves to providing advice and support to the 
Government’s negotiating teams.  The Government’s teams were responsible for all of the nego-
tiations with ArcelorMittal and Firestone.  
Support to the Government’s negotiating teams provided by their technical advisors included: 
1) drafting and preparing all documents, researching and framing issues to represent the 
Government’s position, consulting with other experts to bolster the Government’s positions, 
and modeling ﬁnancial projections of the impact to changes in the Government’s positions; 2) 
helping the Government ﬁnd viable compromises to difﬁcult issues and apparent ‘deadlock’ 
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situations by using knowledge and experience gained over long careers of negotiating similar 
transactions; 3) providing the Government an objective measure to balance views from both 
members of the Government’s negotiating team and the companies; and, 4) facilitating discus-
sion among the Government’s team members to clarify the implications of proposed positions. 
Recommendations:  To ensure similar gains in ongoing and future concession negotiations, the 
Government should institutionalize the beneﬁts of leadership, teamwork and technical assis-
tance. It can do this by growing and scaling its own capacity to lead, manage and negotiate 
complex investment agreements.
While Liberia has experienced signiﬁcant gains through the Government’s successful re-nego-
tiations of the ArcelorMittal and Firestone contracts, the leadership and teamwork in the nego-
tiating process occurred at the highest levels of Government.  Additionally, external technical 
assistance was required to close and ﬁll existing gaps in the Government’s capacity to negotiate 
complex agreements.  A negotiating process supported by the highest levels of Government and 
international technical assistance is not scalable.  As Liberia seeks to attract greater international 
investment to spur the country’s economic development, it will need to grow its ability to nego-
tiate complex investment agreements beyond its top ofﬁcials and external technical advisors.  
The Government can grow its capacity for the negotiation of complex investment agreements 
through: 1) mentoring, professional development and training programs for current Government 
employees involved in contract negotiations; 2) recruitment of Liberians both locally and from 
the Diaspora who have the experience to support the Government’s concession activity; and, 3) 
providing scholarships and practical training abroad for Liberians who are pursuing careers that 
can support the infrastructure the Government will need to manage its concession agreements.  
To accomplish these steps, the full Report recommends a three-fold, concurrent approach that 
addresses both the Government’s short-term needs and the longer-term capacity needs. The 
recommended three-fold approach includes: 1) Short-term: mentoring, professional develop-
ment and training programs; 2) Medium-term: Recruitment of Liberians both locally and from 
the Diaspora to support the Government’s concession activity; and 3) Long-term: Providing 
scholarships and extended practical training abroad for Liberians pursuing careers that will 
support the Government’s concession activity.  
6. Increasing the Transparency of Concession Negotiations
Non-governmental Consultations:  The Mittal and Firestone fast track negotiation process had 
no formal mechanisms for consultation with non-government stakeholders. 
Interviews with Government ofﬁcials highlight the absence of a framework for incorporating 
non-government stakeholders’ input into the IMCC contract review process. A majority of govern-
ment ofﬁcials—including the President—are favorable to consultations with non-governmental 
stakeholders as long as they are time-bound, focused and organized at the outset of the contract 
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review phase. Under such an approach consultations with non-government stakeholders should 
take place early in the concession award process as part of the bid tender, evaluation, or award 
process.  If there have been no consultations with non-governmental stakeholders as part of the 
process to select the concessionaire, then a time-bound and focused consultation at the outset of 
the concession contract review phase is advisable.  
The development of a non-governmental stakeholder consultation mechanism for the contract 
review process should be done as part of the Government’s harmonization of the PPCA with the 
negotiation practice used in ArcelorMittal and Firestone. Prior to ﬁnalizing such a mechanism, 
input and comments should be sought from non-governmental stakeholders (e.g., traditional 
community representatives, civil society, labor unions, etc.).  
Making Concession Agreements Accessible to the Public:  Contracts negotiated by the Govern-
ment often have tremendous impact on the political, social and economic life of communities 
affected by the operation of these agreements. Recognizing the impact of these concession agree-
ments, the Government committed to transparency and freedom of information by making the 
ArcelorMittal and Firestone agreements public documents. There seems, however, to be some 
confusion within the Government about its obligation to make admittedly public documents 
accessible.  
Most of the Government ofﬁcials interviewed felt that contracts signed by the Government but 
not subject to ratiﬁcation (e.g., qualifying investment incentive contracts or mining exploration 
agreements) are not public documents and should not be made available to the public.  
The Government will need to address two issues to further promote transparency: 1) to make 
ratiﬁed concession agreements accessible, the Government must ﬁnd a cost-effective means 
of providing public access. This can be done by posting contracts like the ArcelorMittal and 
Firestone contracts on appropriate Government websites; and, 2) the Government should, as a 
policy matter, clarify its position on making contracts public that are not subject to Legislative 
ratiﬁcation. The Report recommends that the Government make such contracts accessible to the 
public as part of future freedom of information legislation that the Government may enact.
7. Contrasting the Fast Track Negotiations to the Negotiating 
 Practice under the Public Procurement Concessions Act 
The negotiating practice the Government successfully used in the ArcelorMittal and Firestone 
negotiations differs from the concession negotiation process in the PPCA in a number of signiﬁ-
cant ways.  This section of the full Report contrasts these differences. Section 7 also compares the 
negotiating practices of the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Lands, Mines and Energy 
to the practices employed in the ArcelorMittal and Firestone negotiations.  Finally it highlights 
the differences between the negotiating process in the 2000 Mining Law and the negotiating 
practice used in ArcelorMittal and Firestone and set out in the PPCA. 
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The Section concludes by recommending the Government resolve the differences between the 
various negotiation processes by amending the PPCA to incorporate best practices from the 
negotiations with ArcelorMittal and Firestone.  The Government has followed a similar route by 
amending the Liberian tax code (e.g., the 2000 Revenue Code of Liberia) to capture the substan-
tive ﬁscal beneﬁts of the ArcelorMittal and Firestone negotiations.  
For comparisons between the concession negotiation process in the PPCA and the practices 
used by the MOA and MLME in the ArcelorMittal and Firestone negotiations, please see Table 3 
(Chapter 7, p. 72).
Recommendations:  To institutionalize the factors that produced success in its recent negotia-
tions, the Government will need to apply those best practices to the various negotiation processes 
that currently exist. In order to bring the PPCA, the 2000 Mining Law, and the practices used 
by the MOA and the MLME into line, best practices from the ArcelorMittal and Firestone nego-
tiations should be applied in the areas of: 1) process for constituting the negotiating team; 
2) composition of the negotiating team; 3) composition, operation and function of the IMCC; 
and, 4) process for consultation with non-governmental stakeholders.
The Government should have one negotiating practice that all Ministries follow when conducting 
concession negotiations.  This practice should represent best practices from the 2000 Mining 
Law, the PPCA and the practice used in the ArcelorMittal and Firestone negotiations. 
To create a single negotiation process, the Report Team recommends that the Government 
amend Section VI of the PPCA, Speciﬁc Procedures for Processing Concession Agreements, using 
the following steps:  1) convene an IMCC to discuss, study and draft amendments to Section VI 
of the PPCA; 2) solicit technical assistance from the Government’s international advisors; and 
3) seek formal input to the draft amendment from non-governmental stakeholders before 
submitting it to the Cabinet. 
8. Concession Agreement Monitoring and Compliance
In this section, the Report Team observes that, in order to achieve full beneﬁt from the conces-
sion contracts it negotiates, the Government will have to monitor and ensure compliance with 
the terms of its concession agreements.  
Exactly how the Government should accomplish its monitoring and compliance efforts is a topic 
for a separate study.  However, the full Report offers a number of recommendations on how the 
Government might enhance its ability to monitor and ensure compliance with its concession 
agreements: 1) centralize concession resources in a single secretariat or bureau; 2) expand the 
mandate, authority, staff, resources and funding of the current Bureau of Concessions; 3) elevate 
the Bureau’s stature, position, and reporting structure; and 4) develop a concession contract 
process and legal framework that includes and supports the work of the Bureau.  
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The Report Team suggests that the Government combine its study on strengthening its ability 
to monitor and ensure compliance with the provisions of its concession agreements, with its 
work on bringing all its negotiation processes into line with best practices.  This will ensure that 
a comprehensive look is taken at Liberia’s entire concession contract process. Through such a 
study, the roles and functions of the Bureau of Concessions and the various ministerial commit-
tees and bid panels involved in the concession process would be examined in the context of 
amending the PPCA.  If formally requested, the Government’s international advisors, (e.g., RWI, 
UNDP and ISLP) are likely to provide expert technical support for such an effort.
9. Conclusion 
The full Report documents the negotiating practice the Government employed so successfully 
in the ArcelorMittal and Firestone negotiations.  Further, it provides analyses and recommenda-
tions for strengthening, institutionalizing and harmonizing the process the Government uses in 
concession negotiations.  Finally, the Report offers steps to strengthen the Government’s ability 
to monitor and seek compliance with the terms of its concession contracts.
The Report ﬁnds that the signiﬁcant gains achieved in Liberia’s recent re-negotiations of the 
ArcelorMittal and Firestone can be attributed to several factors: 1) Presidential leadership; 2) 
teamwork and the development of consensus on the Government’s negotiating teams aided by 
successful negotiating strategies; and 3) world-class technical assistance from the Government’s 
advisors.  
For the Government to ensure similar gains in ongoing and future concession negotiations, it 
will need to: 1) grow and scale its own capacity to manage and negotiate complex investment 
agreements; 2) have consultations with and input from non-government stakeholders affected 
by concession activity; and 3) promote transparency by making concession agreements more 
easily accessible to the public. 
To take advantage of its recent successes with the ArcelorMittal and Firestone negotiations, 
the Government should incorporate its best practices into policy by amending the PPCA. Such 
changes will not only institutionalize those practices but also ensure that a single concession 
negotiating process is followed by all Government Ministries and agencies.
Finally, the Report Team suggests that the Government consider strengthening its ability to 
monitor and seek compliance with the terms of its concession agreements by examining the 
over-all role the Bureau of Concessions should play in Liberia’s concession contract process. 
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Endnotes
1 See full Report for the List of Acronyms.
2 This Report refers to the Ministerial level committee created by the President to review 
the contracts in the ArcelorMittal and Firestone negotiations as the Inter-Ministerial 
Concession Committee (“IMCC”).  
3 This document is available at: http://www.emansion.gov.lr/doc/MittalAgreementFinalMit
rix.pdf. 





The Government of President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf faced extraordinary expectations, and enor-
mous security and economic challenges when it came into ofﬁce on January 16, 2006. The 
challenges the Government faced were a result of Liberia’s fourteen-year conﬂict which ended 
in 2003. 
The conﬂict, in a country of just over 3 million, resulted in the death of more than 300,000 people 
and injury to tens of thousands more.  Hundreds of thousands became refugees. Institutions of 
governance and justice were destroyed. Warlords used Liberia as a base from which to smuggle 
diamonds, trade arms, launder money for global terrorist groups, and support criminal activities 
that destabilized the country, the region, and beyond. 
In addition, Liberia’s commercial and productive activities ceased as warlords and their part-
ners looted and vandalized the country.  This led to a precipitous decline in incomes and a 
sharp increase in poverty.  Average income (in 2005 prices) declined from $1,269 in 1980 to 
$163 in 2005, a fall of 87 percent. Unemployment became the norm, further fueling insecurity. 
Government ﬁnances collapsed so far that total revenues amounted to just $80 million in 2005, 
translating into total public spending per capita of about US$25—one of the lowest levels in the 
world. Years of mismanagement had left Liberia with debts totaling US$3.7 billion, equivalent to 
an astonishing 3,000 percent of exports.
As a result of the conﬂict, when the Government came to power many roads were impassable, 
further undermining the country’s security and chances for economic revival.  There had been 
no electricity, piped water or telephone landlines in the country for more than 15 years. Of the 
325 health facilities operating before the war, about 95 percent were partially or wholly destroyed. 
There were only 50 Liberian physicians to cover the nation’s public health needs, about one per 
70,000 people. In 2006, about 70 percent of school buildings were partially or wholly destroyed 
by the war, and the majority of Liberian children and youth remained out of school (Government 
of Liberia).
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It is against this backdrop that President Sirleaf and her Government began their efforts to 
revitalize Liberia’s economy, secure the country’s peace, provide much-needed jobs, rebuild the 
country’s infrastructure and restore basic services.  As part of these efforts, President Sirleaf 
announced soon after taking ofﬁce that her Government would review all of the country’s conces-
sion agreements. 
Her announcement was supported by an agreement the National Transitional Government of 
Liberia (“NTGL”) signed in September 2005 with Liberia’s international partners and donors to, 
among other things, review all contracts signed by the NTGL between 2003 and 2006.  This agree-
ment, the Governance and Economic Management Assistance Program for Liberia (“GEMAP”), 
originated among Liberia’s international donors as a response to international concern at the 
mismanagement of public ﬁnances under the NTGL and the threat such mismanagement posed 
to the implementation of Liberia’s peace process.  Under GEMAP, the Mittal Steel Holdings N.V. 
(“ArcelorMittal”) and Firestone Natural Rubber Company LLC (“Firestone”) concession agree-
ments, signed in 2005 by the NTGL, were both subject to review by Liberia’s Public Procurement 
and Concessions Commission (“PPCC”). 
By mid-2006, given the slow start to the PPCC’s contract review and driven by a desire to respond 
quickly to the high expectations and immense needs of a post-conﬂict Liberia, the Government 
began a separate and independent fast track review of the ArcelorMittal and Firestone contracts, 
the country’s two largest concession agreements.  The fast track review and negotiating prac-
tice adopted by the Government resulted in amended agreements with both ArcelorMittal and 
Firestone that provided signiﬁcant gains for Liberia over the original concession agreements 
signed by the NTGL. 
The ArcelorMittal amended agreement had some 30 improvements over the original contract; 
the Firestone amendment had nearly 40 improvements.  These improvements covered gains in 
transfer pricing, taxes, duties, the agreement term, corporate governance, infrastructure owner-
ship, value-added manufacturing, sovereignty issues, environmental matters and, most impor-
tant, gains in social beneﬁts (e.g., housing, water and sanitation, education, requirements for 
Liberian employment and training, and community obligations beyond the concession area). 
Both amended agreements resulted in increased investment in Liberia and created additional 
jobs for the country.
The ArcelorMittal and Firestone amendments were accepted by the Liberian public, ratiﬁed by 
the National Legislature and have received the support of donor nations, the WorldBank/IMF 
and international civil society.  ArcelorMittal and Firestone have both expressed satisfaction with 
the outcome of the negotiation process and, following the signing of its amended agreement, the 
Chairman of ArcelorMittal increased the company’s investment in Liberia to $1.5 billion from 
$1.0 billion citing a renewed partnership with the Liberian Government.  The Government has 
widely cited the renegotiations of the ArcelorMittal and Firestone contracts as proof of investor 
conﬁdence that Liberia is “re-opened for business.” 
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 Introduction 
Liberia’s successful negotiations with ArcelorMittal and Firestone have also caught the attention 
of other African governments seeking to ensure that their nations maximize value from conces-
sion agreements covering their natural resources.  Many of these nations, evaluating the best 
approach to capture additional value from their concession agreements, are deciding whether 
to: 1) enact new legislation and/or implement new regulatory schemes; or, 2) re-negotiate their 
concession agreements on a case-by-case basis. Although shaped by unique facts and its develop-
ment objectives, Liberia’s success in renegotiating its two largest concession agreements offers 
useful insights to African Governments and a number of African countries (e.g., Guinea, Sierra 
Leone, and Tanzania) have expressed interest in learning more about Liberia’s concession nego-
tiation process.
The negotiating practice used in the ArcelorMittal and Firestone negotiations is generally under-
stood within the Government, but it has not been studied, and there is ambiguity among some 
in the Government of all of its requirements.  In order to develop a more consistently followed 
negotiating process driven by best practices, the Ofﬁce of the President, through the Liberian 
Reconstruction and Development Committee (“LRDC”), asked the Report Team headed by the 
Senior Legal Advisor, Ofﬁce of the President and funded by Revenue Watch Institute (“RWI”), to 
prepare a Report documenting and analyzing the practice the Government used to re-negotiate 
the ArcelorMittal and Firestone agreements. 
The Report provides recommendations for institutionalizing, harmonizing and strengthening 
the negotiating practice the Government employed in the ArcelorMittal and Firestone negotia-
tions.  Further, it offers recommendations to further the Government’s post-signature contract 
monitoring and compliance efforts. 
The Report Team gathered in Monrovia and, starting on May 17, 2008, began its meetings, both 
in and outside of Government, to further its understanding of these questions. Interviews were 
held with a wide range of ofﬁcials involved in the concession negotiation process including the 
President, the heads of all Ministries involved in concession agreements, the CEOs and other 
representatives of the companies involved in negotiations, technical advisors, and PPCC ofﬁ-
cials.  A complete list of all the persons the Report Team met is attached as Appendix I.  Attached 
as Appendix II is the Questionnaire the Team used in its interviews.
The Report Team sought to answer a number of questions in its work including:
1. What historical factors inﬂuenced the negotiating practice the Government used in the 
ArcelorMittal and Firestone negotiations?
2. How did the negotiating practice in ArcelorMittal and Firestone work? 
3. What made the negotiating practice used in ArcelorMittal and Firestone successful, and 
why? How can it be improved in future concession negotiations?
4. How is the practice used in the ArcelorMittal and Firestone negotiations different from 
the concession negotiation process under the PPCA?  How is it different from the practice 
currently used by the Ministries of Land, Mines and Energy and Agriculture? What should 
the Government do to harmonize existing differences?
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5. What steps should the Government take to strengthen its ability to monitor and ensure 
compliance with the terms of its concession agreements?
The Report attempts to answer these questions in the following manner:  Section 2 provides the 
historical background for the negotiating practice the Government used in the ArcelorMittal 
and Firestone negotiations.  Sections 3 and 4 describe the negotiations with ArcelorMittal and 
Firestone respectively, and their outcomes. Section 5 analyzes the factors that made the nego-
tiating practice used in the ArcelorMittal and Firestone negotiations successful and makes a 
number of recommendations for capturing and institutionalizing those factors.  Section 6 
examines the transparency and consultative nature of the ArcelorMittal and Firestone nego-
tiations and makes recommendations for improvements.  In Section 7, the practice used in 
the ArcelorMittal and Firestone negotiations is compared to the concession negotiation process 
under the PPCA.  In this Section, the current concession negotiating practice at the Ministry of 
Lands, Mines and Energy and the Ministry of Agriculture are reviewed and recommendations 
are made to harmonize the negotiating practice used in the ArcelorMittal and Firestone nego-
tiations with the PPCA.  Section 8 suggests steps the Government might take to strengthen its 
ability to monitor and ensure compliance with the terms of its concession agreements.  Section 




International support for the GEMAP review of contracts signed by the interim government 
helped secure ArcelorMittal and Firestone’s cooperation.  The GEMAP review occurred in 
parallel with the Government’s separate fast track review of the ArcelorMittal and Firestone 
agreements, and inﬂuenced the negotiating strategy the Government adopted.  This Section 
discusses the historical context for GEMAP and the contract review process it mandated.  Section 
2 also explores how the Government’s negotiating practice and success in the negotiations with 
ArcelorMittal and Firestone were assisted by GEMAP.
2.2 Liberia’s Review of Contracts Signed by the 
 National Transitional Government of Liberia under GEMAP
GEMAP has its roots in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (“CPA”) that Liberia’s warring 
factions signed in Accra on August 18, 2003, with the urging and support of Liberia’s interna-
tional partners.  Among its provisions, the Peace Agreement created the Contract and Monopolies 
Commission (“CMC”) to “...ensure that all public ﬁnancial and budgetary commitments entered 
into by the National Transitional Government of Liberia (“NTGL”) [were] transparent, non-monopo-
listic and in accordance with the laws of Liberia and internationally accepted norms of commercial 
practice.”  Liberia’s international partners and Liberian civil society called for the creation of 
the Commission to stem the endemic corruption and lack of ﬁnancial control that existed in 
Liberia’s public procurement and contracting pre-NTGL.
The effectiveness of the Contract and Monopolies Commission was limited however by delays in 
adopting a regulatory framework for its operations. Concerned that the CMC had failed and that 
corruption and mismanagement of public ﬁnance continued unabated under the NTGL, Liberia’s 
international partners began discussions with the NTGL on GEMAP1.  In September 2005, the 
NTGL and the United Nations; World Bank; European Union; International Monetary Fund; 
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Governments of Ghana, Nigeria, and the United States; Economic Community of West African 
States; and the African Union (“Liberia’s International Partners”) signed GEMAP.  Among other 
things, GEMAP mandated the review of all contracts and concessions entered into by the NTGL 
(i.e., contracts and concessions entered into between October 14, 2003 and January 16, 2006).
Concurrent with the signing of GEMAP, Liberia’s National Transitional Legislative Assembly 
enacted the Public Procurement and Concessions Act (“PPCA”) on September 8, 2005. Under 
its provisions, the CMC ceased to exist on the inauguration of Liberia’s democratically elected 
government. 
When President Sirleaf assumed ofﬁce on January 16, 2006 she pledged that her Government 
would support the international community’s call for a review of NTGL contracts and conces-
sions under GEMAP.  In May 2006, the Government and its international partners ﬁnalized a 
Guiding Framework for the Review of NTGL Contracts and Concessions (“Framework”) under 
the auspices of GEMAP.  The Framework (see Appendix III) called for the Government to 
convene a Contracts and Concessions Review Committee (“CCRC”) with the mandate to review 
all NTGL contracts and concessions. 
The Contracts and Concessions Review Committee was to report ﬁndings to the GEMAP Technical 
Committee (“GEMAP–TS”) and ﬁnally to the Economic Governance Steering Committee 
(“EGSC”) headed by President Sirleaf.  The EGSC and the GEMAP–TS were made up of repre-
sentatives from the Government, Liberia’s International Partners and civil society.  To support the 
contract review process and conduct its procurement reform work, the Public Procurement and 
Concessions Commission (“PPCC”), the successor to the now defunct Contract and Monopolies 
Commission, received a $1.5 million grant from the World Bank.
The President appointed the Chairman of the PPCC as Chair of the CCRC.  Other members of 
the CCRC were representatives from the Ministry of Justice, Liberia National Bar Association, 
Liberia Chamber of Commerce and an internationally recruited contracts and concessions expert 
who also served as the team lead for the CCRC Technical Secretariat (“CCRC–TS”).
The CCRC–TS was responsible for the actual review of NTGL contracts and concessions and at 
various times included four international lawyers funded by the World Bank, USAID and the 
United Nations, and for four months a Liberian lawyer funded by USAID.  The CCRC–TS also 
received pro-bono legal support from the International Senior Lawyers Project (“ISLP”) and six 
law students from Columbia Law School in New York.  It had a number of industry experts at 
various times and, in addition to the team lead, had a full-time staff of three.  The CCRC–TS staff 
was paid competitive salaries in order to attract quality candidates. 
The CCRC–TS began its work on June 25, 2006.  The public was notiﬁed of the CCRC’s mandate 
to review contracts signed by the NTGL, and efforts were made through the local media and 
Internet to solicit contractors and concession holders to bring forward their contracts for review. 
In the end, 105 NTGL contracts and concessions were identiﬁed, and of those the CCRC–TS 
reviewed 95 agreements.  Seven agreements had no written contracts and 3 telecommunications 




The CCRC used the following criteria to determine the validity of contracts: 1) contract award 
(e.g. Is the contracting company a bona ﬁde legal entity?  Was there an open, advertised tender?); 
2) contract technical consideration (e.g., Is the contract clear in the terms and obligations of the 
parties?  Are there penalty and performance clauses?); 3) contract performance (e.g., Did both 
parties perform their obligations under the contract?); and, 4) contract economic evaluation 
(e.g., Did Liberia get a fair value on the contract?  Is the contract term appropriate, considering 
local circumstances?).3 
Of the 95 contracts the CCRC–TS reviewed, 52 agreements were accepted, 36 were recommended 
for cancellation4 and 14 were recommended for renegotiation.  The 14 contracts recommended 
for renegotiation included 5 oil contracts and the ArcelorMittal and Firestone agreements5. 
Renegotiations of the ArcelorMittal and Firestone agreements have been completed and the 5 oil 
contracts have either been renegotiated or are being renegotiated by the National Oil Company 
of Liberia.  The status of the other 8 contracts sent to the Ministry of Justice for renegotiation 
could not be ascertained at the time of the writing of this Report.
The CCRC–TS completed its work on December 22, 2006, and with the submission of a ﬁnal 
report to the EGSC, the Contracts and Concessions Review Committee was dissolved. 
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with urging and support of Liberia’s 
international partners to ensure 
NTGL ﬁnancial practices: transparent, 
non-monopolistic, lawful and 
internationally accepted no 
implementing regulations or 
procedures provided
August 18, 2003
Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed in Accra




NTGL comes into ofﬁce Introduced in response to international 
community’s concern over NTGL’s 
mismanagement of public ﬁnances; 
requires international expert authority 
and control Mandated review of NTGL 













& Procedures (“IPPP”) 
issued
Makes IPPP and IGCAL null and void 
Creates Public Procurement and 
Contracts Commission
September 8, 2005
Public Procurement and Concessions 
Act enacted by National Transitional 
Legislative Assembly
Implemented 




Interim Guidelines for 
Concession Agreements 
in Liberia established 
(“IGCAL”) 
PPCA and PPCC become effective
CMC ceases to exist
World Bank grants PPCC $1.5 million in operational funding
January 16, 2006
President Sirleaf assumes leadership of 
democratically elected government
Chart 1
Timeline of the Agreements and Committees that Led to the Review of Contracts 
Signed by the NTGL
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 Background 
Ad-hoc committee under PPCC authorized to review all NTGL contracts and 
concessions 
Findings reported to GEMAP’s Technical Committee and  Economic Governance 
Steering Committee
President appoints Contracts and Concessions 
Review Committee
CCRC membership from MOJ, Liberian National Bar Association, Liberia 
Chamber of Commerce; also includes international contracts & concessions 
expert funded by EU
President appoints Chair of PPCC
as Chair of CCRC
Led by EU funded international contracts & concession expert
Includes international and Liberian lawyers funded by USAID/United Nations, 
and industry experts
Receives pro-bono legal support from ISLP experts and Columbia Law School 
students
June 25, 2006
CCRC’s Technical Secretariat begins to review
NTGL contracts and concessions
105 NTGL agreements identiﬁed, 95 reviewed, 52 accepted, 36 recommended for 





Ten changes recommended to CCRC–TS Team Leader report
EGSC dissolves CCRC after work completed
March 11, 2007
Other CCRC members submit their comments 
to his report
Produced within GEMAP’s international community
May 2006
“Guiding Framework for the Review of NTGL
Contracts and Concessions” ﬁnalized
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2.3 The GEMAP Contract Review Process and the Government’s 
 Negotiations with ArcelorMittal and Firestone 
In June 2006, with the GEMAP-mandated contract review process still in its early stages, the 
President decided to speed up the review and renegotiation of the ArcelorMittal and Firestone 
contracts in order to meet critical timelines of her Government’s poverty reduction and economic 
recovery program. The Government launched a separate and independent “fast track” contract 
review and negotiating process concurrent with the CCRC review. Unlike the CCRC review 
process under GEMAP, the fast track process involved only Government ofﬁcials and their tech-
nical advisors. It did not ofﬁcially include Liberia’s international partners or members of civil 
society.  The fast track process was led by Government Ministers and took place in parallel 
with the separate GEMAP-mandated CCRC review of the ArcelorMittal and Firestone agree-
ments and other contracts. The fast track process was spearheaded by an Inter-Ministerial 
Concession Committee (“IMCC”)6 and negotiating team reporting directly to the President and 
her Cabinet.
The CCRC process was slowed by several factors. It was subject to political pressures brought 
on by the differing agendas of each of Liberia’s International Partners, civil society and the 
Government.  The many layers of review (i.e., CCRC–TS, CCRC, PPCC, GEMAP–TC and EGSC) 
and wide range of players involved (i.e., Liberia’s International Partners, civil society and the 
Government) slowed the process.  Funding, teamwork and consensus-building for the GEMAP- 
mandated CCRC process proved challenging and contributed to the slower pace.  Although the 
CCRC process was initiated in September 2005 with the mandate to review NTGL contracts, 
actual review of contracts began in earnest only in June of 2006 due to funding and coordina-
tion constraints.  Once the CCRC review process began it took 9 months to complete; there 
were 6 months of ﬁeldwork consisting of interim reports to the GEMAP–TC and EGSC, and 
3 months to produce all ﬁnal reports.  The last report from the CCRC was delivered in March 
2007—months after the Government had already ﬁnalized an amended concession agreement 
with ArcelorMittal. 
The CCRC process did, however, yield consensus among its participants on the need for the 
Government to renegotiate the ArcelorMittal and Firestone contracts.  This consensus was impor-
tant because it lent international credibility to the Government’s decision to move forward with 
its fast track review and renegotiation of the ArcelorMittal and Firestone agreements, and made 
the process more palatable to investors.  The larger community’s role in the CCRC process lent 
an air of transparency and freedom from bias to the Government’s decision to conduct an inde-
pendent fast track review and renegotiation of the ArcelorMittal and Firestone contracts. 
In conclusion, it is important to note that the Government’s review of contracts signed by the 
NTGL was not primarily driven by an attempt to beneﬁt from windfall proﬁts received by inves-
tors from record high global prices for natural commodities derived from Liberia.  Instead the 
CCRC’s review of NTGL contracts was largely driven by Government and international concern 
at the mismanagement of public ﬁnances under the NTGL.  The Government’s fast track review 
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 Background 
of the ArcelorMittal and Firestone contracts sought to address concerns over the mismanage-
ment of public ﬁnances under the NTGL, but was primarily driven by the urgency to address the 
pressing social and economic needs of Liberia’s post-conﬂict society. 
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3. The ArcelorMittal Negotiations
3.1 Background
The Government’s decision in early 2006 to review and renegotiate the ArcelorMittal conces-
sion was risky.  The company operating then as Mittal Steel Holdings NV had less than a year 
earlier—on August 17, 2005—signed a Mineral Development Agreement (“MDA”) with the 
NTGL for the exclusive right and license to explore, develop, produce and market iron ore and 
associated minerals in the concession area formerly granted to the Liberia American-Swedish 
Minerals Company (“LAMCO”) in a concessions agreement dating back to 1960.  Under the 
MDA, ArcelorMittal took ownership of and committed to rehabilitating Liberia’s largest railroad 
and iron ore port, neither of which were functional following signiﬁcant damage suffered during 
Liberia’s civil conﬂict. 
The ArcelorMittal MDA was the ﬁrst signiﬁcant foreign investment in Liberia in more than 
20 years.  In a post-conﬂict country with more than 80% unemployment, few basic services 
and infrastructure that was almost all destroyed or damaged by war, ArcelorMittal’s promise of 
almost $900 million in new investment signiﬁed hope for a better future and was badly needed. 
Given the looming needs of a restless war-torn and overwhelmingly young population, there 
was signiﬁcant pressure on the newly elected Government headed by Liberia’s ﬁrst truly demo-
cratically elected President, who also happened to be a woman, not to stand in the way or delay 
the start of the project with the review of the MDA.  Nevertheless, the Government decided to 
move forward with review of the MDA.  The Government believed that given the 25-year term of 
the MDA and the economic importance of the ArcelorMittal contract to Liberia’s future, it was 
important to review the contract.
In March 2006, the Government of President Sirleaf requested that ArcelorMittal cease its 
operations in Liberia to provide the newly elected Government time to prepare for the review 
and renegotiation of the MDA.  The Government team began its work with a strong sense that 
they had to get these negotiations right because so much for Liberia was riding on their perfor-
mance.  Adding to their sense of urgency was the domestic and international media coverage 
that surrounded the Government’s decision to review the ArcelorMittal MDA.  The international 
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donor and civil society communities largely supported the Government’s decision to review the 
ArcelorMittal MDA, but there were signiﬁcant questions about whether the newly elected and 
untested Government would be up to the task.  
Included below, as Table 1, is a timeline of events in the Government’s review of the ArcelorMittal 
MDA.
Table 1
Timeline of Events in the ArcelorMittal Negotiation Process
Date Event Context and Critical Outcomes
August 17, 2005 Mineral Development 
Agreement signed with NTGL
Earned exclusive right and license to explore, develop, 
produce, and market iron ore from former LAMCO 
concession area
March 2006 GOL requests cessation 
of operations
June 2006 CCRC begins to staff up to 
conduct GEMAP sponsored 
review of NTGL signed 
contracts
President convenes IMCC 
committee to fast track review 
process
IMCC composition and MLME chairmanship
ISLP technical input and support
August 2006 IMCC submits report to 
President who selects a 
negotiation team 
Negotiating team composition, MLME chairmanship
ISLP technical input and support
Negotiation strategy further developed and reﬁned
August 22, 2006 Initial meeting held in 
Monrovia between GOL and 
ArcelorMittal
Based on discussion points developed by Government 
negotiating team
Stage set for the ﬁrst round of negotiations in NYC
Input from ISLP advisors and legal team including 
Cravath
August 28, 2006 Final CCRC report submitted Recommended that instead of canceling, 
GOL re-negotiate the agreement 
CCRC points were all covered in some form in the Draft 
Term Sheet developed by the negotiating team and its 
technical advisors
Early-September President provides the 
negotiating team with 
4 guiding principles for 
negotiation
Negotiating team and its 
technical advisors meet 
in NYC to prepare for 
ArcelorMittal meetings
Term Sheet ﬁnalized and sent to ArcelorMittal in advance 
of the parties’ meeting
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Date Event Context and Critical Outcomes
September 12–15, 
2006
1st round negotiation meetings 
held in NYC between 
GOL & ArcelorMittal 
Initial discussion between the parties focus on the 
validity of the 2005 ArcelorMittal MDA
Government’s Draft Term Sheet used to guide 
negotiations
ISLP technical advice and input provided to Government 
negotiating team




2nd round negotiation 
meetings held in NYC 
Infrastructure issues resolved
Ownership of port/railroad transferred back to GOL
Fiscal, corporate governance and sovereignty matters 
discussed
MDA mark-up produced from Draft Term Sheet
2nd Conﬁdential Non-Binding Protocol of Discussions 
signed




Final round of negotiation 
meetings held in NYC
Both parties motivated to conclude discussions
Final agreement reached on all issues raised in 
connection with Government’s review of the 2005 
ArcelorMittal MDA




Parties meet in Monrovia
President & ArcelorMittal 
Chairman intervene to close 
gap on issue of withholding 
tax provisions 
Finalized Amended MDA appendices
ArcelorMittal raises issue of withholding tax provisions; 
input sought from Government’s technical advisors
Withholding tax issue settled
December 28, 2006 Amended ArcelorMittal MDA 
signed by both parties
Signed the amended MDA
April 27, 2007 Agreement ratiﬁed by both 
the House and Senate and 
subsequently signed by the 
President. 
3.2 Contract Review
With the CCRC review process in its early stages, the President decided that it was in Liberia’s 
national interest to fast track the review and renegotiation of the ArcelorMittal and Firestone 
contracts in order to meet critical deadlines of her Government’s economic recovery program. 
The Government’s preparation for review of the ArcelorMittal MDA began in earnest in June 
2006 when the President convened an IMCC to review the agreement separately from the 
ongoing but slower-moving CCRC review process.  The President appointed the Minister of 
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Lands Mines and Energy as chair of the IMCC.  In addition to the Ministry of Lands Mines 
and Energy (“MLME”), the IMCC had representatives from the Ministry of Finance (“MOF”), 
Ministry of Justice (“MOJ”), Ministry of State, Financial, Legal and Economic Affairs (“MOS”), 
Ministry of Planning & Economic Affairs (“MPEA”), Ministry of Commerce, LRDC, and the 
National Investment Commission (“NIC”).
The IMCC was tasked with conducting the review of the ArcelorMittal MDA and preparing a 
report for the President recommending changes they viewed as necessary to the contract.  The 
IMCC was assisted in its work by reports prepared by Professor Bob Hillman, Professor Lou 
Wells and Joe Bell of the International Senior Lawyers Project at the request of the President.  In 
addition to the ISLP report that outlined the Government’s options if it chose to renegotiate the 
ArcelorMittal MDA, the IMCC also had access to an earlier report on the MDA prepared by the 
Columbia Law School.
During its review the IMCC received technical assistance from a number of advisors both inside 
and outside the Government.  Unlike the CCRC review process, there was no formal mechanism 
for including the views of non-governmental stakeholders. Largely due to the accessibility of the 
President, the Government, however, did engage in informal consultations with non-government 
actors during the IMCC contract review process.  
By the ﬁrst week of August 2006, the IMCC had delivered its report on the MDA to the President. 
While the report was not speciﬁcally marked conﬁdential, it was not viewed as a public document 
but as a negotiation tool setting out the Government’s concerns with the MDA.  As such, circula-
tion of the IMCC report was primarily limited to the IMCC and its advisors on a need-to-know 
basis to preserve the Government’s negotiating leverage and Liberia’s national interest.  
On August 28, 2006 the CCRC delivered its report on the MDA. The CCRC report supported the 
Government’s decision to renegotiate the ArcelorMittal MDA and concluded, among other things, 
that the contract ArcelorMittal signed with the NTGL did not conform to prevailing Liberian law 
at the time of its execution and was not in the best interest of Liberia.  The report recommended 
that the Government consider renegotiating the agreement instead of canceling it—as cancella-
tion would likely lead to lengthy and costly arbitration.
3.3 Selecting the Negotiating Team
With the CCRC report in hand and the IMCC contract review completed, the President named the 
Government’s team for negotiations with ArcelorMittal.7  The negotiating team and its technical 
advisors used the month of August to build consensus, and develop and reﬁne the Government’s 
negotiating strategy.  The team’s work was guided by priorities set by the President based on the 
IMCC report.  These priorities were:
1. the rail and port are part of Liberia’s national strategic interest and Government must 
retain ownership of these assets;
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2. to the extent possible, the new contract must reﬂect the principle of general applicability of 
Liberian law, especially in ﬁscal and environmental matters; 
3. the revised contract should not encroach on the sovereignty of Liberia (e.g., with respect to 
stabilization, etc.); and
4. where possible, the team should seek to maximize near term revenue to the Government.
3.4 Negotiating Strategy 
As the Government team prepared for its initial negotiation session with ArcelorMittal, there 
was signiﬁcant discussion within the team and among its advisors on how to respond to 
ArcelorMittal’s claim that the company’s agreement with the NTGL was valid.  Members of the 
team and its advisors differed on how aggressive the Government should be in seeking changes 
to the ArcelorMittal MDA.  They feared that if the Government pushed too hard or appeared 
unreasonable in its demands, ArcelorMittal would choose to arbitrate instead of negotiate.  One 
issue of considerable debate between members of the team was the Government’s desire, using 
ArcelorMittal’s own data, to argue that the company’s valuation of the project was too low and to 
seek an upfront payment from ArcelorMittal in order to maintain the 70/30 equity split between 
the company and the Government. In the end, the President asked the negotiating team and 
its advisors to ﬁnd a way to challenge the project’s valuation or some other way to maximize 
the Government’s near term revenue.  She added a caveat that any upfront payment to the 
Government from ArcelorMittal could not be structured as a loan or pre-payment of taxes.
An initial draft Term Sheet8 was prepared by Cravath on August 4, 2006, and formed the 
basis for Talking Points9 for the initial meeting between the Government and ArcelorMittal in 
Monrovia on August 22, 2006.  This meeting was an introductory meeting that set the stage for 
the ﬁrst round of negotiations.  During the meeting in Monrovia, the Government presented 
its positions on its need to retain ownership of the railroad and port infrastructure, the general 
applicability of Liberian law to the MDA, and Liberian sovereignty to be restored by limiting the 
stabilization of Liberian laws under the MDA.  
The parties agreed to meet in New York in September to begin substantive negotiations.  The 
Government promised to provide ArcelorMittal a draft Term Sheet to guide the parties’ discus-
sion in New York.  Two factors drove the Government’s choice of New York as the venue for 
the ArcelorMittal negotiations: 1) they felt that the negotiating team would contend with fewer 
interruptions in New York and so negotiations would be more efﬁcient; and, 2) the Government’s 
advisors, primarily the legal team from Cravath, was only available in New York.  
Having the discussions in New York also increased the Government’s chances of maintaining 
conﬁdentiality around the negotiations.  The Government and its technical advisors felt that 
strict conﬁdentiality at this stage of the process was absolutely necessary if Liberia was to succeed 
in its bid to renegotiate the MDA.  Everyone acknowledged that negotiations conducted through 
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the press would make it harder if not impossible for the Government to reach agreement with 
ArcelorMittal.
In the ﬁrst week of September, the Government’s negotiating team and its advisors met in New 
York to ﬁnalize the draft Term Sheet and the Government’s negotiating strategy.  A decision was 
reached on the approach to seeking an upfront payment from ArcelorMittal to maximize much-
needed short-term revenue to the Government; this approach was included in the draft Term 
Sheet.  
The Government and its advisors also decided to force the conversation on all Term Sheet issues 
to be between the Government’s lead negotiator and ArcelorMittal’s business representatives. 
Even when ArcelorMittal’s lawyers asked a question, the Government’s response was to be 
directed to the company’s business people. This was done to allow the parties to reach broad 
understanding necessary to complete an amended contract, and not get bogged down in tech-
nical legal issues. This strategy worked very well because ArcelorMittal had a strong and expe-
rienced business team that did not simply defer to the company’s lawyers.  Using this strategy 
allowed the Government representatives and the ArcelorMittal business people to develop a 
rapport that led to breakthroughs on a number of difﬁcult issues.
At the end of its internal meetings in New York between the negotiating team and its advisors, a 
ﬁnal Draft Term Sheet was sent to ArcelorMittal and the initial round of substantive negotiations 
was set for September 12 to 15, 2006. 
The draft Term Sheet deliberately did not prioritize certain issues over others.  Instead the 
Government and its advisors chose to present all of the Government’s issues on ﬁscal, infra-
structure, social and environmental matters in the sequence that they appeared in the MDA. 
Negotiating dynamics determined the order in which to tackle issues raised by the Term Sheet. 
This order was not ﬁxed and was revised by mutual agreement of the parties as dictated by the 
progress of the negotiations.  For example, the ﬁrst signiﬁcant Term Sheet issue the parties tried 
to resolve was the issue of ownership of the port and railroad even though it was not the ﬁrst 
issue listed in the Term Sheet. 
Consensus-building within the negotiating team was an important negotiation strategy used 
by the Government’s team.  To accomplish this, the negotiating team agreed that none of its 
members would speak during the negotiation sessions without ﬁrst obtaining permission from 
the person serving as Chairman of the team for that session.  When it became clear during a 
negotiation session that there might be differing views on the appropriate Government response, 
the Chairman of the negotiating team requested a break and the Government team retreated to 
a separate room to sort out its position. 
As the team worked to build consensus, there were frequent and sometimes heated discussions 
about the right approach to reaching compromise with ArcelorMittal on key issues like transfer 
pricing and the appropriate debt to equity ratio for ArcelorMittal’s Liberia entity.  The negotiating 
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team’s discussions were aided by input from its technical advisors.  For example, with the assis-
tance of Prof. Lou Wells and the ISLP, a technical expert on iron-ore pricing, Michael Locker, of 
Locker Associates, was added to the Government’s team to assist in evaluating and countering 
ArcelorMittal’s transfer pricing proposals.  Eventually a decision was reached that all members 
of the team felt they could support.  At that point, the team returned to the negotiations with 
ArcelorMittal.
Escalation was also used effectively by the Government’s negotiating team to break through dead-
lock.  The discussion between the parties on the appropriate debt-equity ratio for the company’s 
Liberian subsidiary was an issue that both parties had to escalate to their ﬁnal decision-makers 
to reach agreement.  The Government team also escalated issues related to the ownership of the 
railroad and port infrastructure and transfer pricing to the President for her advice. For example, 
after a conference call with the President, the parties were able to reach agreement on language 
that ensured transfer pricing between the company’s afﬁliates would be on an arms-length fair 
market value basis under international standards with due consideration given to product cost. 
The parties agreed to meet at a later date, but prior to the company’s ﬁrst shipment of product 
from Liberia, to work out the precise formula for calculating transfer pricing.  Under the 2005 
MDA signed by the NTGL, transfer pricing used to calculate royalty payments to the Government 
was based only on ArcelorMittal’s invoice price to its afﬁliates. 
3.5 Negotiation Rounds
There were three negotiation rounds between the Government’s team and ArcelorMittal in New 
York.  A ﬁnal round of negotiations was held in Monrovia at the end of December. 
The ﬁrst two days of the initial round of negotiations in September were spent on discussions 
related to the validity of the 2005 ArcelorMittal MDA.  The company wanted the Government to 
agree that it had a valid contract. The Government insisted that the parties did not have to address 
the question of contract validity to review the MDA and discuss the Term Sheet.  In the end the 
company agreed to begin discussions on the Term Sheet after the Government acknowledged 
that such discussions would not be construed as a concession by ArcelorMittal on its position 
regarding the validity of the 2005 MDA.  
After this breakthrough, some progress was made with the issues raised by the Government in 
the Term Sheet.  The meeting ended on September 15 with the signing of a conﬁdential Non-
Binding Protocol of Discussions10 and an agreement to meet the following month of October. 
The next round of negotiations was held in New York October 12 to 15, 2006.  The negotiations 
resolved the parties’ issues over infrastructure and agreement was reached to transfer ownership 
of the port and railroad back to the Government under a revised MDA.  During the October meet-
ings, there was also signiﬁcant discussion between the parties on ﬁscal (e.g., taxation, duties, royalty 
and transfer pricing), corporate governance and sovereignty matters.  The meeting ended with 
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agreement between the parties that the discussions had progressed far enough to turn the Term 
Sheet into a mark-up of the MDA.  A second conﬁdential Non-Binding Protocol of Discussions 
was signed that called for the Government to respond to a draft Amended MDA prepared by 
ArcelorMittal.  The next and proposed ﬁnal round of negotiations was set for December 2006.
Throughout November the parties exchanged comments on the draft amendments to the MDA. 
The ﬁnal meeting in New York was held December 2 to 8, 2006, with both parties highly moti-
vated to conclude the discussions.
On December 8, 2006, the parties signed a ﬁnal conﬁdential Non-Binding Protocol, which 
provided that the draft amendment to the MDA attached to the Protocol reﬂected the ﬁnal agree-
ment between the parties on all issues in the Government’s review of the MDA.  The two sides 
agreed to meet in Monrovia on December 18, 2006 to ﬁnalize the applicable tables for rates asso-
ciated with ArcelorMittal’s custom and duty obligations and to sign the amended MDA.
The parties met in Monrovia to ﬁnalize appendices to the Agreement.  That was quickly done 
but then ArcelorMittal raised a concern about “double taxation” under the draft amendment to 
the MDA.  After the Government proposed a solution, the ArcelorMittal team clariﬁed that its 
real concern was the withholding tax provisions on contractors and consultants in the proposed 
draft MDA amendment.  The Liberian team was taken aback.  They saw this as an attempt by the 
company to re-open what had already been agreed to in New York and expand its tax carve-outs 
and exemptions.  ArcelorMittal saw this as a necessary clariﬁcation of a point that was not fully 
addressed in New York.  Under the 2005 MDA, all payments otherwise due the Government 
under Liberia’s Revenue Code (Act of 2000) for withholding taxes on contractors/consultants and 
interest were clearly waived in Article XXV Section 5 of the agreement.  In the draft amendment 
this provision was deleted and replaced by a provision that made ArcelorMittal subject to Liberia’s 
Revenue Code (Act of 2000) unless otherwise set forth in the Agreement.  The Revenue Code 
(Act of 2000) imposes on payments to non-resident contractors and consultants a 20 percent 
withholding tax and a 15 percent withholding tax on payments on interest.
On December 23, 2006, ArcelorMittal’s Chairman, Lakshmi Mittal, sent the President an e-mail 
to try and close a growing gap on the withholding tax provisions between the company and the 
Government.  After direct discussion between the President and Mittal’s Chairman and advice 
from the Government’s technical advisors, the parties ﬁnally settled the withholding tax matter 
by agreeing that for a period of 10 years from the amended MDA’s effective date, payments by 
ArcelorMittal to non-residents and residents (afﬁliated or unafﬁliated) would be subject to a 6 
percent withholding tax for payments to contractors/consultants and a 9 percent withholding tax 
for payments on interest. 
The Amended ArcelorMittal MDA was signed by both parties on December 28, 2006. The 
Government subsequently submitted the Agreement to the Legislature. It was ratiﬁed by both 
the House and Senate on April 27, 2007 and subsequently signed by the President. 
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3.6 Ratification Process
As part of the ratiﬁcation process, the Amended MDA was printed into handbills and made a 
public document.  The amended contract was presented to the National Legislature by the nego-
tiating team in a public hearing that was broadcast on live radio.  At the hearing, the Legislature 
heard from a wide range of stakeholders including company representatives and civil society.  The 
Amended MDA was also the subject of signiﬁcant domestic and international media coverage. 
After several months of debate, the National Legislature ratiﬁed the Amended MDA. 
While the Agreement is public, it is not easily accessible. However a Summary of the Main 
Changes Brought About by the Review of the Mittal Mineral Development Agreement is posted 
on the Executive Mansion’s website and highlights the gains the Government made in the 
Amended MDA over the 2005 MDA11.
3.7 The Gains
In addition to the gains in infrastructure ownership, transfer pricing, the debt to equity ratio 
and withholding taxes, the Mittal Summary of Changes document highlights the Government’s 
gains in: 
• the royalty calculation: FOB Buchanan (port) instead of FOB Yekepa (minehead); 
• income taxation: removal of the tax holiday under the 2005 MDA; 
• import duties: imposition of a seven year limit on the 50% reduction in import taxes on 
gasoline and diesel and the removal of the exemption of ECOWAS Fees; 
• corporate governance: the Amended MDA gives the government representation on the 
Liberian concession company’s board equivalent to the Government’s equity ownership, 
requires ArcelorMittal to conduct all activities with its afﬁliates on an arm’s-length basis, 
and provides a guarantee from ArcelorMittal’s parent company on the adequacy of its 
Liberian company’s start-up capitalization and its ability to meet its payment and environ-
mental obligations; 
• upfront payment to the Government of $15 million; 
• sovereignty: under the Amended MDA Liberian law instead of UK law applies to the 
Agreement and stabilization is limited to laws related to taxes and duties; 
• social beneﬁts: under the Amended MDA there are speciﬁc targets for the Liberianization 
of the work force, an increase in scholarship funds from $50,000 to $200,000 per year 
to provide overseas training for Liberians, and a commitment from the company that its 
security forces will comply with law and the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human 
Rights; and,
• environmental protections: ArcelorMittal now required to conduct annual environmental 
audit and assessment.
The complete Mittal Summary of Changes document is attached as Appendix IV.
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4. The Firestone (Firestone 
 Liberia, Inc.) Negotiations
4.1 Background 
On April 12, 2005 the NTGL signed a new Concession Agreement with the Firestone Natural 
Rubber Company, LLC, an afﬁliate of Bridgestone Firestone North American Tire, LLC.  The 
Sirleaf Government’s decision to review this 2005 Concession Agreement presented different 
challenges from its decision to review the ArcelorMittal contract. 
Unlike ArcelorMittal, Firestone was an ongoing and fully operational concern with nearly 80 
years of doing business in Liberia.  It was not a new investor, like ArcelorMittal, motivated to 
reach agreement to lock-up a much sought- after natural resource in light of rising commodity 
prices on the world market.  The Government recognized that, even with international support 
for its decision to review the 2005 Concession Agreement, Firestone had little incentive to agree 
to signiﬁcant changes to the contract, especially changes that would cost the company money and 
eat into its proﬁts. 
Many observers believed that the 2005 Concession Agreement signed between the NTGL and 
Firestone was far more favorable to the company than its previous contract, signed on August 
28, 1976. The 2005 Concession Agreement further limited the applicability of Liberian law to 
Firestone.  It granted Firestone a reduction of the export sales tax to 1 percent; a reduction of the 
turnover tax from 2 to 1 percent; an exemption from goods and services tax; a reduction in non-
resident dividend withholding tax from 15 to 10 percent; eliminated the ECOWAS tax; provided 
custom duty exemptions for select items and reduced the corporate income tax rate to 25 percent 
from the 35 percent required by law.  The 2005 Concession Agreement had a broad stabiliza-
tion provision exempting Firestone from most changes to Liberian law during the term of the 
contract and provided for a potential term of 86 years.  Firestone and the NTGL defended these 
changes as necessary to justify the signiﬁcant additional investment the company would need to 
make to repair or replace assets lost, damaged or destroyed during Liberia’s civil conﬂict, and to 
restore the concession’s productive capacity to pre-1990 levels.
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Adding to the challenges the Government faced in its decision to review the 2005 Concession 
Agreement was the fact that, next to the Government, Firestone is Liberia’s largest employer 
providing nearly 4000 jobs—employment critical to maintaining peace and stability in the post-
conﬂict country.  In addition, Firestone was also a signiﬁcant source of tax revenue for the cash-
strapped Government.
The Government also faced the challenge of managing public expectations that Firestone should, 
at this point in Liberia’s history, be prepared to do more than it had committed to doing under the 
2005 Concession Agreement, especially after 80 years of very proﬁtable operations in Liberia.  
Firestone, on the other hand, seemed to come to the negotiations with low expectations for 
achieving agreement based on their experience in dealing with Liberian governments over the 
last 20 years.  Early on the Firestone team expressed concern that these negotiations were another 
attempt by a Liberian government to demand Firestone “do more” when similar demands would 
not be made of the company’s competitors.  There was also a sense on the Firestone team that 
the company was a visible and convenient scapegoat for Liberian politicians and activists to 
explain the suffering of Liberian workers, which the company felt had largely been caused by the 
country’s civil war.  The company’s team referred to the lawsuits ﬁled in the U.S. accusing the 
company of maintaining “slave-like” living and working conditions for its employees as exam-
ples of unfair attacks on Firestone.  These were the views that set the stage for the Government’s 
review of the 2005 Concession Agreement with Firestone.
Included below, as Table 2, is a timeline of events in the Government’s review of the Firestone 
2005 Concession Agreement. 
Table 2
Timeline of Events in the Firestone Negotiation Process
Date Event Context and Critical Outcomes
April 12, 2005 NTGL signs Concession 
Agreement with Firestone Natural 
Rubber Company
Revised 1976 Agreement
Further reversed the general applicability of 
Liberian law to Firestone
Mid-2006 President convened an IMCC 
to review the 2005 Concession 
Agreement and IMCC submits 
report to President
DATE CCRC submits report on Firestone 
Contract 
Recommended that the Government 
re-negotiate the 2005 Concession Agreement
January 2007 President names the Firestone 
negotiating team and provides 
4 guiding principles
Negotiating team and its advisors 
begin preparation for negotiation 
meetings with Firestone
Negotiating team composition, MOA 
chairmanship
ISLP technical input and support
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Date Event Context and Critical Outcomes
January 5, 2007 ISLP prepares draft Summary of 
Principal Terms for negotiating 
team’s review
February 9-10, 2007 Negotiating team meets with 
technical advisors in Washington, 
D.C.
Summary of Principal Terms ﬁnalized and 
sent to Firestone
Government’s positions for proposed 
changes to contract laid out with supporting 
data
February 12 & 18-20, 2007 1st round of negotiations held in 
Washington, D.C.
Initially, very little agreement between 
respective positions 
Input from Government’s rubber ﬁnancial 
expert
Information exchanged regarding ﬁnancial 
model with Non-Disclosure Agreement in 
place
Conﬁdential Non-Binding Protocol of 
Discussions signed
March 19-23, 2007 2nd round of negotiations held in 
Washington, D.C. 
Firestone walks out after GOL challenges 
validity of 2005 Agreement
Chairman of GOL negotiating team takes 
leadership role in resolving matters; 
negotiations continue next day
Discussions focus on positions regarding 
GOL’s proposed changes outlined in 
Summary of Principal Terms
Conﬁdential Non-Binding Protocol of 
Discussions drafted
Agreement to meet again at undetermined 
date
April 27-30, 2007 3rd round of negotiations held in 
Monrovia
IMCC core team joined by MOF, MOJ, MOL 
Ministers and Firestone’s team adds another 
lawyer; time needed to orient new members
Cautious progress, agreements reached on 
non-ﬁscal issues
Labor strike slows discussions
Conﬁdential Non-Binding Protocol of 
Discussions drafted
Agreement to meet again at undetermined 
date
June 19, 2007 President meets with negotiating 
team 
Discussion on negotiation progress 
June 25, 2007 President’s Memorandum Outlines 3 key points for ongoing 
negotiations
Smaller team formed: MOA, MOF, MOS, 
LRDC legal consultant
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Date Event Context and Critical Outcomes
July 1-3, 2007 4th round of negotiations held 
in Washington, D.C.
Agreement reached on nearly all non-ﬁscal 
issues
Fiscal issues discussed in detail
Conﬁdential Non-Binding Protocol of 
Discussions drafted to include GOL’s formal 
ﬁscal settlement offer
Issues from Principal Summary of Terms 
used to mark-up 2005 Agreement 
Agreement to meet again at undetermined 
date
August 3-8, 2007 5th round of negotiations held 
in Monrovia
Discussions focused on reaching ﬁnal 
contract language for ﬁscal provisions
Both sides consulted with their principals to 
break deadlock
Agreement reached on ﬁnal contract 
language for all ﬁscal issues and parties 
sign-off on document with new ﬁscal terms 
Legal teams to work together to ﬁnalize 
remaining language through conference calls
November 6-9 and 
13-14, 2007
Washington, D.C. Negotiation teams reached ﬁnal agreement 
on outstanding issues 
Agreement submitted to Cabinet and 
Firestone’s board for review and approval
Additional changes from the respective 
reviews were later incorporated into 
document
February 22, 2008 GOL and Firestone sign 2008 
Amended and Restated Concession 
Agreement in Monrovia
Ratiﬁcation process by National Legislature 
starts
March 31, 2008 Agreement signed into law 
by President
National Legislature ratiﬁes 2008 Concession 
Agreement 
Agreement published into handbills
4.2 Contract Review
In mid-2006 the President convened an Inter-Ministerial Concessions Committee to review the 
2005 Concession Agreement and report back to her with their recommendations. The President 
appointed the Minister of Agriculture as chair of the Firestone IMCC and included representa-
tives from the MOF, MOJ, Ministry of Labor (“MOL”), MOS, NIC and the LRDC.  The IMCC was 
supported in its work by its technical advisors: Mr. Michael Jordan, a rubber industry ﬁnancial 
expert familiar with Liberia’s rubber industry, Mr. Jim Belcher, a rubber industry consultant to the 
Government and later by Mr. Joe Bell of the ISLP.  
Table 2 (continued)
 The Firestone Negotiations 
— 43 —
The review by the Firestone IMCC, like the one conducted by the ArcelorMittal IMCC, was 
done in parallel with the CCRC review of the 2005 Concession Agreement.  As in the case with 
ArcelorMittal, the goal was to fast track the review in order to jump start the Government’s 
economic recovery program.  The IMCC completed its review of the 2005 Concession Agreement 
and submitted its report to the President. 
The Firestone IMCC relied on input from its technical advisors and on previously prepared 
reports, such as the May 2006 report of the Rubber Task Force.  The Task Force had been set up 
by the President in February 2006 to report on the state of Liberia’s rubber industry. Its report 
provided the IMCC with technical background and helped to identify stakeholders in Liberia’s 
rubber industry.  Although the IMCC did not formally include non-governmental stakeholders in 
its review, the Task Force provided the IMCC with a mechanism to solicit input from and consult 
with non-governmental stakeholders. The IMCC’s report reﬂected its informal discussions with 
these stakeholders, as well as with the Rubber Planters Association of Liberia and with labor 
unions representing the workers in Liberia’s rubber industry. 
Like the report delivered by the ArcelorMittal IMCC, the Firestone IMCC report was viewed as a 
negotiation tool setting out the Government’s concerns with the 2005 Concession Agreement. 
It was not considered a public document and as such circulation of the Firestone IMCC report 
was limited to the IMCC and its advisors on a need-to-know basis to preserve the Government’s 
negotiating leverage and Liberia’s national interest.
When the CCRC submitted its report on the 2005 Concession Agreement, it validated the 
Government’s decision to fast track the review of the contract and recommended that the 
Government renegotiate the contract with Firestone.
4.3 Selecting the Negotiating Team 
In January 2007, with the ArcelorMittal negotiations completed, the Government turned its atten-
tion to re-negotiating the 2005 Firestone Concession Agreement and the President named the 
Government’s negotiating team.  The team named by the President was a sub-set of the members 
on the Firestone IMCC.12 
Prior to the meetings with Firestone, the President provided the IMCC negotiating team with 
4 principles to guide their negotiations: 
1. to the extent possible, the new contract must reﬂect the principle of general applicability of 
Liberian law, especially in ﬁscal and environmental matters; 
2. transfer pricing must be based on arms-length transactions linked to international market 
mechanisms;
3. the revised contract must have a commitment from Firestone for value-added manufac-
turing (e.g., a rubberwood factory); and 
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4. the automatic 50-year Extended Term must be eliminated and the term of the Agreement 
limited to 36 years: the period for Rehabilitation and Regular Terms. 
4.4 Negotiating Strategy
A draft Summary of Principal Terms13 was prepared by the negotiating team’s technical advisors, 
the ISLP, on January 5, 2007.  This document was circulated to the negotiating team and its advi-
sors for their review and comments.  The document underwent numerous revisions following 
conference calls and input from the entire team.  On February 9 and 10, 2007 the negotiating team 
met with its advisors in Washington, D.C. to ﬁnalize the draft Summary of Principal Terms. 
The ﬁnal Summary of Principal Terms laid out the Government’s positions for proposed changes 
to the Firestone contract on ﬁnancial matters (e.g., taxation and fees, social obligations, rubber 
wood processing, term limit) and contract issues (e.g., making the concession holder a Liberian 
entity, making the agreement generally subject to Liberian law, addressing transfer pricing and 
ensuring transparency). 
At this stage the Government and its advisors felt that strict conﬁdentiality was necessary if they 
were to succeed in their bid to re-negotiate the 2005 Concession Agreement.  Given the complex 
relationship with Firestone, the negotiating team recognized that it was especially important to 
demonstrate to Firestone that the Government was committed to protecting all conﬁdential the 
company provided.  The negotiating team understood this information was key to obtaining the 
concessions sought from Firestone.  Everyone acknowledged that negotiations conducted through 
the press would make it harder, if not impossible, for the Government to reach agreement with 
Firestone.
The team realized that while Firestone had agreed to participate in the meetings, the company’s 
position was that its 2005 Concession Agreement was valid and not subject to review outside the 
terms of the contract.  Firestone contended that the company’s 2005 Concession Agreement, 
unlike other contracts being reviewed, was untainted by corruption or the violation of Liberian 
procurement law.  Firestone had said publicly that, while the company was always willing to talk 
to the Government, it saw no legal or contractual basis to re-open its contract. 
During its pre-negotiation meetings with its technical advisors in Washington, D.C., the negoti-
ating team decided to counter Firestone’s positions by arguing that the Government had the right, 
beyond its mandate under GEMAP, to seek changes to the 2005 Concession Agreement under the 
terms of the contract itself.  With the help of its rubber experts, the Government prepared a ﬁnan-
cial model to support its position that the sudden and dramatic rise in world rubber prices was 
a “Profound Change in Circumstances” under Section 31.1 of the 2005 Concession Agreement 
and, as such, the contract required the parties to consult to make the necessary changes and 
adjustments.14  Using information provided by Firestone, the Government’s data sought to 
show that with the doubling of world rubber prices since the signing of the 2005 Concession 
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Agreement, Firestone was experiencing a windfall proﬁt and would re-coup its investments more 
quickly than the company originally projected and so, the Government argued, Firestone did not 
need the aggressive tax concessions the NTGL granted in 2005.  The negotiating team believed 
this was especially true at a time when the Government sorely needed revenue to rebuild the 
country following years of war-caused devastation. 
The Government team also thought its position under Section 31.1 was compelling because past 
Liberian governments had reviewed and made changes to Firestone’s contract due to global 
economic changes.  In 1982 the Liberian government granted Firestone’s request for an exemp-
tion from all taxes except corporate income tax on a self-renewal yearly basis for as long as the 
rubber industry remained depressed because of a drop in world rubber prices from the effec-
tive date of the 1976 Concession Agreement.15  The Government believed the 1982 drop in 
world rubber prices that led to exemption from taxes for Firestone under the 1976 Concession 
Agreement was a less dramatic “Profound Change in Circumstances” than the rise in prices 
between Firestone’s projections during its 2005 negotiation with the NTGL and the global price 
of rubber in early 2007.16  
Much like the Government’s negotiations with ArcelorMittal, during the Firestone negotiations 
the parties did not establish a rigid structure for dealing with issues raised in the Summary of 
Principal Terms.  Instead the Summary of Principal Terms guided the parties’ discussions in 
their initial meetings.  Negotiation dynamics and the desire of the Government team to make 
quick progress determined which issues were tackled in later meetings.  This order was not 
ﬁxed and was adjusted or revised by mutual agreement as it became necessary to maintain the 
momentum of negotiations.  For example, after ﬁve rounds of negotiations, it became clear to 
both sides that progress towards achieving ﬁnal agreement could only be made if the parties were 
able to resolve the ﬁscal issues raised by the Government team.  The parties agreed that the sixth 
round of negotiations would focus only on ﬁscal matters and the parties would stay at the table 
until they agreed to contract language on ﬁscal terms. 
The Government’s team used the same strategy employed in the ArcelorMittal negotiations to 
build consensus. The team agreed that when it became clear during a negotiation session that 
there might be differing views on the appropriate response to a position adopted by Firestone, 
the Chairman of the negotiating team would request a break and the Government would retreat 
to sort out its position.  The team also used escalation as negotiating strategy much like with 
ArcelorMittal.  For example, the negotiating team sought the President’s advice on their discus-
sions with Firestone on ﬁscal and value-added manufacturing matters.
The Summary of Principal Terms, and data supporting the Government’s position that escalating 
world rubber prices had resulted in a “Profound Change in Circumstances” under the 2005 
Concession Agreement, were sent to Firestone. 
The ﬁrst round of negotiations between the Government and Firestone was set for February in 
Washington, D.C. 
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4.5 The Negotiation Rounds 
During initial meetings between the Government and Firestone in February 2007, both sides set 
out their opening positions.  In these ﬁrst meetings there was very little agreement on anything. 
Firestone was adamant that its 2005 Concession Agreement was valid and that there was no 
basis for a renegotiation.  The company refused to be subject to generally applicable Liberian law, 
as it required predictability for its long-term investments.  Rejecting the ﬁscal provisions in the 
Government’s Summary of Principal Terms, Firestone insisted that all taxes should be computed 
as set out in the 2005 Concession Agreement.  The company also challenged the Government’s 
economic model (showing Firestone would make windfall proﬁts under current world rubber 
prices) and promised to provide data refuting the Government’s predictions. 
After substantial discussions with signiﬁcant input from the Government’s rubber industry 
ﬁnancial expert, the parties agreed to exchange information to reconcile the differences in their 
ﬁnancial models.  Firestone agreed to provide the Government team with the needed informa-
tion once the Government agreed to a strict Non-Disclosure Agreement. The parties signed a 
conﬁdential Non-Binding Protocol of Discussions17 and agreed to meet again in Washington, 
D.C. from March 19 to 23, 2007. 
After the ﬁrst round of negotiations, the Government team realized that negotiations with 
Firestone could be protracted and very difﬁcult.  The company’s negotiation team was domi-
nated by lawyers.  Its chief negotiator was its outside counsel who had represented Firestone 
before the Liberian government for over thirty years.  He had also largely been responsible 
for drafting the 2005 Concession Agreement.  The negotiating strategy that the Government 
employed in ArcelorMittal, of directing all conversation to the investor’s business representatives 
to build rapport between the parties and avoid a purely legal discussion, did not seem to work 
with Firestone. 
When the parties met again in Washington, D.C. from March 19 to 23, 2007 to resume their 
discussions, strong feelings on both sides came to a head when the Firestone delegation walked 
out of the talks over a discussion on the Government’s basis for challenging the validity of the 
2005 Concession Agreement.  What could have been a real setback to the negotiations was quickly 
resolved through the leadership of Minister Toe in his position as chair of the Government’s 
negotiating team. The Firestone delegation returned to the negotiating table the following day.
With Firestone back at the negotiating table, the parties agreed to set aside discussions on the 
validity of the 2005 Concession Agreement and focus on obtaining a better understanding of 
each other’s views on the proposed changes to the 2005 Concession Agreement.  While there was 
no signiﬁcant movement during the talks by either side, substantive discussions led to a better 
understanding by each side of the other’s positions.  The second round of negotiations ended 
with the drafting of a conﬁdential Non-Binding Protocol of Discussions and an agreement to 
meet again at an undetermined date.  
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The next round of negotiations was held in Monrovia April 27 to 30, 2007.  Other members of 
the IMCC joined the negotiating team. These included Minister Antoinette Sayeh, MOF; Solicitor 
General Taiwan Gongloe, MOJ; and Assistant Minister Rosetta Nagbe-Jackollie, MOL. A promi-
nent Liberian lawyer joined Firestone’s negotiating team. 
During these talks the parties made cautious progress and reached agreement on a number of 
non-ﬁscal issues.  The discussions bogged down on more complicated ﬁscal issues as both sides 
became distracted by their attempts to manage a workers’ strike at the company plantation in 
Harbel.  In addition, the inclusion of new people on both sides of the negotiating table introduced 
new personal dynamics and slowed progress as everyone worked to understand what had been 
discussed and agreed in earlier meetings.  The meeting ended with the drafting of a conﬁdential 
Non-Binding Protocol of Discussions and an agreement to meet at a later undetermined date.
On June 19, 2007, the President met with the Firestone negotiating team to discuss the progress 
of negotiations.  In a Memorandum dated June 25, 2007, the President captured the key points 
agreed to in her discussions with the negotiating team: 
1. insist as much as possible on tax laws of general application while identifying anticipated 
major changes to be included in the new Revenue Code; 
2. be aggressive and inﬂexible on transfer pricing; pricing must be linked to international 
market mechanism; and 
3. remain ﬁrm on application of ECOWAS Levy and Rubber Development Fee, the latter 
subject to mechanisms of accountability to be agreed upon. 
In her Memorandum, the President urged the team to push Firestone for value added manu-
facturing beyond rubberwood processing and to indicate the Government’s commitment to a 
strong partnership in enhancing plantation security. 
Her Memorandum also suggested that the Government’s interest was best served by a smaller 
negotiating team and reconstituted the team to include the Minister of Agriculture, Minister of 
Finance, Minister of State, and the LRDC legal consultant.  She asked all other members of the 
original negotiating team to remain on call to consult or participate as determined by the new 
prime negotiators.
The next round of negotiations with Firestone occurred in Washington, D.C. from July 1 to 3, 
2007.  The parties made real progress during these meetings and reached agreement on nearly 
all remaining non-ﬁscal issues, including social matters, support for small farmers, the devel-
opment plan, Firestone’s reporting obligation to the Government and the establishment of a 
rubberwood factory.  The Government presented Firestone a formal settlement on ﬁscal issues 
as part of the Non-Binding Protocol of Discussions drafted at the conclusion of the meeting. 
The parties agreed to begin turning the issues raised in the Summary of Principal Terms into 
a mark-up of the 2005 Concession Agreement.  They also agreed to meet again at an undeter-
mined date.
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The ﬁfth round of negotiations with Firestone was held in Monrovia, August 3 to 8, at the Ministry 
of Agriculture.  The parties agreed that the meeting would focus solely on ﬁscal matters and that 
both sides would remain in Monrovia until they reached agreement on ﬁnal contract language 
for the ﬁscal provisions.  Discussions during this round were intense but productive with both 
sides consulting with their principals to break deadlocks and ﬁnd compromise. 
In the end, the parties reached agreement on ﬁnal contract language for all ﬁscal provisions, 
including stabilization.  The Government had achieved the general applicability of both current 
and future Liberian tax laws during the term of the amended agreement, and Firestone had 
preserved its right to stabilize its income tax liability. A stabilization clause limited the compa-
ny’s tax burden if current or future tax laws exceeded 110 percent of the tax liability the company 
was obligated to pay under the Revenue Code in effect on July 1, 2007 (Liberia’s Revenue Code 
of 2000).  The meeting ended with both sides signing-off on the document that captured the 
newly agreed contract terms.  They agreed to use conference calls to ﬁnalize outstanding non-
ﬁscal issues which had been discussed earlier. 
The parties did not meet face-to-face again until November 2007 when they reached ﬁnal agree-
ment on all substantive issues.  The agreement and its appendices were submitted to the Cabinet 
and to Firestone’s Board for ﬁnal review and approval.  Those reviews produced a number of 
changes that were later incorporated. 
The Government and Firestone signed the Amended & Restated Concession Agreement on 
February 22, 2008 (“2008 Concession Agreement”) at a ceremony in Monrovia at the Ministry 
of Agriculture. 
4.6 The Ratification Process
Like the Amended ArcelorMittal MDA, the 2008 Concession Agreement with Firestone was 
presented to the National Legislature by the negotiating team in a public hearing that was broad-
cast on live radio.  At the hearing, the Legislature heard from a wide range of stakeholders 
including company representatives and civil society.  The amended contract was also the subject 
of signiﬁcant domestic and international media coverage.  As part of the ratiﬁcation process, the 
2008 Concession Agreement was printed into handbills and made a public document.  After 
several months of public and closed-door debate, the amended agreement was ratiﬁed by the 
National Legislature and signed by the President into law on March 31, 2008.
While the 2008 Concession Agreement is public, it is not easily accessible. However, a Summary 
of the Main Changes Brought About by the Government of Liberia’s Review of the 2005 Concession 
Agreement with Firestone Liberia, Inc. (“Firestone Summary of Changes”) is posted on the Executive 
Mansion’s website and highlights the gains the Government made in the 2008 Concession 
Agreement18. 
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4.7 The Gains 
In addition to the gains made in the general applicability of Liberian tax laws to Firestone under 
the 2008 Concession Agreement (e.g., corporate income tax rate raised to 30% retroactively 
through 2007 and net taxable income to be computed in accordance with applicable Liberian 
law), the Firestone Summary of Changes document also highlights the Government’s gains in:
• other taxes and duties (e.g., exemption on the ECOWAS trade levy removed, 10 percent 
withholding tax on interest, dividends and payments to contractors/consultants imposed, 
company subject to General Sales Tax (GST), real property taxes imposed, land rental raised 
from US$0.50 to US$2.00 and adjusted for inﬂation every 5 years, and full import duties 
established by law imposed except during the Rehabilitation Term ending 2015 where 
certain reductions apply; 
• transfer pricing: export sales prices for any afﬁliate transaction determined by reference 
to available international prices or indices. Currently the export price for dry rubber based 
on the TSR 20 Singapore Commodity Exchange price and for latex, the Malaysian Rubber 
Board price for bulk concentrate latex; 
• value-added manufacturing: committed to building a $10 million rubberwood factory and 
employing 500 new workers by 2008; 
• social beneﬁts: each employee entitled to housing, committed to build 2300 new houses 
and refurbish existing houses to new standards, committed to providing bathroom or sani-
tary latrine for each house, committed to complete construction of a high school within 
concession area, committed to meet targets for employment of Liberians in management 
and committed to security forces adhering to law and Voluntary Principles on Security and 
Human Rights; and, 
• length of the contract term: 50-year Extended Term through 2091 eliminated; term now 
36 years through 2041.
The complete Firestone Summary of Changes document is attached as Appendix V.
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5. The ArcelorMittal and Firestone 
 Negotiations: Analysis and 
 Recommendations
5.1 Introduction
The government’s success in renegotiating the ArcelorMittal and Firestone contracts can be 
attributed to several factors:
1. engaged leadership and a clear and direct reporting line from the negotiating teams to the 
ultimate decision-maker;
2. strategies that supported consensus-building among the negotiating teams; and,
3. the availability of technical support from world-class advisors at every signiﬁcant stage of 
the negotiation process.
To ensure that the Government can repeat these gains in future concession negotiations, it 
should should institutionalize these factors by: 1) maintaining a clear and direct reporting line to 
the ultimate decision-maker from all negotiating teams; and, 2) grow its capacity to lead, manage 
and negotiate complex investment agreements through:
• professional development and training;
• recruitment; and,
• education.
The Government can also improve upon the ArcelorMittal and Firestone negotiations by 
increasing the transparency of the process by:
• adopting mechanisms that require the negotiating team to engage non-government stake-
holders affected by concession activity; and,
• implementing policies assuring the public's right to access concession agreements. 




President Sirleaf’s leadership in the ArcelorMittal and Firestone negotiations was key to Liberia’s 
success.  From the beginning, the President established a direct reporting line from the Chairman 
of the negotiating team.  She exhibited a number of leadership traits that helped make the nego-
tiations with ArcelorMittal and Firestone successful.  Among other things, President Sirleaf:
A) Communicated a vision of national priorities 
 From the start the President made it clear to the nation and its investors that her Government 
would support the GEMAP mandate for review of concession contracts signed by the NTGL. 
She went further and announced a ‘national’ policy on concessions review as part of her 
Government’s strategy for poverty reduction and economic recovery.  The President’s policy 
of concession review was clearly articulated to investors and is being consistently applied 
across all sectors of the economy. 
B) Prioritized concession review by demonstrating an understanding of how a given concession ﬁts 
into Liberia’s national framework 
 The President’s decision to fast track the review and negotiations of the ArcelorMittal and 
Firestone contracts showed her understanding of the importance of these two concessions 
to Liberia’s economic recovery.  With soaring public expectations for economic improve-
ments following the election, it was important for the Government to move quickly 
and produce some wins to help secure the country’s peace.  Choosing to fast track the 
ArcelorMittal and Firestone review demonstrated the President’s understanding that she 
needed to rapidly restore the public’s and international investment community’s conﬁdence 
in Liberia’s private sector.  Consistent with these priorities, deciding to review ArcelorMittal 
ﬁrst provided the Government greater incremental returns than starting with Firestone 
would have, since Firestone was already operating.  The ArcelorMittal contract amendment 
allowed the company to begin its operations under an agreement that brought new and 
greater investment dollars to Liberia than Firestone, created new jobs and increased short 
term revenue for the Government.  In the words of the President, a leader has to under-
stand “the nature of the operation and its importance for the national architecture.”
C) Selected a negotiating team composed of individuals with diverse skills and knowledge
 The teams that the President selected for the ArcelorMittal and Firestone negotiations 
comprised individuals with different backgrounds, skills and experience.  For example, the 
ArcelorMittal negotiation team headed by the MLME Minister had individuals with signiﬁ-
cant mining, environmental, investment banking, ﬁnance, legal, and management experi-
ence.  This diverse team brought distinct perspectives to issues raised in the ArcelorMittal 
negotiations.  Their differing views forced intense exchanges, consensus building and 
collaboration to ﬁnalize the Government’s position. 
 The ArcelorMittal and Firestone Negotiations: Analysis and Recommendations 
— 53 —
D) Established a direct reporting line between the President and the negotiating team 
 Throughout the negotiations, the President maintained a clear and direct reporting rela-
tionship with the negotiating team through the chairman.  By making herself available 
and allowing the team to directly report to her, the President empowered the team to speak 
with authority and decisiveness during negotiations with ArcelorMittal and Firestone.  She 
freed the negotiating team to seek compromise or hold the line as they deemed appropriate 
during the negotiations with the caveat that they check with her if there was uncertainty 
about her position on an issue, or disagreement among team members about the correct 
course of action.  Thus by maintaining a direct reporting relationship with the negotiating 
team, the President was able to both empower the team to make decisions and to hold the 
team accountable for its decision-making. 
E) Adjusted the size of the core negotiating team to maintain the integrity and pace of negotiations
 At various points in the negotiation when it became necessary, the President changed the 
size and composition of the team.  For example in Firestone, when the Government’s nego-
tiating team had grown to more than 11 people and the negotiations were bogged down by 
the 5th round of meetings, the President stepped in and re-sized the team stating that, “at 
this stage, negotiation is best served by a small team including the Sector Head Minister, 
Minister of Finance, Minister of State and the (LRDC) legal consultant.”  She asked the 
rest of the Government team to remain on stand-by to support the negotiations as needed. 
After reducing the size of the government team, the negotiations with Firestone made 
greater progress.
F) Provided the negotiating team technical assistance from world-class experts with a personal 
commitment 
 The President was able to assemble as advisors to the negotiating team some of the best 
legal and technical minds in the world.  These advisors came with the backing and resources 
of some of the largest U.S. law ﬁrms.  For example, in the ArcelorMittal negotiations, 
in addition to making three lawyers (a partner and two associates) available to support 
the Government’s negotiating team, the New York law ﬁrm Cravath, Swaine and Moore 
hosted the negotiations at its ofﬁces in New York.  One negotiating team member stated 
that the Government’s advisors played a signiﬁcant role since one of “the key elements 
of success were the preparation of the team through the commitment of the technical 
assistance team.”  It is also important to note that through the leadership of the President 
all of Liberia’s technical assistance was provided on a pro-bono basis or through donor 
funding.
The President’s leadership in the ArcelorMittal and Firestone negotiation process also displayed 
the following characteristics; she 
• was consistent, had integrity; the negotiation team knew they could count on her backing 
if needed;
• stayed involved and looked for updates;
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• listened to the negotiating team and its advisors, and was accessible;
• was a consensus builder; 
• held people accountable;
• had substantive knowledge and could speak to the issues being negotiated; and
• was decisive.
These leadership characteristics allowed the President to successfully manage the politically 
charged atmosphere surrounding the ArcelorMittal and Firestone negotiations. 
5.2.2 Teamwork
Teamwork was an essential element in the Government’s success in the ArcelorMittal and 
Firestone negotiations.  The negotiating teams comprised a broad cross-section of professional 
viewpoints and consensus-building required intense discussions.  In both the ArcelorMittal and 
Firestone negotiations, the team members felt a personal need to “get it right,” driven by an 
understanding that they were going to be held accountable by the President, and were ultimately 
responsible to the Legislature and the people of Liberia.  This need, coupled with the recogni-
tion that the negotiations were of historic importance for post-conﬂict Liberia, heightened the 
urgency for consensus building and collaboration among team members. 
Teamwork was also important for members of the ArcelorMittal and Firestone negotiating teams 
because, as part of a new Government of “national unity,” a number of the team members came 
from differing political backgrounds and had never worked closely together before.  Being part 
of the negotiating team gave them an opportunity to bring their diverse backgrounds together to 
forge uniﬁed Government positions.
The negotiating team’s consensus-building and collaborative efforts operated in the manner 
outlined below: 
1. initial intense discourse, at times difﬁcult, but essential to building communication and 
trust;
2. recognition by members of the team that they had been hand-picked by the President to 
bring particular expertise to the table;
3. development of a clear understanding of each other’s positions, strengths, and value to 
accomplishing the Government’s negotiating objectives; and,
4. understanding that issues on which no consensus could be reached or certain key compro-
mises were to be raised to the President with the team’s recommendations for ﬁnal deci-
sion. 
This process of consensus-building and collaboration by the ArcelorMittal and Firestone nego-
tiating teams was aided by the negotiating strategies the teams employed. For example, none of 
the members of the team would speak during the negotiations without ﬁrst obtaining permis-
sion from the Chairman of the negotiating team for that session.  When it became clear during 
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negotiations that there might be differences among members of the team on the appropriate 
Government response, the Chairman of the negotiating team requested a break to sort out its 
position.  This focus on consensus-building resulted in shared ownership of the ﬁnal contract 
terms by team members, enabling the team to defend the positions they had adopted before all 
stakeholders.
5.2.3 Technical Assistance
The Government’s use of world-class technical advisors in the ArcelorMittal and Firestone 
negotiations was essential to its success.  During the negotiations, these advisors prepared and 
empowered the IMCC negotiating team.  Based on their areas of expertise Liberia’s advisors 
educated the Government’s negotiating team on the issues, provided recommendations on 
negotiation strategy, and suggested options and drafted language for resolving conﬂicts. 
Using 21st century tools and technologies, and with the resources of some of America’s best law 
ﬁrms (Cravath in ArcelorMittal and Hogan & Hartson in Firestone), the Government’s advisors 
were able to provide the negotiating team a 24 by 7 support infrastructure.  Technical advisors 
often worked as a team themselves where differences needed to be worked out before presenting 
a recommendation to the Government.
Throughout the process in both the ArcelorMittal and Firestone negotiations, the role of the 
Government’s advisors was clear.  They were advisors to the Government’s negotiating teams; 
they were not on the Government’s negotiating teams nor were they negotiators for the 
Government.  The technical advisors limited themselves to providing advice, support and input 
to the Government’s negotiating teams.  The Government’s teams were responsible for all of the 
negotiations with ArcelorMittal and Firestone.  With support from its advisors, the negotiating 
teams made all of the decisions on substantive issues, compromises and strategy. 
Support to the Government’s negotiating teams provided by their advisors included:
• drafting and preparing all documents, researching and framing issues to represent 
the Government's position, consulting with other experts as necessary to bolster the 
Government's positions, and modeling ﬁnancial projections of the impact to changes in 
the Government's positions (e.g., impact on government revenues from changes to appli-
cable tax law);
• helping the Government ﬁnd viable compromises to difﬁcult issues and apparent 'deadlock' 
situations with ArcelorMittal and Firestone. In Firestone, for example, Liberia's advisors 
helped the Government's negotiating team ﬁnd a compromise between the Government's 
position that Firestone should be subject to Liberian laws of general applicability and 
Firestone's demand for protection against changes to Liberian law that could undermine 
the economics justifying their investment.  Liberia's advisors helped draft language to 
which Firestone agreed that applied the principle of general applicability to Firestone while 
allowing the company relief if a new tax law increased the company's tax liability over 10 
percent from its tax liability in the previous tax year; 
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• providing the Government an objective measure to balance views from both members of 
the Government's negotiating team and the companies; and,
• facilitating discussion among the Government's team members to clarify the implications 
and ramiﬁcations of proposed positions. 
5.3 Recommendations
The factors discussed above were key in the Government’s success in the ArcelorMittal and 
Firestone negotiations, delivering signiﬁcant gains for Liberia (see Appendices IV and V for a 
listing of contract gains negotiated by the Government).  To ensure similar gains in ongoing and 
future concession negotiations, the Government should institutionalize the beneﬁts of leader-
ship, teamwork and world-class technical assistance. It can do so by strengthening its capacity to 
lead, manage and negotiate complex investment agreements.
While Liberia has made signiﬁcant gains through successful renegotiations of the ArcelorMittal 
and Firestone contracts, it needs to be noted that the leadership and teamwork in the negotiating 
process occurred at the highest levels of Government.  Additionally, external technical assistance 
was required to ﬁll gaps in the Government’s capacity to negotiate these agreements. 
A negotiating process supported by the highest levels of Government and international technical 
assistance is not scalable.  As Liberia seeks to attract greater international investment to spur the 
country’s economic development, it will need to grow its ability to negotiate complex investment 
agreements beyond its top ofﬁcials and external technical advisors. 
Largely due to the effects of Liberia’s fourteen-year civil conﬂict, the Government’s capacity to 
manage complex investment agreements beyond its top-most ofﬁcials (e.g., Ministers) is weak. 
Over the next few years, as Liberia competes for investment dollars on the world market, it will 
need to expand and institutionalize its ability to negotiate investment agreements.  Speciﬁcally, 
the Government should develop a program to grow its capacity to conduct complex investment 
agreements through:
• mentoring, professional development and training programs for current Government employees 
involved in contract negotiations;
• recruitment of Liberians both locally and from the Diaspora who have the experience to support 
the Government's concession activity; and,
• providing scholarships and internships abroad for Liberians pursuing careers that support the 
Government’s concession activity. 
To accomplish these steps, a three-fold, concurrent approach is recommended that addresses the 
Government’s short-term needs and longer-term capacity needs. 
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A) Short-Term: Mentoring, Professional Development and Training Programs
 Beginning immediately, mentoring, professional development, and training programs 
should be conducted with the support of the Government’s technical advisors in parallel 
with concession negotiations that are underway.  These programs should involve a variety 
of intensive learning experiences designed to enhance the expertise of Government staff 
responsible for supporting the Government’s concession activity. 
 In addition to mentoring and training programs that deliver the substantive knowledge 
required to negotiate complex investment agreements (e.g., royalty, tax, stabilization, and 
debt to equity ratio matters), the Government’s training program should also enhance the 
business process skills of Government staff. 
 Based on the factors which contributed to the Government’s success in the ArcelorMittal 
and Firestone negotiations, business process topics for training programs should include:
 • leadership and teamwork
 • concession negotiation management and strategy
 • negotiator training for complex concession negotiations
 • contract management to ensure monitoring and subject-matter compliance.
 There are several proven models for professional development that the Government may 
want to consider.  Among these are:
 • one-on-one mentoring exercises that involve a trainee shadowing a Government tech-
nical advisor involved in concession negotiations (e.g., the trainee would be assigned 
to a speciﬁc Government technical advisor, attend all meetings and negotiation 
sessions with the advisor, and meet regularly in person or through email with the 
advisor to discuss his/her experiences); and,
 • speciﬁc training courses comprising short intensive workshops and seminars (e.g., 
week-long exercises) with curricula designed to provide a target Government audi-
ence speciﬁc substantive knowledge or business process skills. 
 There are several partners available to the Government that could provide the capacity and 
technical assistance for such mentoring exercises as well as professional development and 
training courses. These include the International Senior Lawyers Project and the UNDP’s 
Regional Project for Capacity Development for Negotiating Contracts and Regulation of 
Investment Contracts.  Identifying employees within relevant Government Ministries 
beyond the Ministers or Deputy Ministers who can beneﬁt from such mentoring and 
training will be a necessary ﬁrst step.
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B) Medium-Term: Recruitment of Liberians both Locally and From the Diaspora
 Recruitment is another tool the Government can use to grow its capacity to negotiate and 
manage its concession agreements.  There are many talented, well-trained and experienced 
Liberian professionals in the Diaspora, as well as locally, who might be persuaded to join 
the Government for speciﬁed periods to support its concession activity.
 Currently the government runs various programs, such as the TOKTEN and SES programs, 
to rebuild its civil service through foreign recruitment. The Government should tap into 
these programs to bring in professionals who can support its concession work and provide 
training to future generations.  The funding and mechanisms for such recruitment 
already exist under the TOKTEN and SES programs.  What remains is for someone in the 
Government to be tasked, in coordination with the relevant Ministries, with identifying: 
1) the skills the Government needs to successfully conduct and support its concession 
activities; and, 2) where these recruits should be placed to provide maximum value to the 
Government’s concession negotiation activity.
 Additionally, the Government should look for talented and experienced Liberian profes-
sionals locally through programs like the Scott Family Program.  For example, local lawyers 
engaged in commercial practice might be persuaded to join the Government for a speciﬁed 
period under funding available through programs like the Scott Family Program.
C) Long-Term: Scholarships and Internships Abroad 
 Given the signiﬁcant revenue and other beneﬁts Liberia derives from its concession activity, 
the Government should undertake some long-range planning to ensure that a steady 
stream of Liberians will be available to support the Government’s concession activity.  Since 
most concession agreements have contract terms of between 25 and 50 years, there will be 
career paths within the Government related to its concession activities for the foreseeable 
future. 
 In developing its long range plans, the Government should consider providing scholarships 
to top students in local graduate and undergraduate programs who are pursuing careers 
that support Liberia’s concession activity.  The Government should also consider funding 
scholarships for advanced training abroad for students who are committed to returning to 
work for the Government.  One or two year degree programs abroad like the LLM or MBA 
can provide the Government quick returns on its investments.
 The Government might also consider a practical training program that places Government 
employees and select university graduates recruited to Government service with organiza-
tions (e.g., law ﬁrms, investment banking ﬁrms, foreign government concession secretar-
iats, etc.) for 18 to 24 month internships.  The Washington, D.C. headquartered non-proﬁt 
organization, Africare, Inc., developed and ran a similar program in the early 1990’s to 
provide practical training to black South Africans to prepare them for positions in post-
apartheid South Africa.  The program, the Career Development Internship Program, 
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provided its interns a stipend and placed them with U.S. organizations for 1 to 2 years. 
The program, funded by USAID and major U.S. corporations interested in doing business 
in South Africa, lasted three years and was considered by many, including South Africa’s 
African National Congress, to be a success.  The Liberian Government may want to explore 
developing a similar program for Liberia working with USAID and Africare, both of whom 
are actively involved in development initiatives in Liberia. 
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6. Improving the Transparency 
 of Concession Negotiations
6.1 Consultations with Non-Governmental Stakeholders 
The Mittal and Firestone fast track negotiation process had no formal mechanisms for consulta-
tion with non-governmental stakeholders. Any consultations that took place were due largely to 
the accessibility of the President.
Interviews with Government ofﬁcials highlight the absence of a framework for including non-
governmental stakeholders’ inputs into the IMCC contract review process. A majority of govern-
ment ofﬁcials—including the President—are favorable to consultations with non-governmental 
stakeholders as long as they are time-bound and focused. Consultations with non-governmental 
stakeholders should take place early in the concession award process as part of the bid tender, 
evaluation, or award process.  If there have been no consultations as part of the process to select 
the concessionaire, then a time-bound and focused consultation at the outset of the contract 
review phase is advisable.  Consultations during the contract review process are sometimes 
necessary for negotiations of agriculture concessions where the concession area is occasionally 
identiﬁed after the concessionaire has been selected and before there has been an opportunity 
for consultations with the affected communities. 
Some in the Government have pointed out that soliciting third-parties’ input during the conces-
sion negotiation phase runs the risk of breaching the conﬁdentiality required during negotia-
tions.  They point to Liberia’s forestry regulations as an example of a consultation process gone 
too far.  Under the forestry regulations Government cannot proceed with a proposed forestry 
contract unless it has written consent from communities affected by the contract to enter into 
“social agreements” with the winning company.19  Nearly all Government representatives viewed 
the requirements for consultations with non-governmental stakeholders as too burdensome. 
They also considered the forestry regulations impractical to implement in complex commercial 
ventures involving international investors. These ofﬁcials argued the forestry regulations did not 
respect the conﬁdentiality required between negotiating parties.
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The development of a non-governmental stakeholder consultation mechanism should be done 
as part of the Government’s efforts to harmonize the PPCA with the negotiation practices used 
in ArcelorMittal and Firestone. Prior to ﬁnalizing such a mechanism, input should be sought 
from non-governmental groups such as community representatives and labor unions.  
Consultations with stakeholders should occur as part of the concession bid tender, evaluation 
and award process. If this is not possible, then consultation with non-governmental stakeholders 
should occur as part of the contract review process. 
In adopting rules for consultations with stakeholders, the Government should require that such 
consultations occur:
• early in the negotiation process (i.e., during the contract review process and prior to the 
development of a draft term sheet); 
• as part of a formal public process; and 
• in a time-bound and focused manner.
6.2 Accessibility of Public Documents 
Contracts negotiated by the Government often have tremendous impact on the life of commu-
nities affected by the operation of these agreements. In many developing countries, conces-
sion agreements also have nation-wide economic and social implications and can even affect 
state security. Today the ArcelorMittal and Firestone concessions play a critical role in Liberia’s 
economic development strategy.
Recognizing the impact of these concession agreements on Liberia, the Government committed 
to transparency by making the ArcelorMittal and Firestone agreements public documents. 
Contract transparency is in the best interest of the government, private investors and citizens. 
The disclosure of contracts expresses the public ownership of the exploited natural resources. 
Transparency also ensures that expectations from communities affected by the contracts are 
managed and realistic.  Public disclosure of the terms of concession agreements provides a 
safeguard for private investors to ensure contract stability and avoid abuse in contract imple-
mentation. Dissemination of contractual terms has the further effect of increasing buy-in from 
affected communities and of facilitating monitoring and compliance of the agreement in the 
post-signature phase. 
However, there seems to be confusion within the Government about its obligation to make 
public documents accessible.  Most Government ofﬁcials recognize that the ArcelorMittal and 
Firestone contracts are public documents as a result of being published into handbills during 
the Legislative ratiﬁcation process. Yet a majority of Government representatives argued that the 
Government has no obligation to ensure subsequent public access to contracts. 
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Most Government ofﬁcials interviewed also believed that contracts not subject to ratiﬁcation, 
such as qualifying investment incentive contracts or mining exploration agreements, are not 
public documents and should not be made available to the public. Some ofﬁcials justiﬁed 
keeping such contracts from the public by arguing that under the terms of these agreements the 
Government had an obligation to protect the conﬁdential information of investors. Others indi-
cated that without a clear policy on which documents are required to be made public, it was difﬁ-
cult for them to know how to respond to public requests for information about contracts. The 
Report Team pointed out that many countries had policies allowing the Government to make 
commercial contracts available to the public while protecting conﬁdential investor information. 
To further promote transparency and make its contracts more readily available to the Liberian 
public, the Government should:
A) ﬁnd a cost-effective means of providing public access to ratiﬁed concession agreements. 
This can be done by posting contracts on Government websites accessible by the public; 
B) clarify its position on making contracts that are not subject to Legislative ratiﬁcation public. 
The Report Team recommends the Government make such contracts accessible to the 




7. Contrasting the Fast Track 
 Negotiations to Other Government 
 Negotiating Practices 
7.1 Introduction
The negotiating practice the Government successfully used in the ArcelorMittal and Firestone 
negotiations differs from the process of the Public Procurement and Concessions Act in signiﬁ-
cant ways.  In subsequent concession negotiations, the Government has largely followed the 
negotiating practice used in the ArcelorMittal and Firestone negotiations.  The Report Team found 
only one instance, a recent negotiation for a gold mining concession, where the Government 
used a different negotiating process.  In that case, the Ministry of Lands, Mines, and Energy 
(“MLME”) followed the negotiating process in the Minerals and Mining Law of 2000 (“2000 
Mining Law”). 
This Section of the Report contrasts the negotiating practice the Government used in ArcelorMittal 
and Firestone and the practice under the PPCA.  It also describes the practice used by the 
Ministry of Agriculture (“MOA”) and MLME for recent negotiations following the ones with 
ArcelorMittal and Firestone.  Finally it highlights the most signiﬁcant differences between the 
negotiating process in the 2000 Mining Law, the practice used in ArcelorMittal and Firestone, 
and the process set out in the PPCA.
The Section concludes by recommending the Government resolve the differences by amending 
the PPCA to incorporate best practices from the ArcelorMittal and Firestone negotiations.  The 
Government has followed a similar route by amending the Liberian tax code (e.g., the 2000 
Revenue Code of Liberia) to capture the substantive ﬁscal beneﬁts of the ArcelorMittal and 
Firestone negotiations.  The process of codifying the gains achieved in negotiation institutional-
izes the beneﬁts of these negotiations and reduces the transaction costs of having to argue for 
the same points in future negotiations. 
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7.2 Analysis
7.2.1 Constituting the Negotiating Team
Under Part VI of the PPCA (see Appendix VI), only the IMCC has the authority to constitute a 
team to negotiate concession agreements.20  The PPCA provides further that the act of consti-
tuting a negotiating team by any person or entity other than the IMCC established by the PPCA 
is void.21  In the ArcelorMittal and Firestone negotiations, the President either appointed the 
negotiating team directly or approved the members of the team based on the recommendation 
of the Sector Head Minister in his capacity as Chair of the IMCC.  Appointment of the negoti-
ating team was not left to a committee, as is the case under the PPCA where only the IMCC has 
the authority to constitute the negotiating team.  During the ArcelorMittal and Firestone nego-
tiations, the President assumed responsibility for the make-up of the Government’s negotiating 
team.  Her leadership style as discussed in Section 4.1 was a signiﬁcant factor in the success of 
the negotiations and resulting gains to Liberia. 
7.2.2 Composition of the Negotiating Team
Under the PPCA the negotiating team must comprise relevant experts in a team of not less 
than three but not more than seven persons appointed by the IMCC.22  The intent of the PPCA 
language seems to be to exclude political appointees--the Government employees who are the ulti-
mate decision makers within the Government.  The process for selecting the negotiating teams 
in the ArcelorMittal and Firestone negotiations did not exclude the ﬁnal decision makers within 
Government.  While the President was free to appoint anyone she wanted to the ArcelorMittal 
and Firestone negotiating teams, she chose teams comprised almost exclusively of Government 
Ministers or Agency Heads who sat on the IMCC. 
In the ArcelorMittal and Firestone negotiations the President exercised the power to adjust the 
size and membership of the team during negotiations as she deemed necessary to further the 
Government’s objectives.  There was no pre-set minimum or limit to the size of the team, as is 
the case under the PPCA. In practice, however, experience in the ArcelorMittal and Firestone 
negotiations bore out that the ideal size of the negotiating team was between 3 and 7 members.
In the ArcelorMittal and Firestone negotiations, the members of the negotiating team were the 
ﬁnal decision makers.  They were not technocrats who had to get ﬁnal approval for their deci-
sions from Ministers or other political appointees on the IMCC.  The Ministers on the negoti-
ating teams in the ArcelorMittal and Firestone negotiations, while assisted by technical advisors, 
were responsible for their own decisions.  Under the process used in the ArcelorMittal and 
Firestone negotiations, members of the negotiating team were personally accountable to the 
President and answerable to the National Legislature and Liberian public before whom they 
had to go during the Ratiﬁcation process to defend the ﬁnal product.  In the PPCA negotiation 
process, members of the negotiating team are technocrats and accountable only to the IMCC; 
they are also presumably free of political inﬂuence and any conﬂicts of interest. 
The PPCA speciﬁcally prohibits the Sector Head Minister from being a member of the 
Government’s negotiating team for a concession agreement.23 The Government’s negotiating 
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teams in the ArcelorMittal and Firestone negotiations were, however, chaired by the Sector 
Head Minister.  This leadership role ensured that the Ministry responsible for implementing 
the concession agreement was prepared to take ownership of it.  Having the Sector Minister lead 
the negotiations also ensured that the Government Ministry with presumably the largest subject 
matter expertise was actively involved in the negotiations.  Under the concession negotiation 
process in the PPCA, the ﬁnal decision makers of the Sector Ministry responsible for imple-
menting the concession agreement (e.g., the Minister and other political appointees) could not 
be a part of the negotiating team.
Liberia’s current professional capacity may, in part, explain the different approaches to selecting 
the negotiating team under the practice the Government followed in the ArcelorMittal and 
Firestone negotiations and the negotiation process in the PPCA.  In the end, the practice for 
determining the composition of the Government’s negotiating teams in the ArcelorMittal and 
Firestone negotiations produced signiﬁcant gains for Liberia and seems best suited for Liberia’s 
current realties.
7.2.3 The Composition, Operation and Function of the IMCC
Under PPCA rules, a new IMCC is convened for each concession agreement the Government 
negotiates. This was also done in the ArcelorMittal and Firestone negotiations. Similar to the 
fast track negotiations, under the PPCA when a concession contract is concluded, that partic-
ular IMCC is to be dissolved.24  The IMCC under the PPCA is always headed by the National 
Investment Commission (“NIC”) Chairperson and has as its members the Minister of Justice, 
Minister of Finance, Minister of Economic Affairs25, the Sector Head Minister and two other 
Ministers appointed by the President.26  The two other Ministers appointed by the President are 
to represent the sectors of the economy affected by the concession. 
In the ArcelorMittal and Firestone negotiations, the IMCC was chaired by the Sector Head 
Minister and over time developed a core team that included the Minister of Justice, Minister of 
Finance, Minister of State, Finance, Legal & Economic Affairs, the NIC Chairman and National 
Coordinator of the LRDC.  The President added other Ministers to the IMCC as necessary (e.g., 
Minister of Labor in the Firestone negotiations).  The PPCA on the other hand provides that 
apart from the NIC Chairperson and the Ministers of Justice, Finance and Economic Affairs, 
no person shall have permanent representation on the IMCC.27  The main differences between 
the make-up of the IMCC’s core team under the PPCA and that used in the ArcelorMittal and 
Firestone negotiations are that under the PPCA: 1) the NIC Chairman chairs the IMCC instead 
of the Sector Head Minister; and, 2) the Minister of Economic Affairs instead of Minister of State 
(i.e., the Ofﬁce of the President) is part of the core IMCC team.
The PPCA states that the IMCC is to be convened by the Sector Head Minister through a written 
request to the President and the NIC Chairperson.28  The President, on receipt of the request is to 
nominate two additional Ministers. The NIC Chairperson, on receipt of notice of the President’s 
nominees, is to convene the IMCC for the purpose of the speciﬁc concession.29  A similar process 
was followed for convening the IMCC in the ArcelorMittal and Firestone negotiations.  In the 
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ArcelorMittal and Firestone negotiations, the IMCC was convened directly by the President or 
upon written request of the Sector Head Minister; the Chairman of the NIC was not part of the 
process.
Under the PPCA no member of the IMCC can delegate his/her role as a member of the IMCC 
and only where absolutely necessary a Minister may send a Deputy Minister as a proxy to a 
meeting of the IMCC.30 Delegating under the ArcelorMittal and Firestone negotiating process 
was left to each Minister’s discretion although Ministers remained ultimately responsible for the 
positions taken by their proxies. 
Under the PPCA, the IMCC does not have a quorum without the presence of the Ministers respon-
sible for Finance, Economic Affairs, Justice, and the Sector Head Minister or their duly autho-
rized Deputy Minister.31  There was no similar quorum rule in the ArcelorMittal and Firestone 
negotiations.  Meetings however were generally rescheduled if the Sector Head Minister was not 
available or if the Minister of State and Minister of Finance (or their proxies) could not attend.
Both the PPCA32 and the practice used in the ArcelorMittal and Firestone negotiations allow the 
IMCC to use experts and technical advisors during its meetings.
Finally, under the PPCA, in addition to selecting the negotiating team, the IMCC is also respon-
sible for the review and approval of the concession report33 from the Bid Evaluation Panel, and 
for the preparation of an annual concessions plan for submission and approval by the Cabinet.34 
The IMCC’s role in the practice used for the ArcelorMittal and Firestone negotiations was more 
limited to the contract review and negotiation preparation.
7.2.4 Consultations with Non-Governmental Stakeholders
The PPCA requires consultations with non-government stakeholders.  The PPCA provides that 
the responsible Sector Ministry should undertake public stakeholder consultations as part of the 
concession process.35  The Sector Ministry must provide, at a minimum, the following informa-
tion at a public stakeholder forum36:
• the strategic importance of the project;
• the extent of investment or private resources (i.e. ﬁnancial, human, etc.) to provide the 
needs of the community; 
• the measures taken to address any environmental challenges and adverse externalities for 
the affected population; and,
• any other reason for choosing the concession option for the Project. 
As currently drafted, the provisions of the PPCA requiring a stakeholder forum could be inter-
preted to mean that stakeholder consultations need only be held as part of the concession bid 
and award process, and not as part of the concession negotiation process.  The negotiating prac-
tice used in the ArcelorMittal and Firestone negotiations did not have formal mechanisms for 
gathering input to the contract review process from non-governmental stakeholders.  In Section 
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6.1 above, the Report Team recommended that a mechanism for consultations with non-govern-
mental stakeholders be developed as part of harmonizing the PPCA with the concession negoti-
ating practice used in ArcelorMittal and Firestone.
7.2.5 Concession Negotiations Following ArcelorMittal and Firestone
Following the ArcelorMittal and Firestone negotiations, the Government has negotiated, or is in 
the process of negotiating, a number of smaller concession agreements.  The Government has 
begun negotiations with the agent for Liberia’s Shipping and Corporate Registries37 and, through 
the NIC, has also negotiated a number of hotel lease38 and other investment agreements.39 This 
Report does not cover the Government’s negotiations related to Liberia’s Shipping and Corporate 
Registries nor does it cover contracts negotiated by the NIC.  The Report Team can conﬁrm that 
in negotiations related to Liberia’s Shipping and Corporate Registries the Government has largely 
followed the negotiating practice it used in the ArcelorMittal and Firestone negotiations.  On the 
other hand, in a meeting with the NIC, the Report team conﬁrmed that the NIC largely follows 
the concession negotiating process set out in the PPCA. 
The negotiations discussed below have been for concessions in the agriculture and mining 
sectors.  While the ArcelorMittal and Firestone contracts have become the models used by both 
the Ministry of Lands, Mines and Energy (“MLME”) and the Ministry of Agriculture (“MOA”) in 
contract negotiations, as outlined below, the negotiating practice for recent concession agree-
ments negotiated by the MOA and MLME are different.
7.2.6 Concession Negotiations by the MOA
The concession negotiating practice at the MOA closely follows the practice used in the 
ArcelorMittal and Firestone negotiations.  The MOA has, between October 2008 and April 2008, 
been involved in the negotiation or renegotiation of more concession agreements than any other 
Government ministry.  In addition to Firestone, the MOA has negotiated or is preparing to nego-
tiate at least six concession agreements.  It has re-negotiated and signed two oil palm concession 
agreements with LIBNC and EBF.  The LIBNC and EBF negotiations were done in parallel with 
the Firestone negotiations using essentially the same negotiating team.  The agreements for 
LIBNC and EBF were modeled on drafts of the Firestone agreement.  At the time of writing, the 
MOA has teams actively negotiating two large oil palm concession agreements with Sime Darby 
and Sithe Global.  The MOA and its technical advisors are also preparing for negotiations with 
the Liberian Agricultural Company and LIBCO (i.e., Cocopa). 
As in ArcelorMittal and Firestone, the President has appointed or approved the negotiating team 
with the Minister of Agriculture as Chairman in his role as Sector Head.  The negotiating teams 
in MOA concession negotiations have been largely made up of members (e.g. Ministers or their 
proxies) of the IMCC convened for review of that speciﬁc concession agreement.  In recent 
negotiations conducted by the MOA, the Agriculture Minister convenes and chairs the IMCC’s 
contract review and negotiating strategy meetings.  The core IMCC team for negotiations led by 
the MOA has come to include representatives from the MOF, MOJ, MOS and NIC.  Because the 
Minister chairs MOA IMCC meetings, representatives of other ministries or agencies attending 
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MOA IMCC meetings are usually Ministers, Deputy Ministers or heads of agencies (e.g., NIC 
Chairman). 
In negotiations led by the MOA, because all members of the IMCC also make up the negoti-
ating team, there has been no marked distinction between the make-up of the IMCC and the 
negotiating team as was the case in the ArcelorMittal and Firestone negotiations.  The technical 
contract work of the MOA IMCCs and negotiating teams is driven by the MOA Minister and 
done largely by the MOA’s Chief Counsel and representatives from LRDC, ISLP or other donor 
organizations (e.g., IFC, IMF, etc.).  Like in the ArcelorMittal and Firestone negotiations—since 
there is no formal procedure for consulting affected communities, labor unions or others in 
civil society—the MOA has through informal meetings sought input from those who might be 
impacted by the concession agreements being negotiated.  As in the ArcelorMittal and Firestone 
process, the MOA Minister in consultation with other members of the IMCC or negotiating 
team will, as necessary, raise contract issues or negotiation priorities for the President’s input. 
Similar to the practice used in the ArcelorMittal and Firestone negotiations, once the MOA nego-
tiating team reached ﬁnal agreement with the investor, the MOA has presented the concession 
contract to the President and Cabinet for ﬁnal review and approval before submitting it to the 
Legislature.
7.2.7 Concession Negotiations by the MLME
In its most recent concession negotiation the MLME seems to be following the negotiating 
process in the 2000 Mining Law. 
Under the 2000 Mining Law, concession negotiations are conducted by a Ministerial Technical 
Committee (“MTC”).  Section 3.5 of the 2000 Mining Law provides that the MTC shall be empow-
ered to negotiate concession agreements under the chairmanship of the MLME Minister. Section 
3.4 of the 2000 Mining Law states that the MTC shall, in addition to the MLME, be made up 
of representatives from the MOJ, MOF, MPEA, MOL, NIC, Council of Economic Advisors to 
the President of Liberia and the Central Bank of Liberia. The 2000 Mining Law provides that 
the President can appoint up to 3 additional persons who are not Government ofﬁcials to serve 
as members of the MTC.  Section 3.3 of the 2000 Mining Law further provides that the MLME 
Minister may delegate any power conferred upon him under the 2000 Mining Law to Deputy 
Ministers, Assistant Ministers, Directors and other ofﬁcials.
The most signiﬁcant differences between the concession negotiating process of the 2000 Mining 
Law and that used in ArcelorMittal and Firestone are the composition of the ministerial review 
committee, the make-up of the negotiating teams and the levels of delegation permitted. 
In the 2000 Mining Law, the MOS (e.g. the Ofﬁce of the President) is not part of the core minis-
terial review committee as was the case in ArcelorMittal and Firestone.  The 2000 Mining Law 
also has the MPEA, MOL, Council of Economic Advisors to the President and the Central Bank as 
members of the core ministerial review team; none of these entities were part of the core ministe-
rial review team in the ArcelorMittal and Firestone negotiations. 
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Under the 2000 Mining Law, the ministerial review committee and the negotiating team are one 
and the same group.  In the negotiating practice used in ArcelorMittal and Firestone, the minis-
terial review committee and the negotiating team were two groups with distinct functions; the 
IMCC reviewed the contract and made recommendations for negotiating priorities, and the nego-
tiating team negotiated the contract.  In contrast to the 2000 Mining Law, in the ArcelorMittal 
and Firestone negotiations the President had the ﬂexibility to appoint anyone to the negotiating 
team. 
The 2000 Mining Law allows the MLME Minister to delegate his chairmanship of the MTC’s 
contract review and negotiations.  Under the practice used in the ArcelorMittal and Firestone 
negotiations, the chairmanship of the IMCC and negotiating team was rarely, if ever, delegated 
and any delegation was for a single meeting and not the entire process. 
It is important to note that the PPCA under Sections 141 (2) (c) (i) and Sections 141 (2) (c) (iv)40 has 
amended or otherwise repealed the sections of the 2000 Mining Law governing the negotiating 
practice for mining concessions (i.e., 2000 Mining Law Sections 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5). 
In the AmLib negotiations, the MTC was chaired primarily by the Assistant Minister of MLME, 
who kept the MLME Minister informed of the MTC’s progress.  In addition to the MLME Assistant 
Minister, the AmLib MTC is made up of representatives from the MOJ, MOF, MPEA, MOL, NIC, 
and the Central Bank of Liberia.  Government representation on the MTC is primarily at the 
Deputy Minister, Assistant Minister and Director levels.  Unlike the ArcelorMittal and Firestone 
negotiations, in the AmLib negotiations technical assistance from the Government’s outside 
advisors has been limited.41  The MTC did use the Amended ArcelorMittal MDA as a model for 
developing a draft contract for AmLib.  Consultations with affected communities or other civil 
society groups have not occurred under the AmLib MTC process.  The AmLib negotiations are 
ongoing.  The MLME has indicated once the MLME Minister has approved the contract negoti-
ated by the MTC, it will be submitted to the President and Cabinet for review before submission 
to the national Legislature for ratiﬁcation. 
 
Table 3 below contrasts the concession negotiation process in the PPCA with the negotiation 
practices used in the ArcelorMittal and Firestone negotiations, by the MOA and MLME. 
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Table 3
Contrasting the PPCA Concession Negotiation Process with the Negotiating Practices used in 
the ArcelorMittal and Firestone negotiations, and by the MOA and MLME
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to constitute team; 
constitution by any 
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ﬁnal decision makers 
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IMCC; ﬁnal decision 
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IMCC
Size = 3–7 persons 
Team responsible for 
defending decisions 






assistance of technical 
advisors as needed
President adjusts size/ 
membership when 
needed to further 
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3–7 persons found to be 
optimal size
Practice appears similar 
to ArcelorMittal and 
Firestone negotiations
MLME appears to 





are the same 
team (groups 
were distinct in 
ArcelorMittal/ 
Firestone)
2000 Mining Law 
sections governing 
negotiating practice 
for mining have been 
amended/repealed 
under PPCA
 Contrasting the Fast Track Negotiations to Other Government Negotiating Practices 
— 73 —






Sector Head Minister, 
President, and NIC 
Chairperson convened 









to MOJ, MOF, and 
MPEA
Also Sector Head 
Minister and two 
Presidential appointed 
Ministers representing 
sectors relevant to the 
concession
President (or Sector 
Head Minister) 
convenes new IMCC 




Chair of NIC not 
involved in convening 
of IMCC 
Always headed by 
Sector Head Minister
Core team include MOJ, 
MOF, MOS, NIC and 
LRDC
President adds other 
Ministers as necessary 
(e.g., MOL in Firestone 
negotiations) 
MOA Minister 
convenes and chairs 
IMCC meetings
Core team includes 
representatives from 
MOF, MOJ, MOS and 
NIC
No marked distinction 
between make-up of 




MOA Minister drives 
Technical contract work 
of MOA IMCCs and 
teams; done largely by 
MOA’s Chief Counsel 
and representatives 
from LRDC, ISLP 
or other donor 
organizations 
(e.g., IFC, IMF, etc.)
President can 
appoint up to 3 
additional non-
governmental 
ofﬁcials to the MTC
MLME Minister may 
delegate any power 
conferred upon him, 
to Deputy Ministers, 
Assistant Ministers, 
Directors and other 
ofﬁcials
Chaired by MLME 
Minister, the MTC 
also includes 
representatives 
from MOJ, MOF, 
MPEA, MOL, NIC, 
Council of Economic 
Advisors to the 
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meetings 
Quorum for work = 
Ministers of Finance, 
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authorized Deputy 
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Geared more to 
contract review and 
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negotiation priorities 
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Table 3 (continued)
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public information 
regarding: 
• project’s strategic 
importance












• other reasons 





unclear (only part 
of concession bid/ 
award process, not 
part of the negotiation 
process)
No formal mechanisms 
for gathering input 
to review process but 
input sought through 
informal meetings and 
discussions
No formal mechanisms 
for gathering input 
MOA held informal 
meetings to seek input 
from communities, 
labor unions or others 
in civil society who 
might be impacted by 
concessions 
No mechanism used
7.3 Recommendations for Harmonizing Government 
 Negotiating Practices 
To institutionalize the factors that produced success in its recent negotiations, the Government 
will need to harmonize the practice it used in the ArcelorMittal and Firestone negotiations 
with the requirements of the PPCA and 2000 Mining Law.  In the analysis above the Report 
Team identiﬁed areas that require harmonization of current PPCA law with the practice the 
Government successfully used in the ArcelorMittal and Firestone negotiations.  Those factors 
include the:
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• process for constituting the negotiating team;
• composition of the negotiating team;
• composition, operation and function of the IMCC; and,
• process for consultation with non-governmental stakeholders.
The analyses above also point out the need to eliminate inconsistencies between the PPCA and 
2000 Mining Law negotiating processes.  The Government should have one negotiating prac-
tice that all Ministries follow when conducting concession negotiations.  This procedure should 
unify best practices from the 2000 Mining Law, the PPCA and the ArcelorMittal and Firestone 
negotiations. 
To harmonize the negotiating practices, the Report Team recommends the Government amend 
Section VI of the PPCA, Speciﬁc Procedures for Processing Concession Agreements, in the following 
manner: 
A) Convene an IMCC to draft amendments to Section VI of the PPCA 
 The IMCC discussions should focus, among other things, on producing an amendment 
to the PPCA that will incorporate the best features of the current PPCA, 2000 Mining 
Law and the negotiating practice used in the ArcelorMittal and Firestone negotiations. 
The IMCC for ‘Harmonization of Concession Processes’ could be chaired by the Minister 
of State, Financial, Legal and Economic Affairs and comprise Ministers from the MOA, 
MLME, MOF, MOJ, the Head of the LRDC, and the Chairmen of the NIC and the PPCC. 
 The members of the IMCC should be assisted by a team of Government experts and tech-
nical advisors (e.g., ISLP, USAID, UNDP, etc.) who should be responsible for preparing 
an initial report and draft amendment to Section VI of the PPCA for discussion by the 
Ministers.  The report prepared by the technical advisors should be similar to the reports 
prepared by the Government’s technical advisors (e.g., the IMF) regarding amendments to 
Liberia’s tax code to reﬂect the gains made in the renegotiations of the ArcelorMittal and 
Firestone contracts.
B) Consult non-governmental stakeholders 
 Once the IMCC has agreed on a draft amendment to Section VI of the PPCA, it should 
formally consult with non-governmental stakeholders before presenting the ﬁnal docu-
ment to the Cabinet and President for approval and submission to the Legislature.
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8. Concession Agreement Monitoring 
 and Compliance
8.1 Introduction
This Report has focused on the contract review and negotiation processes Liberia uses for conces-
sion agreements.  In this section, the Report Team takes a look into Liberia’s future and observes 
that, in order to achieve full beneﬁt from the concession contracts it negotiates, the Government 
will have to effectively monitor, and ensure compliance with, the terms of its negotiated 
agreements. 
8.2 Analysis
Exactly how the Government should accomplish its monitoring and compliance efforts is a topic 
for a separate study.  However, the Report Team has provided a number of recommendations 
below that merit further investigation: 
1. centralize concession resources in a single secretariat or bureau;
2. expand the mandate, authority, staff, resources and funding of the current Bureau of 
Concessions;
3. elevate the Bureau’s stature, position, and reporting structure; and
4. develop a concession contract process and legal framework that includes and supports the 
work of the Bureau.




The Report Team recommends that the Government centralize all technical resources to support 
and monitor its concession activity into a single institution (i.e., a technical secretariat or bureau 
within a ministry).  Centralizing its concession resources is the most effective and efﬁcient way 
for the Government to quickly strengthen its institutional capacity to monitor and review conces-
sion contracts.
Centralization would speed the effectiveness of the Government’s monitoring and compliance 
programs, and bring about coherent and consistent concession practices.  A centralized conces-
sion unit would also create a repository for Government knowledge, expertise and documents 
on Liberia’s concession sector.  A centralized concession unit would lower the Government’s 
over-all costs for monitoring and compliance programs. With a clear chain of command to 
the responsible Minister and President, it could be useful in growing a culture of transpar-
ency and accountability in Liberia’s concession sector.  It should be noted that a centralized 
concession monitoring unit is not new to Liberia.  In the mid-seventies, monitoring and compli-
ance programs for Liberia’s concession sector were centralized in a very capable Concessions 
Secretariat that was housed in the MOF. 
8.3.2 Empowerment of Bureau of Concessions 
The Report Team believes that by expanding the mandate, authority, staff, resources and funding 
of the current Bureau of Concessions the Government will be able to:
• better retain the knowledge and experience gained through its concession review and nego-
tiation process; 
• scale its contract review and negotiation activities without being as limited by the avail-
ability of Government Ministers to participate in the process; and,
• target the knowledge transfer and training from its international technical advisors.
If one accepts that a centralized concession unit is the best vehicle for managing the Government's 
role in Liberia's concession sector, then one must conclude that the institutional capacity of the 
current Bureau of Concessions within the MOF will need to be strengthened signiﬁcantly.  By 
mandate, the Bureau of Concessions is limited to monitoring the ﬁscal provisions of Liberia's 
concession agreements.
At the very minimum, the Bureau's monitoring of concession agreements to ensure compli-
ance with contract terms and conditions should be expanded beyond ﬁscal provisions to include 
social and environmental provisions.  Additionally, the scope of the Bureau's monitoring should 
be increased to include both the investor's and the Government's compliance with the terms of 
the agreement.  This is important since often the investor's obligations under the agreement are 
triggered by Government's performance of its obligations 
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By contrast, the Concessions Secretariat in the mid-1970's had the responsibility to: 
• evaluate and assess investment proposals; 
• develop ﬁscal policy for Liberia's concession sector; 
• negotiate all concession agreements; 
• monitor Liberia's concession sector and concession agreements; and, 
• seek compliance with the terms of the country's concession agreements. 
The head of Secretariat reported to the Chairman of the Concessions and Investments Committee, 
who was the Minister of Finance, as well as to the MOF Deputy Minister for Administration (the 
principal MOF deputy at the time).  The Secretariat was staffed with very well trained Liberian 
professionals and had available to it the expertise of international advisors. 
If the current Government accepts that the responsibility to evaluate and assess investment 
proposals must remain with the NIC, and that the development of ﬁscal policy for the conces-
sion sector is better-handled by others in the MOF or by the MPEA (admittedly open questions 
that the Government may want to further study), the Report Team suggests that the Government 
consider expanding the mandate of the Bureau to include the following tasks: 
1. review of contracts and provision of technical assistance to the IMCC; 
2. provision of legal and negotiation support to the concession negotiating teams appointed 
by the President; 
3. monitoring of Liberia's concession sector and concession agreements (including the moni-
toring of non-ﬁscal terms, e.g., social, environmental, etc.) to ensure compliance by both 
the investor and the Government. 
Expanding the mandate of the Bureau in these ways would create opportunities for its staff 
to develop the subject-matter expertise necessary to do the technical review work.  Currently, 
this work is largely done by Deputy and Assistant Ministers and other political appointees who 
make-up the "technical" committees (i.e., what is often called the IMTC) convened to provide 
the IMCCs with technical and subject-matter input during the negotiation of a particular conces-
sion.  If the Bureau were allowed to play an expanded role in supporting the IMCC's negotiation 
of concession agreements, a similar growth in its legal and negotiating capacity would occur. 
This expanded role in both the review and negotiation of concession agreements would allow the 
Government's political appointees to attend to their other demanding duties, while at the same 
time allowing the Government to scale its concession review and negotiating activities without 
depending upon the availability of Ministers and/or Deputy and Assistant Ministers to attend 
IMCC or IMTC meetings.  Having the Bureau's technical experts perform the work of the IMTC 
would also allow the Government to retain the know-how to conduct concession review after 
political appointees leave Government.  It would make the Government's concession review 
process more transparent by freeing it from the perception of being constrained by potential 
conﬂicts of interest.  Similarly, enabling the Bureau's experts to play a larger role in negotiating 
concession agreements would grow within the Government a team of world-class concession 
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negotiators and allow the Government to retain the invaluable negotiation knowledge and expe-
rience long after the IMCC's Ministers leave Government. 
For such a structure to work, the Bureau’s experts must be compensated at close-to-market rates 
for carrying out expanded responsibilities.  Salaries for the Bureau’s staff must be designed to 
attract and keep Liberia’s best and brightest (from in the country and the Diaspora); and not be 
limited by the Government’s civil-service pay scale.  This would free the staff from the pressure 
of improper inﬂuence and can be justiﬁed given the billions of dollars in concession revenue the 
Bureau’s experts would be responsible for helping the Government generate and protect. 
8.3.3 Elevation of Status
The Report Team proposes that the Government consider changing the Bureau of Concessions’ 
name to the Concessions Secretariat; thereby, growing the Bureau’s stature and providing an 
elevated reporting structure that will be necessary for the Bureau to accomplish the expanded 
responsibilities suggested above. 
The name-change would mark a return of the Bureau to a more central role in the Government’s 
concession activity, and better capture the increased responsibility the Bureau’s staff would have 
in the concession process. 
Elevating the reporting status of the Bureau of Concessions could be accomplished by having the 
head of the Concessions Secretariat report to the Chair of the IMCC and to the Minister where 
the Secretariat would be housed.  Currently, the Director of the Bureau reports to the MOF 
Deputy Minister for Revenue.  He has a staff of 3 (including an advisor from the World Bank) 
to oversee 45 contracts.  Clearly, the Government would need to grow the stafﬁng and funding 
of the Bureau if it is to become the driver of, and central unit for, the Government’s concession 
review, negotiation, monitoring and compliance processes. 
It should be noted that elevating and expanding the Bureau’s role within the concession review 
and negotiating process would also allow the Government to maximize the value it receives from 
its world-class international advisors (e.g., ISLP, RWI, UNDP, Columbia Law School, etc.) by 
having a constant group of Bureau staff within Government with whom these advisors can work, 
develop relationships, and train. 
If the Government commissions a study on how to strengthen its concession monitoring and 
compliance ability, it should ask the study team to examine the pros and cons of continuing to 
house the Concessions Secretariat within the MOF.  Such a report should also weigh the pros 
and cons of housing the Concessions Secretariat at the MOJ, MPEA or the NIC. 
8.3.4 Development of a Regulatory Framework
Finally, the Report Team recommends that, for the longer-term, the Government develop a legal 
framework to support the work of the Bureau—one that would allow the Government to opti-
mize its results from Liberia’s Concession Sector. 
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With the support of a World Bank advisor, the Bureau of Concessions has begun looking at what 
is needed for the Government to revive an effective concessions monitoring and compliance 
program.  With limited resources, the Bureau has made signiﬁcant headway in developing draft 
policies for a concession monitoring and compliance program.  A study on strengthening the 
Government’s ability to monitor and ensure compliance with concession agreements should be 
informed by the Bureau’s work to date.
The Report Team suggests that the Government combine its study on strengthening its ability 
to monitor and ensure compliance with the provisions of its concession agreements, with its 
study of Inter-Ministerial efforts to harmonize its various concession negotiating practices.  This 
will ensure that a comprehensive look is taken at Liberia’s entire concession contract process. 
Through such a study, the roles and functions of the Bureau of Concessions, and the various 
ministerial committees involved in the concession process would be examined in the context of 
amending the PPCA.  If formally requested, the Government’s international advisors (e.g., RWI, 




This Report has documented what the Report Team learned about the negotiating practice 
the Government employed to achieve the gains Liberia experienced in the ArcelorMittal and 
Firestone negotiations.  It has also laid out the Report Team’s analyses and recommendations for 
strengthening, institutionalizing and harmonizing the Government’s contract review and nego-
tiating process.  Lastly, it has outlined suggestions that would help the Liberian Government 
strengthen its ability to monitor and seek compliance with the terms of its concession contracts, 
post-signature.
Speciﬁcally, the Report documented how and why the signiﬁcant gains the Government achieved 
in Liberia’s recent renegotiations of the ArcelorMittal and Firestone can be attributed to several 
important factors: 1) Presidential leadership; 2) teamwork and the development of consensus 
on the Government’s negotiating teams aided by successful negotiating strategies; and 3) world-
class technical assistance from the Government’s advisors. 
The Report Team’s analyses and recommendations of possible strategies for the Government 
to ensure similar gains in ongoing and future concession negotiations were presented.  Several 
key factors were discussed, including strengthening and institutionalizing the Government’s 
efforts to: 1) grow and scale its own capacity to manage and negotiate complex investment agree-
ments; 2) have consultations with and input from non-governmental stakeholders affected by 
concession activity; and 3) promote transparency by making concession agreements more easily 
accessible to the public. 
In addition, this Report discussed the Government’s need to harmonize the negotiating prac-
tice it used in the ArcelorMittal and Firestone negotiations with the concession negotiation 
requirements of the PPCA.  The Report made the point that amendment of the PPCA will be 
necessary to: 1) achieve effective institutionalization of the factors that produced success in the 
Government’s recent negotiations with ArcelorMittal and Firestone; and, 2) ensure that a single 
concession negotiating process is followed by all Government Ministries and agencies.
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Finally, as part of its efforts to harmonize the ArcelorMittal and Firestone negotiating practice 
with the PPCA, the Report Team suggests that the Government consider strengthening its ability 
to monitor and seek compliance with the terms of its concession agreements by examining the 
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Questionnaire Documenting Liberia’s Current Negotiating and 
Contract Review Practice
A Questionnaire to Gather Information
Necessary to Document Liberia’s Current Negotiating and Contract Review Practice
1. Describe Liberia’s current contract and concession agreement negotiation process from 
your perspective?  How different is this process from the contract review process?
 A. How did you get involved?  How were you selected? Who contacted you?
 B. Were you the only person from your Ministry involved in the contract review and 
negotiation team?  Who were the others?  How were they selected?
 C. Who were the other members of the contract review and negotiation team? What 
were the other Ministries / Agencies represented on the team?
 D. Who made the ﬁnal decision on the make-up of the negotiation team?  Was the ﬁnal 
make-up of the negotiation team made public?
 E. Did the negotiation team have a formal name (e.g., Inter-Ministerial Technical 
Team?) 
 F. How did the team decide when and where negotiation meetings would take place? 
Was the timing and location of each negotiation session made public?
 G. Where did the team derive its mandate/authority to negotiate on behalf of the 
Government (e.g., in law, regulation, executive order)?
 H. How did the team decide which contract to negotiate?  On what basis did the team 
select to negotiate one contract over others requiring negotiation?  Who was involved 
in making this decision?
 I. Did the negotiation team receive technical input from experts during the negotia-
tion process?  Were they Government employees or outside experts supporting the 
Government?
 J. How were outside experts selected and assigned to the negotiation team?  Who made 
that decision?
 K. What was the role of these experts in the negotiation process?
 L. How did the negotiation team establish its negotiation strategy and positions? Did 
the team start by considering input from its technical experts?  Did the team rely 
on or consider reports or recommendations from other groups within the govern-
ment (e.g., the Contracts and Concessions Review Secretariat, the Inter-Ministerial 
Contract Review Committee)?  Did the team receive or seek input from non-govern-
mental actors (e.g., civil society, investors, Liberian business or labor associations, 
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etc.)? How were these non-governmental input provided the Government’s technical 
experts for consideration in their analysis?
 M. How were issues raised, prioritized, discussed and resolved among members of 
the negotiation team? How did the negotiation team reach consensus on issues 
or compromise positions offered to the other side? What role did technical experts 
assisting the Government play in the arriving at a consensus or a compromise posi-
tion?
 N. Were there ever issues that the team deadlocked on and felt they needed the President’s 
input to resolve?  How was the decision made to escalate a particular issue to the 
President?  How were escalated issues presented to the President? Who participated 
in these escalation meetings with the President?
 O. Did the President generally participate in the group’s meetings?  What was the process 
for involving her in a meeting?
 P. What was the process for updating the President on the progress of the negotiation?
 Q. Did the negotiation team keep their deliberations conﬁdential during the negotiation 
process?
 R. How did the negotiation keep the documents it was required or wanted to keep conﬁ-
dential from being made public?
 S. How did the negotiation team handle requests from civil society or the press for 
updates on the negotiation process?
 T. How did the negotiation team gain public support for the ﬁnal contract negotiated 
with the investor?
 U. How did the negotiation team support the Government in the contract ratiﬁcation 
process before the National Legislature?  Who from the negotiation team participates 
in this process? How were they selected?
 V. What is the process for making the contract a public document following ratiﬁcation 
by the National Legislature?
 W. From your perspective, what do you think are the major gains from the (re)-negotia-
tion process for the Government and people of Liberia?
 X. What mechanisms does the Government have in place to ensure contract monitoring 
and compliance following the ratiﬁcation process?  What can be done to strengthen 
those mechanisms and processes?
2. Describe the contract review process from your perspective?
 A. How did you get involved?  Who contacted you?
 B. What documents were you given?  Who provided the documents?
 C. What was your role in the review process?
 D. What was your objective in the review process?
 E. What was your deliverable?
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 F. Did you review the documents personally?
 G. Did you receive technical input from experts?  Were they Government employees or 
outside experts supporting the Government?
 H. Did you receive input from others (e.g., civil society? investors? Liberian business or 
labor associations, etc.?
 I. Were you the only person from your Ministry involved in the review process?  Who 
were the others?
 J. Who were the other members of the contract review process?  What other Ministries/
Agencies were represented in the process?
 K. How often did everyone involved in the contract review process meet?
 L. What was the formal name given to the team meeting to review the contract in ques-
tion?
 M. Who called the meetings? Who chaired the meetings?  Was there a quorum 
required?
 N. Where did the team derive its mandate/authority for review (e.g., in law, regulation, 
executive order)?
 O. How did the team prioritize its contract review?  On what basis did the team select a 
contract for review over other contracts needing review?
 P. What was the legal or contractual basis for reviewing the contract in question?   
 Q. What was your understanding of the scope and objective of the team’s review?
 R. What was the team’s deliverable?
 S. How were the meetings conducted?  How were issues raised, prioritized, and 
discussed? 
 T. Did the President ever participate in the group’s meetings?  What was the process for 
involving her in a meeting?
 U. Did the contract review team include governmental actors outside of the Executive 
branch?
 V. Were third party views (non-governmental) views heard at the meeting?  Did the 
group solicit input from civil society, investors, and other non-governmental actors 
in the discussion of issues at the meeting? How was this input solicited?  Were such 
non-governmental actors invited to participate or present at the meetings?
 W. Was the resolution of issues guided by certain broad policies (e.g., the general appli-
cability of law)?
 X. How were issues decided?  How did the group reach consensus? What role did tech-
nical experts assisting the Government play in the decision making process?
 Y. Who recorded the minutes, action items and follow-up requirements from the 
meeting?
 Getting a Better Deal from the Extractive Sector 
— 90 —
 Z. Was there a timeline for completing the review?  Who set the timeline?  What was the 
process for handling delays?
 AA. Who prepared the ﬁnal report?  What did it recommend?  Were there broad policy 
and negotiation strategies adopted in the report?  Did the ﬁnal report include desired 
wording on speciﬁc provisions in the contract being reviewed?
 BB. What happened to the report? Who was the report sent to?
 CC. Were you involved in the actual negotiation process?  Were others from the contract 
review group involved in the negotiation process?  How were people selected to 
participate in the negotiation process?
 DD. Did the negotiation team seek formal input or ask questions of the contract review 




Guiding Framework: Review of NTGL Contracts and Concessions
Introduction
The GOL will convene a Contract and Concession Review Committee (The Committee or CCRC,) 
under the auspices of the Governance and Economic Management Assistance Program, with 
the mandate to review all contracts and concessions entered into by the National Transitional 
Government of Liberia. The Committee will review all contracts entered into by the NTGL as 
allowed by the following mandates:
a. Mandate of the Public Procurement and Concessions Committee under the terms of the 
Governance Economic Management Assistance Program (GEMAP).
b. By the appointment of a Contracts and Concessions Review Committee by the President of 
Liberia
c. Section 5(e) of the Public Procurement and Concessions Committee Act.
 
This review may be conducted in several stages, by various review Committees involving 
Ministries, International Partners, International Legal Experts and State Owned Enterprises. 
Additionally, the government reserves the right to expand the review at a later date to cover 
contracts engaged in prior to the term of the NTGL but this is outside the scope of the GEMAP. 
This document provides the guiding framework under which the review under GEMAP can 
provide a fair and consistent basis for providing recommendations to the President of Liberia, 
and Cabinet.
The overall consideration when conducting the review will be: Is this contract/concession (and 
its implications) in the national interest of Liberia?
Public outreach program
There is a need for public outreach on the contract and concession review to achieve four goals:
1. Solicitation of all documentation pertaining to contracts and concessions signed by the 
NTGL so the review Committee has a comprehensive list
2. Informing the public of the purpose and scope of the review process so as to provide 
stability in the business community
3. Solicitation of input from members of the public who may have relevant information 
regarding the contracts to be reviewed
4. Gain public support to strengthen the existing mandates for the review
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Appendix 1: Public outreach Program outlines the activities and timing of the public awareness 
events designed to inform and solicit participation from the public in the contract and conces-
sion review.  Primary actions will include:
1. PPCC to publish a list of all known NTGL contracts and concessions and conduct a public 
solicitation for all other contracts entered into during the life of the NTGL. 
2. Communication to the public about the need for and purpose of the review, with an 
emphasis on providing reassurance to the business community. 
3. Solicitation for public comment on contracts under review, via letter or email address
1. Creation of a Formal Contract and Concession Review Committee
The formal CCRC will review contracts and present their ﬁndings to the GEMAP Technical 
Team and the Economic Governance Steering Committee.  The CCRC, through it’s technical 
secretariat, will create and work to ﬁll Company Data Sheets like the samples in Appendix 2: and 
present this data to the GEMAP TT and EGSC, along with recommendations to the President. 
These recommendations and proposals may include: maintaining the contract; negotiating 
amendments to the contract; canceling the contract or declaring it null and void. The President 
of Liberia may elect to further review the CCRC recommendation with the Cabinet and other 
relevant ofﬁcials of the Government and share their comments, observations and recommenda-
tions for action with the EGSC.
CCRC Composition: 
1. Committee lead: Representative from PPCC
2. Member from Ministry of Justice
3. Member from the Chamber of Commerce
4. Member from Liberian Bar Association
5. International representative (to be ﬁlled by IRCCE upon arrival)
A Technical Secretariat comprised of the following persons will support the work of the CCRC:
1. Lead: Internationally Recruited Contracts and Concession Expert
2. International attorney(s): Expert in international and procurement law
3. Local Attorney: Local legal expert in contract/concession and Liberian constitutional law
4. Administrative assistant: Local administrative support staff
5. There is also a need for short-term, subject matter experts (SME) in the areas of: minerals 
energy, telecommunications, general services and construction, equipment, manufac-




• The EC will recruit the IRCCE.
• The USG has recruited a minerals concession expert who will be able to serve as the SME 
for minerals contracts. This expert should be in place by the end of April. 
• The USG will fund the local attorney and administrative assistant who could be recruited 
quickly.
• The World Bank will provide SME’s for other industry sectors. The World Bank will also 
provide the international attorney.
CCRC terms of reference:
1. Compile information for review.
2. Contact contract and concession holders, and current/former government ofﬁcials for 
additional necessary documents.
3. Reﬁne the review methodology and criteria of the CCRT, including data sheets, according 
to member expertise and applicable law at the time of contract execution.
4. Review each contract and concession, complete company data sheets and document 
ﬁndings and recommendations (supported through the work and recommendations of 
the TS.)
5. Present clearly all evidence and make evidence available to GEMAP TT and EGSC.
6. Maintain minutes for meetings and all other secretarial duties.
7. Facilitate ﬁeld visits and appointments if necessary.
8. Co-opt any necessary technical expertise.
9. Provide information and make contract speciﬁc recommendations through the GEMAP 
TT to the EGSC as well as recommendations on possible procurement reforms.
10. Write status reports for presentation to the GEMAP Technical Team and report to the 
TT and EGSC on periodic or on needed basis.
11. After the review, the CCRC will prepare a lessons learned document recommending 
improvements to contracting and public procurement procedures
2. Contract and Concession Review Criteria
Composition
There are three possible levels of review possible:
1. Formal GEMAP Review Committee- convened by the President
2. Pro Bono legal assistance- provided by international actors 
3. Ministerial or Parastatal level review efforts
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Ground Rules
Ground rules are established for the following reasons:
1. To deﬁne a framework for evaluating all contracts and concessions on a fair and equal basis 
(level playing ﬁeld)
2. To establish the legal grounds for consideration of a legal review of the various contracts 
and concessions; and
3. To determine the basis to make recommendations to the President after completion of 
reviewers work.
The following criteria will be examined to determine the validity of any contract. (Note: in all 
circumstances, the applicable law at the time of contract execution will shape the applicability or 
non-applicability of these guidelines.)
 1. Contract Award: 
  • Is the contracting company a bona ﬁde legal entity?
  • Was there an open, advertised tender?  
  • Applicable if contracts were entered into after the Interim Public Procurement 
Procedures came into effect on November 15, 2004
   i. Did the tender comply with the IPPP? 
   ii. Was it single sourced, and if so, was this justiﬁed?
   iii. Was the contract approved by the CMC? 
   iv. Did the CMC act within the law?
  • Was the process transparent (i.e. was the contract properly tendered, well docu-
mented, bidding committee, were there allegations of corruption, etc.) 
  • Was the contract properly executed, (e.g. all necessary signatures, ratiﬁcation by 
the legislature (if necessary,))?
  • Does the winning company have the capacity to perform on the contract?
 
 2. Contract Technical Considerations: 
  • Is the contract clear in the terms and obligations of the parties? 
  • Are there penalty and performance clauses?
  • Is the timeframe reasonable?
  • If there was a tender issued, are the contract terms consistent with the tender 
documents? 
  • Does the contract comply with the rule of law (I.e. are provisions of the contract 
consistent with similar contracts of this nature)?
  • Was the contract properly executed, (e.g. all necessary signatures, ratiﬁcation by 
the legislature (if necessary,))?
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 3. Contract Performance (Analyzed only if the contract is ongoing or complete): 
  • Did both parties perform their obligations under the contract?
 4. Contract Economic Evaluation: 
  • Did Liberia get a reasonable exchange on the contract? 
  • Is the contract term appropriate, considering local circumstances? 
  • Is the contract in the national ﬁnancial interest? 
  • Do the terms (accounting for local factors like risk) reﬂect comparable deals 
elsewhere?  
Multiple Reviews
The responsible Ministry or Parastatal may wish to engage in a review of a contract prior to 
examination by the CCRC. This is acceptable, provided that the entity follows the above guide-
lines and provides the EGSC the documentation pertaining to its review. No entity should use 
this review as a pretext or justiﬁcation for contract modiﬁcation, cancellation or endorsement 
without consultation with the CCRC and EGSC. Contracts modiﬁed, endorsed or cancelled 
without such consultation are still subject to the review of the CCRC.
A Note on Precedent
This document in no way provides a legal justiﬁcation for reviewing, modifying or canceling 
contracts outside of the process established above. Nor does it establish precedent in Liberian law 
for arbitrary review of contracts and concessions. Contract law in Liberia must be respected at all 
times. This contract and concession review is necessitated by the exceptional circumstances, as 
outlined in GEMAP, surrounding the long-term civil conﬂict and the general breakdown of the 
rule of law, especially as it relates to public procurement and concessions. 
The Government of Liberia may conduct future reviews to cover contracts engaged in prior to 
the term of the NTGL, so as to insure compliance with the rule of law. However, going forward, 
contracts that meet the requirements of the public procurement code and rule of law shall not 
be subject to review, absent similar extraordinary circumstances. This notation is necessary to 
insure future compliance with the rule of law and to insure respect for the sanctity of legally 
engaged contracts. 
3. Present Recommendations 
The CCRC will conduct their review and present their ﬁndings in segments, rather than 
completing the entire review and presenting a report. Dividing the review into segments will 
allow the Committee to show results quickly, reﬁne the review process, and also allows for the 
staging of the highest priority industry groups toward the beginning of the review. In their 
reports, the Review Committee will present recommendations to the GOL on whether contracts 
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should be maintained as is, renegotiated, cancelled or declared null and void. The national 
interest will have to be balanced in these recommendations, as cancellation may expose the GOL 
to litigation.
Upon completion of the Review, the Committee will submit its report and recommendations to 
the GEMAP Technical Team for comment. The CCRC will then present the report to the EGSC. 
The President of the Government of Liberia may distribute the report and act upon the recom-
mendations at her discretion.
4. Scheduled Work Plan
Present to May  Recruit Committee members
Present to May  MoF to solicit list of NTGL contracts and concessions
Present to August Columbia University team to conduct initial assessment
May–June  Committee formation and organization
June–September Committee review of contracts and concessions
July    First committee report to GEMAP TT/EGSC
September  Second committee report to GEMAP TT/EGSC
October  Wrap up reports and Committee conclusion of work
Appendix 1: Public Communication 
There is a need for public outreach on the contract and concession review to achieve four goals:
1. Solicitation of all documentation pertaining to contracts and concessions signed by the 
NTGL so the review Committee has a comprehensive list
2. Informing the public of the purpose and scope of the review process so as to provide 
stability in the business community
3. Solicitation of input from members of the public who may have relevant information 
regarding the contracts to be reviewed
4. Gain public support to strengthen the existing mandates for the review
Primary actions will include:
1. PPCC to publish a list of all known NTGL contracts and concessions and conduct a public 





PUBLIC PROCUREMENT AND CONCESSIONS COMMISSION
GEMAP CONTRACTS AND CONCESSIONS REVIEW
Ofﬁcial Solicitation for All Contract and Concession Agreements signed between the 14th October
2003 and the 16th January 2006 with the National Transitional Government of Liberia
The Government of Liberia has committed itself in the interests of accountability and transpar-
ency with the Liberian People and the International Community, to undertake a complete review 
of all contract and concession agreements signed by the NTGL from the period 14th October 
2003 to 16th January 2006.  This review is to ensure that the contractual arrangements and 
agreements entered into on behalf of the People of Liberia by the NTGL, were undertaken in an 
appropriate, transparent and economically justiﬁable manner.  The Contracts and Concession 
Review Committee (CCRC) will conduct this review under the auspices of the Governance 
and Economic Management Assistance Program (GEMAP) in collaboration with the Public 
Procurement and Concessions Commission.  The CCRC will work with a secretariat, which will 
comprise of national and international specialists between May and October 2006.
Therefore it is hereby announced that ALL PERSONS OR ENTITIES IN LIBERIA OR OUTSIDE 
OF LIBERIA who entered into a contract agreement with any Government Ofﬁcial, Agency, 
Ministry, Institution or Public Corporation of the NTGL between October 14th, 2003 and January 
16th, 2006 must register this full contract and all accompanying documentation with the Public 
Procurement and Concessions Commission by 1st June 2006.  This registration is mandatory for 
all contracts where the value is above US10,000.
The updated list of registered contracts can be picked up at the PPCC Ofﬁce.
Authority for this solicitation and penalties for failure to respond or misrepresentation are found 
in Part II, paragraph 11 of the Public Procurement and Concessions Act (2006.)
Attn:
The Executive Director
Public Procurement and Concessions Commission
Capitol Hill, Monrovia, Liberia
West Africa
All respondents are requested to include contact information (contact name, physical address, 
telephone and fax number and email) so the PPCC and/or the review team can follow up if 
further information is needed.
All persons or entities whose contracts are not registered with the PPCC by 1st June 2006 and 
that are subsequently discovered by the Review Team to be in existence, will automatically be 
recommended to be declared null and void under the laws of the Republic of Liberia and subject 
to penalties as mandated in the Public Procurement and Concession Act.
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Appendix 2: Sample Review Worksheets
Example individual company data sheet
Date:     
Company name: 




A. Verify if concession holder is a bona 
ﬁde legal business entity authorized 
to operate in Liberia
1. Bona ﬁde company
B. Tendering process: Was there an 
open, advertised tender? 
 Did the tender comply with the IPPP? 
 Was it single sourced, and if so, how 
was this justiﬁed?
 Was the contract approved by the 
CMC? If so, on what basis? 
1. Authenticity of contract
C. Was the contract properly executed, 
e.g. all necessary signatures, 
ratiﬁcation by the legislature 
(if necessary,)?
1. Compliance with legal requirements 
for execution
D. Does the contract comply with the 
rule of law (i.e., does it break any 
Liberian laws (tax, customs, criminal, 
etc.,) violate Security Council 
resolutions, etc)
1. Compliance with Liberian and 
international laws.
E. Does the winning company have the 
capacity to perform on the contract?
1. Industry experience
Contract Technical considerations: 
A. Is the contract clear in the terms and 
obligations of the parties? 
1. Clarity of contract terms and 
obligations
B. Are there penalty and performance 
clauses?
1. Penalty and performance clauses 
exist and are reasonable
C. Is the timeframe reasonable? 1. Timeframe is reasonable and in 
accordance with tender documents
D. Are the contract terms consistent with 
the tender documents?
1. Contract terms agreement with 
tender
Contract Performance (Analyzed only if 
the contract is ongoing or complete): 
A. Did both parties perform their 
obligations under the contract?




Terms of Reference Point Issue to Be Veriﬁed Means of 
Veriﬁcation
Yes/No
Contract Economic Evaluation: 
A. Did Liberia get a reasonable exchange 
on the contract? 
1. Fees paid to government. Resources 
or concession exchanged.
B. Is the contract term appropriate? 1. Term is appropriate for contract and 
entity
C. Do the terms (accounting for local 
factors like risk) reﬂect comparable 
deals elsewhere?
1. Is the value Liberia receives 
appropriate considering risk and 
circumstances?
D. Is the contract in the national ﬁnancial 
interest?
1. Subjective evaluation of all factors. 
2. Evaluation of cost/beneﬁt of 
possible contract cancellation/
modiﬁcation and possible litigation 
vs. performance on the contract.
Example summary of results—Overall company data sheet
Company 
Name
Terms of Reference Responses to Points 1–9 
from Individual Company Worksheets
Committee 
Recommendation
1 2 3 4a 4b 5a 5a 6a 6b 7 8a 8b 9 10
Co #1 Y N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y N N Y N
Co #2 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y
C
D
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Appendix IV 
Summary of the Main Changes Brought About by the Review of the 
Mittal Mineral Development Agreement
IMPORTANT: This summary is for information purposes only and must be read in light of the 
   full Mineral Development Agreement as amended.
Original MDA (2005) Amended MDA (2006)
Infrastructure
• Buchanan to Yekepa railroad and Buchanan mineral 
port (excluding commercial port facilities) to be 
transferred to Concessionaire.
• Right of third parties to access excess capacity of the 
railroad and mineral port, subject to negotiations in 
good faith among Concessionaire, Government and 
such third party.
• Concessionaire entitled to reasonable compensation 
for third party use.
• Government to retain ownership of the Buchanan 
to Yekepa railroad and Buchanan port, but to grant 
right to develop, use, operate and maintain same to 
Concessionaire.
• Government to authorize third party access 
to excess capacity of the railroad and port, in 
consultation with Concessionaire.
• Revenue for third party use to be shared between 
Government and Concessionaire.
• Concessionaire to undertake the expansion and 
modernization of the railroad and port at the request 
of Government. Failure to do so gives Government 
the right to proceed on its own or through a third 
party, subject to consensus on excess capacity and 
revenue sharing formula.
• New joint committee to review decisions regarding 
third party access to and modernization of the 
railroad and port.
Royalties
• Rate of 4.5%. Pricing based on invoiced sales of iron 
ore.
• Calculated FOB Yekepa.
• Lower rate of royalty for processed iron ore.
• Rate of 4.5%. Pricing based on fair market value 
under international standards for similar quality iron 
ore, with due consideration given to product cost, 
and subject to applicable adjustments.
• Calculated FOB Buchanan.
• Negotiated index price for processed iron ore. Rate 
to remain at 4.5%
Income Taxation
• Application of Liberian tax law as at the date of the 
agreement, and as contractually modiﬁed or limited 
through the agreement
• Ceiling tax rate of 30%.
• 0.5% turnover tax rate (credited against income tax 
liability).
• Renewable tax holiday.
• General application of Liberian tax law as at the 
date of the amendment, subject to certain agreed 
exceptions and to an agreed exhaustive list of 
applicable taxes.
• Ceiling tax rate of 30%.
• 1% turnover tax rate (credited against income tax 
liability).
• No tax holiday.
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Original MDA (2005) Amended MDA (2006)
Withholding Taxes on Payments to Nonresidents and Residents
• Total exemption from withholding taxes on 
contractor and interest payments. 
• No tax on the distribution of dividends by 
Concessionaire or any of its associates.
• Withholding tax is payable on contractor payments 
and interest payments at a reduced rate of 6% and 
9%, respectively, for 10 years.
• Tax exemption on dividends limited to 
Concessionaire.
Duties
• Application of Liberian taxes and duties as 
contractually modiﬁed or limited in the agreement.
• 50% reduction on import duty on gasoline for the 
term of the agreement.
• $400,000 to be paid in 2 installments in lieu of 
duties on a wide range of imports for the term of the 
agreement.
• Tax and duties on other items to be no higher than 
for any other producer of iron ore.
• Application of ordinary taxes, fees and revenue 
charges.
• Exemption from BIVAC fee.
• Exemption from ECOWAS fee.
• General application of Liberian law with speciﬁc 
exemptions and subject to an agreed exhaustive list 
of applicable duties.
• 50% reduction on import duty and sales tax on 
gasoline and diesel for 7 years.
• $400,000 to be paid in 2 installments in lieu of 
duties on items listed in an appendix (mainly capital 
goods such as construction equipment) for the ﬁrst 
5 years.
• 40% of import duties on appendix items for years 
6 to 10.
• Goods and Service Tax exemption for appendix 
items for term of agreement.
• Concessionaire to bear inspection fees.
• No exemption from ECOWAS fee.
One-time Payment
• No one-time payment. • $15 million to be paid to Government in 3 equal 
installments.
Sovereignty
• Provisions of the agreement prevail over Liberian 
laws and regulations
• Complete stabilization of Liberian laws and 
regulations.
• Agreement governed by UK law, with due regard to 
the laws of Liberia.
• General applicability of Liberian laws, subject to the 
provisions of the agreement
• Stabilization of laws relating to taxes and duties.
• Agreement governed by Liberian law, subject to 
generally accepted legal principles.
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Social Beneﬁts
• Preference to the employment of Liberian citizens in 
skilled positions, subject to equality of qualiﬁcations.
• Complete freedom to choose senior management.
• $50,000 per year to fund overseas scholarships.
• $50,000 per year to the Department of Mining and 
Geology at the University of Liberia.
• Schedule to govern the number of qualiﬁed 
Liberians employed in skilled positions.
• 25% of senior management positions to be held by 
Liberians within 5 years, subject to availability.
• 50% of senior management positions to be held by 
Liberians within 10 years, subject to availability.
• 1 of the top 3 senior managers to be a Liberian 
within 1 year.
• $200,000 per year to fund overseas scholarships.
• $50,000 per year towards the creation and operation 
of a Mining and Geology Institute of the University 
of Liberia in the Yekepa area.
• Health and safety facilities, health care procedures 
and practices, and health and safety training to be in 
accordance with accepted international standards.
Environmental Protections
• Government may, at the expense of Concessionaire, 
conduct a periodic environmental audit and 
assessment, subject to prior agreement on scope 
and budget.
• Concessionaire to conduct an annual environmental 
audit and assessment and Government to conduct 
periodic inspections of the concession area at its 
own expense.
Development of Concession Area
• Activities to commence within 45 days of 
the agreement and then to follow a tentative 
development program.
• Tentative development program and:
 (i) 3-year deadline for full rehabilitation of the 
railroad and port;
 (ii) 4-year deadline for the commencement of 
continuous production; and
 (iii) a schedule to ensure consistent annual iron ore 
production.
• Right of ﬁrst refusal to incorporate contiguous 
unencumbered areas with potentially exploitable 
iron ore resources
 into the concession area
• Government to grant an exploration license for any 
area within the concession
 area on notice from the Concessionaire.
• Government to grant the right for Concessionaire to 
utilize and possess public land without cost.
• Where necessary, Government to intervene and 
acquire private land at
 concessionaire’s expense, for Concessionaire to 
utilize and possess. Land then deemed part of the 
concession area.
• Surface rental payable at $200,000 for the ﬁrst 2 
years and $300,000 for the remainder of the term.
• Right to submit a bid for the right to undertake 
exploration of potentially exploitable iron ore in 
unencumbered contiguous areas.
• Right to undertake exploration and development 
of other minerals within the concession area in 
accordance with Liberian mining law.
• Government and Concessionaire to negotiate in
 good faith for the right to use public land located 
outside concession area. Such land not to be part of 
the concession area.
• No Government involvement in negotiations 
between Concessionaire and private landowners.
• Surface rental payable at $200,000 for the ﬁrst 2 
years and $300,000 for the remainder of the term 




Summary of the Main Changes Brought About by the Government of 
Liberia’s Review of the 2005 Concession Agreement with Firestone 
Liberia, Inc.
FINAL
Original Concession Agreement (2005) Amended Concession Agreement (2007)
Parties
• The Republic of Liberia; Firestone Natural Rubber 
Company, LLC; and Firestone Plantations Company
• The Republic of Liberia; and Firestone Liberia, Inc.
Term
• Rehabilitation Term, Regular Term and Extended 
Term total up to 86 years until 2091
• Rehabilitation Term and Regular Term total 36 years 
until 2041 
Grant of Rights
• No Firestone warranty of Ownership • Firestone Liberia acknowledges Government 
ownership of all rubber trees and other non-movable 
assets in Production Area at termination of the 
Agreement and provides Government a covenant 
of non-encumbrance during the Term of the 
Agreement
• Firestone Liberia commitment to provide  sufﬁcient 
rubber trees capable of being tapped at all times, 
including at termination, to permit continuation of 
commercial production of rubber on the farm on a 
going concern basis
• Contemporaneous with the signing of the Amended 
Agreement, Firestone Liberia will have its parent 
company Bridgestone Firestone Diversiﬁed 
Products, LLC (“BFDP”) enter into a Supplemental 
Agreement with the Government which provides, 
among other things, that BFDP will not pledge, or 
use as collateral the ﬁxed assets, including rubber 
trees, of Firestone Liberia, and that Firestone Liberia 
will remain a wholly-owned subsidiary of BFS unless 
the Government grants its written consent
• Firestone free to engage in the production and 
utilization of agriculture products in Liberia
• Firestone Liberia limited to the production and 
utilization of rubber and rubber products in the 
production area
• Firestone and the Government will prepare a map, 
that will be binding upon the parties and conﬁrm the 
total concession area is 118,990 acres and no more. 
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Communication Systems and Utilities and Construction and Use of Support Systems
• Government agrees to make available, free 
of charge, for use by Firestone Liberia or its 
Afﬁliates an adequate number of broadcast and 
communication frequencies
• Firestone and its Afﬁliates may use airports, harbor, 
port or similar facility owned or operated by the 
Government on best terms applicable to any other 
person using the same facility
• Government agrees to make available, at generally 
prevailing rates, for use by Firestone Liberia or its 
Afﬁliates an adequate number of broadcast and 
communication frequencies
• Firestone and its Afﬁliates may use airports, harbor, 
port or similar facility owned or operated by the 
Government on terms generally applicable to 
similarly situated person using the same facility
Conduct of Operations 
• Export sales price on transactions with Afﬁliates 
based on contract negotiated between Firestone 
Liberia and its Afﬁliate, subject to a 90 day 
Government review period
• Commitment to replant at least 5000 acres per year 
from 2009 to 2015
• Purchase price of rubber from Liberian rubber 
farmers derived by taking the average of prices 
received by Firestone Liberia for the same type of 
rubber less the cost of conversion, processing, 
transportation, taxes and duties, administrative and 
production overhead and reasonable proﬁt
• Export sales prices for any transaction between 
Firestone Liberia and an Afﬁliate shall be determined 
by reference to available international reference 
prices or indices 
• For dry rubber, the export sales price shall be 
based on the daily closing price on the Singapore 
Commodity Exchange (“SICOM”) of TSR20 
• For latex concentrate, the export sales price shall be 
based on the daily noon day price on the Malaysian 
Rubber Board (“MRB”) for latex in bulk concentrate 
• Commitment to replant at least 50,000 acres from 
2005 to 2017
• After January 2018, commitment to maintain 65,000 
planted acres of rubber during the Term
• Purchase price to Liberian Rubber Farmer based on 
international index (SICOM for dry rubber or MRB 
for latex) export sales price less cost of sale incurred 
by Firestone Liberia and a reasonable mark-up
• Allocations used in computing deductible costs and 




Original Concession Agreement (2005) Amended Concession Agreement (2007)
Public Health and Safety
• Firestone permitted to establish Plant Protection 
Department to maintain order and security on 
the concession subject to Law with the power to 
apprehend and detain persons to be turned over to 
the appropriate Government authority as provided 
by Law 
• No security plan
• Commitment to provide access to clean and safe 
drinking water to all residential communities within 
the production area prior to the end of 2015
• Commitment to complete program to reconstruct, 
rehabilitate and renovate damaged employee 
housing in the Production Area by 2015 
• Firestone Liberia permitted to establish Plant 
Protection Department to maintain order and 
security on the concession subject to Law and 
international human right principles with the power 
to apprehend and detain persons provided such 
persons are turned over to the Liberian National 
Police no later than 24 hours from the time of 
detention
• Security plan to be agreed upon and implemented 
by Firestone Liberia and the Government
• Commitment that all wells provide potable water 
that meet or exceed standards established by Law 
and, in residential communities served by wells, a 
commitment to provide at least one well per every 
30 houses
• Commitment that each household in the Production 
Area will by Dec. 31, 2011 have a bathroom or safe 
and sanitary latrine
• Commitment to construct 2,300 new houses 
meeting Firestone Liberia’s improved housing 
standard by Dec. 31, 2010
• Commitment to provide one house for each 
Firestone Liberia employee entitled to housing by 
2015
• Commitment to renovate all damaged and older 
housing intended for habitation to conform to basic 
features of Firestone’s improved housing standard 
by Dec. 31, 2017
Education 
• Commitment to undertake a study in coordination 
with the Government on the need for an additional 
high school in the Production Area
• In addition to completing construction on its own 
schools through the high school level, Firestone 
Liberia shall provide ﬁnancial assistance to the 
Harbel Multilateral High School of a $165,000 over a 
three year period from 2008 to 2011  
• Commitment to contribute $35,000 annually 
through 2015 to a Government administered and 
operated adult education program in the Production 
Area, with priority for Dependent spouses
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Employment, Training and Use of Liberian Products and Services
• Unskilled positions not limited to Liberian citizens
• Firestone to provide preference for employment 
to qualiﬁed Liberian citizens at all skilled job levels 
within the company when such positions become 
available 
• Firestone to provide training for Liberians as 
required by its operations and to qualify them for 
employment positions with the company
• When purchasing goods and services required for 
Production, Firestone will give preference to Liberian 
goods and services  
• Liberian citizens to be hired for all unskilled 
positions
• Firestone to provide preference for employment 
to qualiﬁed Liberian citizens at all skilled and 
management job levels within the company with at 
least 30% of ten most senior management positions 
to be held by Liberian citizens within 5 years, and at 
least 50% of such positions within 10 years of the 
Effective Date
• Firestone Liberia to provide on-the-job and 
vocational training for Liberian citizens as 
required by its operations and to qualify them for 
employment positions with the company utilizing
• Additionally, Firestone Liberia to provide $115,000 
through 2015, and thereafter $150,000 annually in 
scholarships for Liberian citizens, with a quarter 
of such amount to be reserved for Margibi County 
students
• Firestone Liberia to provide $50,000 annually to the 
University of Liberia’s College of Agriculture
• When purchasing goods and services related to all 
of its activities, Firestone Liberia will give preference 
to goods produced in Liberia by Liberia citizens 
and services provided by Liberian citizens who are 
resident in Liberia and will require its Afﬁliates and 
major sub-contractors to also give preference to 
such goods and services
Maufacturing
• No commitment to building a rubber wood facility • Commitment to invest $10 million in a rubber wood 
facility to produce sawn timber, kiln dried lumber 
and veneer with an expected start date for the 
main plant mid 2008.  500 persons expected to be 
employed initially and potentially increasing to 1,000
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Community Resources and Support for Liberian Farmers
• During the Rehabilitation Term, Firestone to provide 
“up to” 600,000 rubber stumps per year to qualiﬁed 
Liberian rubber farmers free of charge
• During the Rehabilitation Term, Firestone Liberia 
to provide 700,000 rubber stumps per year of 
the same quality it uses for its own replanting to 
qualiﬁed Liberian rubber farmers free of charge
• Firestone Liberia to sell at its own cost farm supplies 
to qualiﬁed Liberian rubber farmers
• Firestone Liberia to contribute $50,000 to 
independent study to  be commissioned by the 
Ministry of Agriculture on ways to support and 
enhance the rehabilitation of the natural rubber 
industry in Liberia and to assist small holder
• Firestone Liberia will support the Government’s 
efforts to amend the law governing the Rubber 
Development Fund to be independently and 
transparently managed for the solely to support the 
rehabilitation and development of the rubber sector 
in Liberia through a national extension program and 
services for Liberian rubber farmers.   The Fund, 
under the amended law, will be ﬁnanced on fees 
imposed on the export of rubber and Government 
appropriations
• Prior to the activation of the Rubber Development 
Fund, Firestone Liberia shall assist the Ministry of 
Agriculture extension service in providing training 
for Persons engaged in extension services, among 
such trainees may be Central Agricultural Research 
Institute researchers
Environmental Measures
• No speciﬁc reference to Liberian environmental 
legislation regulating the concessionaire’s 
obligations
• Firestone Liberia environmental obligations 
prescribed by Liberian law, including the 
Environmental Protection Management Law.
• Firestone Liberia shall report annually the status of 
its Environmental Management Plan as required 
under the Environmental Protection Management 
Law
Adequate Capital
• Firestone to ensure that Firestone Liberia maintain a 
reasonable and prudent capital structure of a ratio of 
loans to the greater of equity capital or shareholder 
equity of 4:1
• Firestone Liberia to maintain a ratio of indebtedness 
to equity capital no greater than 2:1.  The ratio is to 
be determined annual from the most recent audited 
ﬁnancial statement  
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Income Taxation
• Firestone to be taxed on its net taxable income  at 
an income tax rate not to exceed 25% provided 
concessionaire not in breach of certain obligations
• Firestone’s net taxable income to be computed in 
accordance with the terms of the 2005 Agreement 
• Firestone Liberia to be taxed on its net taxable 
income pursuant to Liberian law, at a rate not to 
exceed 30%.
• The 30% income tax rate to be retroactively applied 
to Firestone Liberia’s 2007 net taxable income 
provided the Amended Agreement is ratiﬁed by 
the National Legislature and signed into law by the 
President on or before March 30, 2008
• Firestone Liberia’s net taxable income to be 
computed in accordance with Liberian law
• After Rehabilitation Term, computation of net 
taxable income shall be in accordance with law 
provided that Firestone Liberia’s income tax liability 
shall be limited to 110 percent of the amount which 
would be payable if Firestone Liberia’s income tax 
liability were computed in accordance with Law as 
in effect on July 1, 2007 utilizing a 30 percent tax 
rate. Any claim of adjustment shall be subject to 
Government audit.
Surface Rental
• Annual rental fee for government land in the 
concession of 50 cents per acre.
• Adjustment of the rental rate allowed once every 10 
years.
• Annual rental fee for government land in concession 
area of $2.00 per acre for a total of $237,980 
• Rental rate  to be adjusted for inﬂation once every 5 
years using U.S. Implicit Price Deﬂator
Other Payments to the Government
• Turnover Tax: Firestone to pay quarterly a 1% 
turnover tax on its gross income (as deﬁned by the 
Agreement)
• Import Duties:  Firestone during the term of the 
Agreement not subject to payment of import duties 
on all goods used in its operations
• ECOWAS Trade Levy:  Firestone not subject to 
payment of ECOWAS trade levy
• Turnover Tax:  Pursuant to law, Firestone Liberia to 
pay quarterly a 2% turnover tax on its gross income 
(as deﬁne by law) provided that in years where 
Firestone Liberia has negative or no income tax 
liability, the rate shall be 1%.  Sums paid as turnover 
tax are treated as a pre-payment of income tax as 
provided by law. 
• Import Duties: Firestone Liberia to pay import 
duties established by law on fuel, rice and other 
goods, provided that during the Rehabilitation Term 
duty on fuel shall not exceed 50% of duty at law, 
duty on rice shall be limited to $1.10 per 100 lbs bag 
of rice, and there will be no duty on goods listed 
in the agreement and used directly in Production.  
The reduced duty on rice applies to only a limited 
volume which is phased out over the Rehabilitation 
Term.
• ECOWAS Trade Levy:  Pursuant to law, Firestone 
Liberia to pay ECOWAS trade levy of 1% on goods 
imported from non-ECOWAS states
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Other Payments to the Government (continued)
• Withholding Tax on Interest:  Firestone not subject 
to payment and withholding of tax on interest paid 
to  non-residents
• Withholding Tax on Dividend:  Firestone not subject 
to payment and withholding of tax on dividends paid 
to shareholders during the Rehabilitation Term
• Withholding Tax on Certain Other Payments:  
Firestone not subject to payment and withholding 
tax on certain other payments required under the tax 
code
• Goods and Services Tax:  Firestone not subject to 
payment of the Goods and Services Tax required by 
law
• Real Property Tax:  Firestone not subject to payment 
of real property taxes
• Inspection Fees: Firestone not subject to payment 
of any inspection fees to the Government or third 
parties on any imports or exports
• Stabilization:
• Withholding Tax on Interest:  Pursuant to law, 
Firestone Liberia to withhold and pay from interest 
paid to non-resident persons the amount required 
by law but not to exceed 10% of such payments
• Withholding Tax on Dividends:  Pursuant to law, 
Firestone Liberia to withhold and pay from dividends 
paid to its shareholders the amount required by law 
but not to exceed 10% of such payments
• Withholding Tax on Certain Other Payments:  
Pursuant to law, Firestone Liberia to withhold and 
pay from certain payments required under the tax 
code the amount required by law but not to exceed 
8% during the Rehabilitation Term or 10% during 
the Regular Term
• Goods and Services Tax:  Pursuant to law, Firestone 
Liberia to pay goods and services tax provided 
that the tax rate shall not exceed 3.5% during the 
Rehabilitation term and no goods and services tax 
shall be payable on capital goods used in Production 
or used to meet Firestone Liberia’s social 
obligations in the agreement
• Real Property Tax:  Firestone shall pay real property 
tax during the Regular Term of $170,000, adjusted 
every 5 years for inﬂation
 • Inspection Fees:  Firestone subject to inspection 
on all imports and exports and shall pay fees to an 
inspection entity approved by Government at rates 
to be negotiated between Firestone Liberia and such 
entity
• Stabilization and Adjustment of Liability:  After the 
Rehabilitation Term, if any new tax or change in tax 
not otherwise stabilized that was not in effect on July 
1, 2007 and results in Firestone Liberia paying more 
than 110% of the total amount of taxes that would 
have been payable if only the taxes in effect as of July 
1, 2007 were paid, then Firestone Liberia may at its 
election receive the excess amount over the 110% 
limit as a credit against taxes or as a refund from the 
Government.  Any claim of credit or refund shall be 
subject to audit
Governing Law
• Unless explicitly provided in the Agreement (i.e., 
with respect to certain ﬁscal provisions regarding 
rates and stabilization), Liberian law applicable to 
Firestone Liberia and its afﬁliates, shareholders, 
contractors and ﬁnanciers, including directors, 
ofﬁcers, agents and employees of the foregoing
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Appendix VI 
Part VI of the Public Procurement and Concessions Act of Liberia 
(2005)
PART VI
SPECIFIC PROCEDURES FOR PROCESSING CONCESSION AGREEMENTS
Sub-Part 1—Deﬁnition and Objectives of Concession Agreements
Deﬁnition 
73. (1) Concession means the grant of an interest in a public asset by Government or its 
agency to a private sector entity for a speciﬁed period during which the asset may be 
operated, managed, utilized or improved by the private sector entity who pays fees or 
royalties under the condition that the Government retains its overall interest in the 
asset and that the asset will revert to the Government or agency at a determined time. 
Under this Act, the term concession shall comprise of all its variants including but 
not limited to the following:
  (a) “Build/Refurbish/Modernize-Operate-Transfer (BOT)”: Where a private entity 
ﬁnances the development of infrastructure/facility/utility and operates it for 
a speciﬁed period after which the project is handed over to the Government/
public entity free of lien or at a cost to the public entity.
  (b) “Build/Refurbish/Modernize-Transfer-Operate (BTO)”: Where the Government/
public entity contracts a private entity to build or complete a facility the owner-
ship of which is transferred to the Government/public entity on completion 
after which the facility is leased back to the private entity for a ﬁxed or renew-
able term.
  (c) “Build/Refurbish/Modernize-Own-Operate-Transfer (BOOT)”: Where the 
private entity obtains a franchise for a ﬁxed period, whether exclusive or not, 
to develop, operate, maintain, manage and collect user fees for a public facility 
over a ﬁxed period at the end of which title to the facility reverts to the public 
entity/Government.
  (d) “Build/Refurbish/Modernize-Own-Operate (BOO)”: Where the Government/
public entity either transfers ownership and responsibility for a public facility 
or contracts with a private entity to build, own and operate a new facility is 
subject to terms and conditions laid down by the Government/public entity for 
the operation of the facility. 
  (e) “Joint Ventures”: Where the Government/public entity shares investment, 




  (f) “Management Contract/Service Contract”: Where a private entity is engaged 
as an agent of the Government/public entity, to perform a public function on 
behalf of the Government/public entity for a fee in whatever form, with or 
without performance incentives regardless of whether the public entity retains 
responsibility for the acts of the private entity agent or not.
  (g) “Outsourcing”: Where the Government/public entity contracts a private entity 
for the continuous provision of an otherwise public service paid for by the public 
entity.
  (h) “Partial Privatization”: The partial disposal of Government interest to a private 
entity other than through the Stock Exchange.




74. The objectives of every concession shall be to promote one or more of the following:
 (a) Increased Government revenue from concessions.
 (b) Harnessing of private sector ﬁnancial, human and technical resources for economic 
development
 (c) Competition in the provision of services, supplies, goods or infrastructure and reduce 
monopolies.
 (d) Accelerate the development of infrastructure, human capacity and the provision of 
services 
 (e) The growth of  the Liberian private sector 
 (f) Partnerships between the public and private sectors 
Sub-Part 2—Scope, Application and Disqualiﬁed Private Sector Entities
Scope and Application 
75. (1) This part shall apply to all activities relating to concessions and shall in particular 
apply to the following:
  (a) The implementation of concessions including, but not limited to the:
   i. Identiﬁcation and certiﬁcation for Concessions
   ii. Planning of the process for concession agreements
   iii. Preparation of concession bid documents
   iv. Invitation and evaluation of bids, negotiations and signing of concession 
agreements
   v. Implementation, supervision and monitoring of concession agreements
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  (b) The grant of concessions of whatever form in all sectors including but not limited 
to:
   i. Mineral exploration and mining
   ii. Fishing
   iii. Timber
   iv. Telecommunications
   v. Electricity, water and other utilities
   vi. Forestry
   vii. Agricultural concessions including plantations
   viii. Oil exploration and extraction 
   ix. Development of public infrastructure including but not limited to airports, 
terminals, toll roads/bridges, shopping malls, etc.
   x. The grant of special licenses including licenses for imports, exports, 
services, works or for the performance of functions on behalf of the public 
sector
   xi. Other sectors as determined by the Minister responsible for Economic 
Affairs.
  (c) All Concession Entities or Government institutions and agencies legally 
mandated to undertake concessions
  (d)  All private sector entities that participate in concessions.
Concession Entities
76. (1) Any entity that is issued with a Certiﬁcate for Concessions in accordance with Sections 
88 and 89 of this Act shall be a Concession Entity for the purposes of this Act and 
shall be responsible for the concession process.
 (2) The head of the Concession Entity shall be held accountable and responsible for any 
action taken in pursuit of his or her responsibilities under this Part and shall not be 
absolved from accountability because he or she delegated the function.
The Role of the Procurement Unit in Processing Concession Agreements
77. (1) The Procurement Unit set up under Section 29 of this Act shall be responsible for 
the performance of the following concessions functions under the oversight of the 
Procurement Committee.
 (2) In respect of concessions the Procurement Unit shall perform the following func-
tions:
  (a) Prepare the Concession Procurement Plan
  (b) Plan and administer concession up to but excluding evaluation and award of 
concession contracts
  (c) Prepare concession bid documents in collaboration with technical experts
  (d) Receive and safeguard bids received
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  (e) Conduct bid opening procedures in accordance with Section 110 of this Act
  (f) Perform secretarial services for the Concession Entity
  (g) Such other functions as may be conferred by the head of the entity in accor-
dance with this Act
Engagement of Advisors
78. (1) A Concession Entity and/or the Inter-Ministerial Committee may where it is condu-
cive to the national interest, engage private sector entities or experts to advise on any 
of the processes of concessions other than approvals and such experts shall work with 
the Procurement Unit for the purposes of the speciﬁc concession.
 (2) The selection of a private sector entity or individual for the purposes of subsection 
(1) of this section shall be made in accordance with the procedure for the selection of 
consultants set out under Sections 70 and 71 of this Act.
Preparation of Concession Procurement Plan
79. (1) The Concession Procurement Plan shall include the following details:
  (a) The allocation of responsibilities and deadlines for all pre-implementation activ-
ities necessary for the concession procurement process including the engage-
ment of consultants to advise at any stage of the concession process;
  (b) Arrangements to ensure co-ordination with other institutions where neces-
sary;
  (c) The method to be employed in the procurement of the concession indicating 
whether it is a National Competitive Bidding or an International Competitive 
Bidding and the reasons for same;
  (d) The proposed dates for the General Notice of Investment Opportunity, Expression 
of Interest, Invitation to Bid, evaluation, negotiation and all processes leading to 
the concession agreement.
 (4) The Commission shall, where necessary to ensure compliance with this Act, request 
for changes in the Concessions Procurement Plan within the twenty-one (21) days of 
receipt of the Concessions Implementation Plan.
Concession Structures
80. There is hereby established under this Act the Inter-Ministerial Concessions Committee 
and the Concession Bid Evaluation Panel.
Composition of the Inter-Ministerial Concessions Committee
81. (1) The Inter-Ministerial Concessions Committee shall consist of seven (7) persons 
constituted on ad hoc basis as required in accordance with subsection (2) of this 
section.  
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 (2) The Inter-Ministerial Concessions Committee shall be responsible for the review of 
a concession and approval of the report of the Concessions Bid Evaluation Panel 
and the preparation of the annual concessions plan for submission and approval by 
Cabinet.
 (3) The Inter-Ministerial Concessions Committee shall comprise the following:
  (a) The chairperson of the National Investment Commission who shall be the 
chairperson of the committee
  (b) The Minister of Justice
  (c) The Minister responsible for Finance
  (d) The Minister responsible for Economic Affairs
  (e) Two other Ministers appointed by the President representing the collective 
interest of various sectors of the economy connected with the concession other 
than the minister responsible for the sector 
  (f) The head of the Concession Entity 
 (4) The Head of the Procurement Unit of the speciﬁc Concession Entity shall serve as 
the non-member secretary to the Inter-Ministerial Concessions Committee for the 
purposes of its work for the Concession Entity.
 (5) The Inter-Ministerial Concessions Committee may co-opt experts to its meetings for 
a particular concession under review for advisory purposes. 
Functions of the Inter-Ministerial Concessions Committee
82. (1) The Inter-Ministerial Concessions Committee shall perform the following functions:
  (a) Review and approve concession bid documents prior to the invitation of bids.
  (b) Review the evaluation reports to ensure that procedures were in strict confor-
mity with the criteria, the Act and relevant regulations, approve or otherwise, 
the evaluation reports to enable the Concession Entity to continue with the next 
step of the process.
  (c) Approve the minimum benchmarks for the negotiations with the concession-
aire as proposed by the Concession Entity.
  (d) If negotiations breakdown, and if acceptable, authorize the Concession Entity to 
negotiate with the next highest ranking bidder.
  (e) Constitute the Concession Bid Evaluation Panel and the Negotiations Team.
  (f) Make recommendations to the head of the Concession Entity and the 
Commission as and when necessary.
 (2) No entity other than the Inter-Ministerial Concessions Committee set up under 
Sections 80 and 81 of this Act shall perform the functions of the Inter-Ministerial 
Concessions Committee and the purported performance of the functions of the Inter-
Ministerial Concessions Committee by any other person or entity shall be void. 
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Meetings of the Inter-Ministerial Concessions Committee
83. (1) The Inter-Ministerial Concessions Committee shall be convened at the instance of the 
Head of the Concession Entity through a written request submitted to the President 
and the Chairperson of the National Investment Commission.
 (2) The President, on receipt of the request from the Head of the Entity, shall nominate 
two (2) persons under subsection (3) (e) of Section 81 for the speciﬁc purpose and the 
chairperson of the National Investment Commission, shall on receipt of the notice 
of the President’s nominees convene a meeting of the committee for the purposes of 
the speciﬁc concession.
 (3) Apart from the Chairperson and the Ministers responsible for Finance, Justice and 
Economic Affairs, no person shall have permanent representation on the Inter-
Ministerial Concessions Committee.
 (4)  When the concession contract is entered into, the Inter-Ministerial Concessions 
Committee shall be deemed to be dissolved for the purposes of the particular conces-
sion. 
 (5) No member of the Committee shall delegate his role as a member. Where absolutely 
necessary any of the persons mentioned under subsection (3) of Section 81 may send 
a Deputy Minister as a proxy to represent the member at a meeting of the Committee. 
The member shall be responsible for any decisions made by the proxy.
Disclosure of Interest
84. (1) A member of the Inter-Ministerial Concessions Committee or a person appointed/
co-opted by the committee who has any interest, direct or indirect, in any matter to 
be considered by or on behalf of the Commission shall disclose the nature of his or 
her interest to the Commission and such disclosure shall be recorded in the minutes 
of the committee.
 (2) A member of the Inter-Ministerial Concessions Committee with any interest shall 
not take part in any deliberation or decision of the committee relating to that matter, 
and a member who contravenes this section shall be guilty of misconduct and liable 
to be removed from the committee and/or suffer any penalty that may be applicable 
under this Act.
Quorum
85. The Inter-Ministerial Commission Committee shall not be properly constituted for its work 
without the presence of the ministers responsible for Finance, Economic Affairs, Justice, 
the head of the Concession Entity or in the absence of any of them the duly authorized 
deputy.
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Disqualiﬁed Private Sector Persons/Entities
86. The following private sector entities, whether local or foreign, are disqualiﬁed from partici-
pating in any concession process.  
 (a) Partnerships
 (b) Sole Proprietorships
 (c) Natural Persons
 (d) Not-for-proﬁt entities or Non-Governmental Organizations
 (e) Unincorporated Associations
Sub-Part 3—The Concession Procurement Process Planning
Inclusion In Economic Development Plan
87. (1) The Minister responsible for Economic Affairs shall develop an annual concessions 
plan for sectors of the economy in which concessions may be promoted for approval 
by Cabinet.  
 (2) The role assigned the Minister responsible for Economic Affairs under subsection (1) 
of this section shall only be exercised in consultation with all Ministers and head of 
Entities that may be affected by the annual concessions plan.
 (3) The head of a Concession Entity shall, prior to commencing any activity for the purpose 
of implementing a concession, request the Minister responsible for Economic Affairs 
to issue a Certiﬁcate for Concession for the speciﬁc concession.
No Concession without Certiﬁcate
88. (1) Every concession implementation process shall commence with the issue of a 
Certiﬁcate for Concession and no concession shall be implemented unless the 
proposed project has been issued with a Certiﬁcate for Concession.
 (2) The Ministry responsible for Economic Affairs shall have the sole responsibility to 
issue the Certiﬁcate for Concession.
Criteria for the Issue of the Certiﬁcate for Concession
89.   (1) Prior to issuing the Certiﬁcate for Concession under Section 88 of this Act, the 
Ministry responsible for Economic Affairs shall ensure that: 
  (a) The concession falls within the area of the economy in which concession 
arrangements may be carried out in furtherance of national economic objec-
tives.
  (b) The proposed concession has not already been allocated with public funds for 
the same purpose envisaged under the proposed project.
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  (c) The barriers or bottlenecks that need to be addressed prior to or in the course 
of the concession procurement process  have been clearly identiﬁed by the 
Concession Entity or by the Ministry responsible for Economic Affairs and 
brought to the knowledge of the Entity.
 (2) The functions of the Ministry responsible for Economic Affairs under subsection (1) of 
this section shall be performed with prior consultation with the head of Concessions 
Entities affected by speciﬁc concession.
Presentation of Concession Option to the Public
90. A Concession Entity shall pursuant to the receipt of the Certiﬁcate for Concession under-
take public stakeholder consultations as part of the concession implementation process.
Information at the Stakeholder Forum
91. At the stakeholder forum, the Concession Entity shall at least provide information on the 
following: 
 (a) The strategic importance of the Project
 (b) The extent of investment or private resources i.e. ﬁnancial, human, etc. to provide the 
needs of the community
 (c) The technical and ﬁnancial feasibility of the Project
 (d) Measures instituted and/or may be instituted to address any environmental chal-
lenges and adverse externalities for the population
 (e) Any other reason that may justify choosing the concession option
Records of the Concession Bidding Process
92. In furtherance of transparency and accountability every entity involved in any concession 
process shall maintain a written record of all proceedings in accordance with Section 43 of 
this Act.
Inspection of the Records
93. The records shall be made available for inspection by the Commission and the Auditor-
General or any person(s) duly authorized by the Commission or relevant Government 
authority.
Speciﬁc Records to Be In Writing
94. Without limiting the generality of this part or any subsection of this part the following shall 
at all times be in writing:
 (a) General Notice of Investment Opportunity
 (b) Request for Expression Of Interest
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 (c) Instructions to Bidders
 (d) The Request For Proposals
 (e) The Evaluation Report together with attachments
 (f) All documents related to the award of contracts
 (g) Concession Information Memoranda
Competitive Bidding
95. Concessions bidding proceedings shall be on the basis of open competitive bidding unless 
otherwise stipulated under this Act.
 
National Competitive Bidding 
96. (1) An Entity shall use National Competitive Bidding where it is concluded that:
  (a) There is the availability of adequate technology in Liberia for the object of the 
concession.
  (b) The expected capital outlay is capable of being raised by local businesses 
  (c) The concession project is not likely to be of interest to foreign investors
  (d) The concession falls within the area of the economy which is by law restricted 
to Liberians
 (2) Where National Competitive Bidding is used only domestic ﬁrms shall be invited to 
participate in the particular bid. 
International Competitive Bidding
97. (1) International Competitive Bidding shall be used where one or more of the following 
conditions may prevail:
  (a) The project requires international expertise
  (b) The project requires technology not available in Liberia 
  (c) The project requires capital outlay not ordinarily available in Liberia
 (2) Bidders shall be allowed not less than six (6) weeks to prepare and submit bids.  
Domestic Firms to Participate In the International Competitive Bidding
98. In all instances of International Competitive Bidding, domestic businesses which meet the 
minimum criteria for participation shall, without restrictions, be qualiﬁed to participate 
either solely or in association with foreign entities.
Criteria for the Application of Margin of Preference In Concessions
99. (1) Where a concession is awarded on the basis of International Competitive Bidding, 
a Concession Entity may allow for Margin of Preference for Domestic and Liberian 
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Businesses as deﬁned under this Act and the Commission shall establish a criteria 
for the Margin of Preference to be applicable to concessions in that respect.
 (2) Notwithstanding the generality of sub-section (1) of this section, the Commission 
shall ensure that the criteria for the Margin of Preference applicable to concessions 
shall, as much as possible, be consistent with the provisions of Section 45 of this Act.
Restricted Competitive Bidding 
100. Subject to the approval of the Commission, Restricted Competitive Bidding shall be 
employed where the Concessions Entity has pre-qualiﬁed bidders in accordance with the 
provisions of this Part of this Act.
Sole-Source
101. Subject to the approval of the Commission a concessionaire may be sole sourced if one or 
more of the following conditions prevail:
 (a) The Concession requires specialized expertise that is available only to one speciﬁc 
bidder.
 (b) The Concession involves an innovation the patent for which is held by one particular 
bidder.
 (c) The Concession requires specialized research, or experiment that only one person is 
prepared to undertake 
 (d) The Concession is in respect of strategic national interest or national defense and 
security and it is not in the national interest to have more than one bidder 
Prior Approval of Commission
102. In all instances other than National Competitive Bidding and International Competitive 
Bidding, the method to be used shall receive the express prior approval of the 
Commission.
Sub-Part 4—Concession Documents Preparation
Performance of Preliminary/Feasibility Studies
103. (1) A Concession Entity shall undertake preliminary or prefeasibility studies to deter-
mine the feasibility of a proposed project and the prefeasibility studies may be carried 
out in consultation with the Minister responsible for Economic Affairs and other 
experts whether from the private or public sector as appropriate.  
 (2) The selection of any private sector entity or individual as a consultant to assist the 
Concession Entity shall be in compliance with Section 70 and 71 of this Act.
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Concession Bid Documents 
 104. (1) Prior to issuing a Request for Expression of Interest or Invitation to Bid, the Pro-
curement Unit shall prepare the full set of the concession bid documents and shall 
submit same to the head of the Concession Entity for review and approval by the 
Inter-Ministerial Concessions Committee.
 (2) The Inter-Ministerial Concessions Committee shall establish the appropriate tech-
nical team to review the concession bid documents and based on their recommenda-
tions approves or otherwise the concession bid documents.
Scope of Concession Documents
105. The concession bid documents shall, at a minimum include the following:
 (a) Project information memoranda which shall cover, but not limited to the following:
  i. the background of the Project
  ii. objectives of the proposed concession
  iii. expected improvements or  deliverables   
  iv. outline of expected project outcome and benchmarks for measuring the attain-
ment of Project objectives
 (b) The invitation to bid as applicable
 (c) Instructions to bidders which shall include the following:
  i. An indication of whether or not there will be a pre-bid meeting and if so the 
date, time and venue.
  ii. Criteria for examination or evaluation of bids
  iii. Criteria for award of concessions
  iv. Form of Agreement
  v. Form of Bid
  vi. Form of Bid Security and Performance Security
  vii. Time and Venue for submission and opening of bids
  viii. Form of Financial Proposal to be submitted separately
  ix. All relevant forms necessary for preparation of bids
 (d)  General and speciﬁc conditions of contract/agreement.
Notiﬁcation of General Notice of Investment Opportunity, Expression of Interest or 
Request for Proposals
106. Upon approval of the concession bid documents, the Procurement Unit shall publish as 
required, a General Notice of Investment Opportunity, Expression of Interest, Request for 
Proposals or all of them in successive order as the context may require in accordance with 




107. The Commission may issue guidelines regarding publications of the General Notice of 
Investment Opportunity, Expression of Interest or Request for Proposal.
Sub-Part 5—Pre-Bid Meeting, Bid Submission and Opening
Pre-Bid Meeting
108. Where necessary, a pre-bid conference may be organized to give prospective bidders the 
opportunity to seek clariﬁcation and to obtain additional information on the requirements 
of the concession or clarify issues set out in the Concession Bid document.
Particulars of the Pre-Bid Meeting
109. The date, time and venue of the pre-bid meeting shall be speciﬁed in the Concession bid 
documents and shall in any case not be less than fourteen (14) days after publication of the 
invitation to bid. 
Submission and Opening of Bids
110. (1) All responses to the Expression of Interest and/or Invitation to Bid whether submitted 
by a bidder earlier or on the same day slated for the Bid Opening shall be opened at 
the same time and place and in the presence of the bidders, their representatives or 
agents in attendance.
 (2) The bid submission and opening shall observe the rules of bid submission and 
opening under Sections 61, 62 and 63 of this Act.
 (3) In the case of two envelope bidding, the Concession document shall specify the proce-
dure for opening of the technical and ﬁnancial envelopes. 
Sub-Part 6—Evaluation
Evaluation 
111. (1) Evaluation of concession bids shall be undertaken by a Concessions Bid Evaluation 
Panel that shall be constituted by the Inter-Ministerial Concession Committee.  
 (2) The Procurement Unit may make recommendations to the head of the Entity 
regarding the composition of the Concessions Bid Evaluation Panel and the head of 
the Entity may direct that speciﬁc persons with expert knowledge on the subject be 
co-opted for the effective evaluation of bids.    
 (3) For the avoidance of doubt the Bid Evaluation Panel to be constituted under Section 30 
of this Act for procurement shall not be construed to be the same as the Concessions 
Bid Evaluation Panel referred to in this section.
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 (4) Notwithstanding subsection (3) of this section, nothing in this Act shall prevent a 
person who is a member of the Bid Evaluation Panel under Section 30 of this Act, 
from being appointed a member of the Concessions Bid Evaluation Panel provided 
the person possesses the requisite qualiﬁcation to serve in that capacity.
 (5) The Concessions Bid Evaluation Panel shall be an ad hoc body and shall be deemed 
to be dissolved once its report is approved by the Inter-Ministerial Concessions 
Committee.
Certainty of Evaluation Criteria
112. No criteria shall be used for evaluation that was not set out in the Concession bid docu-
ments made available to bidders and a Concession Entity shall not change the evaluation 
criteria after the bids have been received. 
Minimum Contents of the Evaluation Criteria 
113. The evaluation shall:
 (a) In respect of an Expression of Interest take into consideration the particular require-
ments of the Project and the nature of the expertise required for the proper imple-
mentation of the Project which must have been set out in the request for Expression 
of Interest.
 (b) In respect of a Request for Proposals take into account the criteria set out in the 
Request for Proposals which shall in any event be designed to attain the objects of the 
concession and shall include at least the following:
  i. technical feasibility of the proposal 
  ii. effectiveness of the methods and resources to be deployed
  iii. planned improvement over the concession period 
  iv. the effect of the proposal on the overall strategic objectives and national devel-
opment plan spelt out by the Ministry responsible for Economic Affairs
  v. technology transfer
  vi. expected effect of the concession on national income, employment of Liberians, 
the environment, related industries and other sectors of the economy
  vii. application of Margin of Preference, where applicable in accordance with 
Section 99 of this Act.
Prohibited Criteria in Evaluation
114. The criteria for the selection of responsive bidders shall not at any stage, include any of the 
following:
 (a) Criteria that cannot be reasonably interpreted as a condition meant to elicit the attain-
ment of any of the principles provided for under this Act.
 (b) Criteria that is non-commercial in character and which will not lead to the attainment 
of the objectives of the concession arrangement.
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 (c) Ambiguous criteria the interpretation of which can be subjective.
 (d) A criteria or condition that leads to the grant of the concession to particular persons 
or group of persons.
 (e) A criteria or condition designed to facilitate the selection of a known bidder in contra-
vention of the competitive process.




115. (1) The Concessions Bid Evaluation Panel shall conclude the evaluation within sixty (60) 
days of the opening of the bids and shall submit an evaluation report to the Inter-
Ministerial Concessions Committee.
 (2) The Evaluation Report shall at least comprise the following:
  (a) A report on the responsiveness of the bids on the basis of the requirements set 
out in the proposals
  (b) Results of the technical evaluation 
  (c) Results of the ﬁnancial evaluation
  (d) Recommendations which shall include a statement that the bidder with the 
highest overall score be invited for negotiations and if negotiations fail with 
that bidder, negotiations should be held with the next bidder in that order till a 
successful bidder is selected.
 (3) Due diligence of all recommended bidders undertaken as provided in Section 116 of 
this Act. 
 (4) The head of the Entity shall not have the power to alter the report of the Concession 
Bid Evaluation Panel or to request for changes in the recommendations.
Due Diligence 
116. (1) Prior to the submission of the evaluation report to the Inter- Ministerial Concession 
Committee a Concession Entity shall undertake due diligence on all responsive 
bidders.
 (2) The extent of the due diligence shall be determined by the Entity but shall at a 
minimum include a veriﬁcation of the following:
  (a) The capacity of the private sector entity to enter into the concession agreement.
  (b) The authenticity of the certiﬁcate of incorporation and other statutory docu-
ments.  If the private sector partner is of a foreign origin company, the validity 
of the document must be veriﬁed from the country of origin. 
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  (c) Authenticity of the persons purporting to represent the bidder  for which 
purpose the public entity shall demand a board resolution of the prospective 
bidder authorizing the persons to negotiate or enter into an agreement on its 
behalf.
  (d) The fulﬁlment by the private sector entity whether wholly foreign owned or in 
partnership with a local counterpart of the requirements of the laws regulating 
business operations in Liberia.
  (e) Where the bidder is a consortium, proof that:
   i. None of the members is disqualiﬁed under this Act;
   ii. Members of the consortium have bound themselves to assume joint and 
several liabilities for the private sector party’s obligations under the conces-
sion agreement or in the alternative that a member(s) of the consortium 
has consented to bear the risk of the other(s) and that a copy of the docu-
ment evidencing same has been deposited with the entity.
  (f) Authenticity of the claims of technical and ﬁnancial capability made by the 
bidder 
 (3) The Concession Entity may, if appropriate engage independent experts to carry out 
the due diligence.
 (4)  In all cases the due diligence must be concluded before the concession’s contract 
comes into force.
Form of Contract 
117. The form of contract for each Concession Agreement shall be developed by the Concession 
Entity in collaboration with the Ministry of Justice and endorsed by the Inter-Ministerial 
Concessions Committee prior to negotiations.
Negotiations 
118. (1) Within fourteen (14) days after the approval of the evaluation report by the Inter-
Ministerial Concessions Committee, the Inter-Ministerial Concessions Committee 
shall constitute a Negotiations Team comprising of technocrats and relevant experts 
co-opted as necessary for the conduct of the negotiation with the highest ranked 
bidder. 
 (2) The Negotiations Team shall comprise of a team of not less than three (3) but not more 
than seven (7) persons appointed by the Inter-Ministerial Concessions Committee.  
 (3) The Negotiations Team shall consist of technocrats and the head of the Concession 
Entity shall not be a member of the Negotiations Team.
 (4) The Negotiations Team shall be responsible for ensuring that the negotiations are 
concluded before the expiry of the original or extended date of the Bid Security 
submitted by the Bidder.  
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 (5) Negotiations shall be entered into with the highest ranked bidder indicated in the 
evaluation report and approved by the Inter-Ministerial Committee. In the event of 
the break down of the negotiations, the Negotiation Team shall report to the Inter-
Ministerial Concessions Committee.  The Inter-Ministerial Concessions Committee 
shall give approval if appropriate for the commencement of negotiations with the 
next highest bidder in that order of ranked bidders until negotiations are concluded 
and all applicable conditions are fulﬁlled.
Issues to Be Considered At the Negotiations
119.  (1) The Negotiations Team shall take the following into account, within the context of 
existing laws, in its negotiations with the prospective concessionaire:  
  (a) Responsibilities of parties under the concession
  (b) Standards of performance including service, deadlines, safety, compliance and 
operating/maintenance requirements
  (c) Contingency arrangements for identiﬁed risks
  (d) Tax obligations
  (e) Mechanisms for monitoring performance, quality of service and other Project 
objectives 
  (f) Dispute resolution mechanisms
  (g) Performance Bonds
  (h) Monitoring/Reporting 
  (i) Reporting Requirements 
  (j) Social Responsibility Requirements
  (k) Use Of Local Labour
  (l) Capacity Building
  (m) Technology Transfer
  (n) The ﬁnancial components including payment provisions, the time of payment 
and currency of payment
  (o) Responsibilities for insurance,  security, operation and maintenance where 
applicable
  (p) Contract revision arising from material change in the conditions of the 
contract
  (q) Environmental Issues
  (r) Termination provisions
  (s) Project failure and remedies, if any
  (t) Breach of contract/Events of default
  (u) Provision for re-entry, buy-back transfer, reversion, assignment and related 
issues
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  (v) Tariffs, charges, rates, fees, etc. that may be charged to third parties, where 
applicable and responsibility for ﬁxing same
  (w) Non-circumvention, conﬁdentiality and scope of these provisions
  (x) Ownership of intellectual property, facilities or new technologies developed
  (y) Provisions which may survive termination of the contract e.g. arbitration, conﬁ-
dentiality
  (z) Contract amendment process
 (2) The Inter-Ministerial Concessions Committee may expand on these issues for nego-
tiations for any particular concession, but the issues must have been included in the 
concessions bid documents. 
Conﬁdentiality Agreement
120. (1) The Negotiations Team shall not commence with the negotiations unless they have 
received a copy of the Conﬁdentiality Agreement entered into between the bidder 
invited for the negotiations and the entity which restricts each of the parties from 
disclosing information in accordance with internationally accepted standards of 
conﬁdentiality in such cases.
Post-Contract Management
121. The Negotiation Team shall conclude post-contract management arrangements during the 
negotiations and this shall at least include:
 (a) Mechanisms for monitoring performance of the terms and conditions of the agree-
ments
 (b) Reports to be submitted on periodic basis and the methods for authentication of the 
reports 
 (c) Asset maintenance and improvement requirements if any
 (d) Arrangement for handling public complaints
Regulations Pertaining to Mining and Petroleum Concessions
122. (1) Without limiting the application of this Part the Commission shall not later than 
one hundred and eighty (180) days after the coming into force of this Act ensure that 
regulations are issued so as to bring the procedure for the issue of prospecting, recon-
naissance and exploration licenses for petroleum and mining concessions under any 
existing law in conformity with this Part of this Act.  
 (2) In the performance of its functions under subsection (1) of this section the Commission 
shall ensure that the issue of any license for prospecting, reconnaissance and explora-





Web Reference for Full Text of Amended Agreements
To read, download or print the full text of the Amended Mineral Development Agreement among 
the Government of the Republic of Liberia, Mittal Steel (Liberia) Holdings Limited, and Mittal 
Steel Holdings A.G. (December 28, 2006), and the Amended and Restated Agreement between 





1. GEMAP is a program of wide scope that targets revenue collection, expenditure 
controls, and government procurement and concession practices.  Its key features are the 
provision of international experts with co-signature authority and management contracts in 
selected ministries and state-owned enterprises; authoritative oversight mechanisms; and 
linkages to the peace implementation process and to UN Security Council sanctions. (Source 
“GEMAP, a Joint UN/WB Review, May 2006)
2. The telecommunications license agreements set aside were the Cellcom, Comium, and 
Intrady-Comad contracts. 
3. For additional details on the contract review criteria see the Contract and Concession 
Review Criteria section of the Framework attached here as Appendix III.
4. The 36 contracts recommended for cancellation included the 7 agreements with no 
contracts.
5. The 14 contracts recommended for renegotiation by the CCRC were Comium, Enisul 
Group, Metallum Liberia Ltd., Western Mineral Resource, Mittal, Resol (2 oil contracts), 
Regal (2 oil contracts), Woodside (oil contract), BIVAC, Nick Scan, Firestone and Agro 
Resource Corp.
6. This report refers to the Ministerial level committee created by the President to review the 
contracts in the ArcelorMittal and Firestone negotiations as the Inter-Ministerial Concession 
Committee (“IMCC”).  This committee often sought technical advice from subject-matter 
experts within the Government.  This group of Government subject-matter experts has 
over time come to be called the Inter-Ministerial Technical Committee (“IMTC”).  The 
IMTC is comprised of Deputy and Assistant Ministers who are responsible for technical 
assistance to the IMCC.  To distinguish the IMTC from the group responsible for nego-
tiating contracts, some in Government refer to the “negotiating” group, which is largely 
made up of Ministers, as the Inter-Ministerial Committee (“IMC”).  The IMTC and IMC are 
not committees described in the PPCA or the Mineral and Mining Law of Liberia (2000). 
The PPCA refers to the IMCC and the Bid Review Panel; the Minerals and Mining Law of 
Liberia (2000) refers to Ministerial Technical Committee (“MTC”).  As part of its efforts 
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to harmonize the negotiating practice used in the ArcelorMittal and Firestone negotia-
tions with the PPCA and the Minerals and Mining Law of Liberia (2000), the Government 
will have to decide the name and functions of various committees and panels used in 
the concession contract review and negotiating process.  See Section 7 of the Report for 
a discussion and recommendations on harmonization.  To avoid confusion, this Report 
uses IMCC to refer to the Ministerial-level committee responsible for contract review and 
evaluation (with the assistance of subject-matter experts and technical advisors inside and 
outside of the Government).  This is consistent with the functions of the IMCC under the 
PPCA.  The group responsible for negotiating concession agreements for the Government 
is simply referred to as the “negotiating team” in this Report.
7. The negotiating team, comprising a sub-set of the IMCC members, was headed by Minister 
Eugene Shannon, MLME.  Its other members were Minister Morris Saytumah, MOS; 
Chairman Richard Tolbert, NIC; Minister O. Natty B. Davis, MOS-LRDC; Solicitor General 
Tiawan Gongloe, MOJ; Director Drayton Hinneh, MOF and Assistant Minister Gesler 
Murray, MLME.  Minister Saytumah was designated lead negotiator.  Supporting the IMCC 
negotiating team in the capacity of technical advisors were Prof. Bob Hillman, ISLP; Prof. 
Lou Wells, ISLP; Mr. Raja Kaul, LRDC; Mr. Stephen Seymour, Columbia Law School and 
through the ISLP also, a team from the New York law ﬁrm of Cravath Swaine and Moore 
that included Mr. Joel Harold, Mr. Alex Vermeychuk and Ms. Kyla French.
8. A Term Sheet is a document that sets out in non-contract language the important deal 
terms that the parties must reach agreement on to establish a meeting of the minds for the 
proposed transaction
9. A Talking Point document usually sets out one party’s position on a set of particular 
issues.
10. A “Non-Binding Protocol of Discussions” is intended to capture the discussions of the 
parties during a speciﬁc round of negotiations.  It sets out the parties positions on issues 
discussed during the negotiations and captures any agreements reached on those issues.  
The document signed by both sides is non-binding and also records a list of each side’s 
representatives participating in the meeting.
11. This document is available at: http://www.emansion.gov.lr/doc/MittalAgreementFinalMit
rix.pdf.
12. The President appointed the Minister of Agriculture, Chris Toe, as chair of the negotiating 
team and included as its members, Minister Frances Johnson-Morris, MOJ; Minister Koﬁ 
Woods, MOL; Morris Saytumah, MOS; Minister O. Natty B. Davis, MOS-LRDC; Chairman 
Richard Tolbert, NIC; Deputy Minister Elfrieda Tamba, MOF and Director Drayton Hinneh, 
MOF.  Supporting the negotiating team as technical advisors were Mr. Joe Bell from the 
Washington, D.C. law ﬁrm of Hogan & Hartson, through the ISLP; Mr. Michael Jordan, the 
Government’s rubber industry ﬁnancial expert; Mr. Jim Belcher, another rubber industry 
consultant to the Government; and Mr. Raja Kaul with the LRDC.  The team also received 




13. Like a Term Sheet, a Summary of Principal Terms is a document that sets out in non-
contract language the important terms that the parties must reach understanding on to 
establish agreement on a proposed transaction.
14. 2005 Concession Agreement: Section 31.1 Profound Changes in Circumstances provides—
For the purpose of considering Profound Changes in Circumstances from those existing 
on the Effective Date or on the date of the most recent review of this Agreement pursuant 
to this Section 31, Government on the one hand and Firestone Liberia jointly on the other 
hand, shall at the request of the other consult together.  The Parties shall meet to review the 
matter raised as soon after such request as is reasonably convenient for them both.  In case 
Profound Changes in Circumstances are established to have occurred, the Parties shall 
effect such change in or clariﬁcation of this Agreement that they agree is necessary.
15. World rubber prices dropped from a high in 1976 of approximately US$0.40 per kilogram 
to a low of US$0.30 per kilogram in 1982.
16. Firestone projected approximately US$0.40 per kilogram as world rubber prices in its April 
2005 negotiations with the NTGL.  When the parties met to review the 2005 Concession 
Agreement in February 2007 world rubber prices were approximately US$0.93.
17. See footnote 10.
18. This document is available at: http://www.emansion.gov.lr/doc/FirestoneAgreementCom
parison20052008.pdf. 
19. See Forest Development Authority Regulation No. 104-07 (“Tender, Award and 
Administration”) Section 22 (j) (“Identiﬁcation of Affected Communities; Pre-Implementation 
Community Consultations—Social Agreements”) which provides:  
 (1) The Authority shall not proceed with offering a proposed FMC or TSC unless the 
Authority has obtained free prior informed consent, in writing, from Community 
Forestry Development Committees representing all Affected Communities identiﬁed 
under this Section, to negotiate in good faith a social agreement with the winning 
bidder and subject themselves to independent arbitration should those negotiations 
not reach a satisfactory conclusion; and 
 (2) If the Authority fails to obtain agreement under Paragraph (1) of this Subsection 
from Community Forestry Development Committees representing all Affected 
Communities, the Authority may reconsider the terms of the proposed FMC or 
TSC.
20. See Appendix VI:  PPCA Part VI Section 82 (1) (e).
21. See Appendix VI:  PPCA Part VI Section 82 (2).
22. See Appendix VI:  PPCA Part VI Sections 118 (1) and (2).
23. See Appendix VI:  PPCA Part VI Section 118 (3).
24. See Appendix VI:  PPCA Part VI Section 83 (4).
25 . Note:  It is believed the PPCA reference to a Minister of Economic Affairs is to the Minister 
of Planning and Economic Affairs.
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26. See Appendix VI: PPCA Part VI Section 81 (3).
27. See Appendix VI:  PPCA Part VI Section 83 (3).
28. See Appendix VI:  PPCA Part VI Section 83 (1).
29. See Appendix VI:  PPCA Part VI Section 83 (2).
30. See Appendix VI:  PPCA Part VI Section 83 (5).
31. See Appendix VI:  PPCA Part VI Section 85.
32. See Appendix VI:  PPCA Part VI Section 83 (1).
33. The nature and composition of a concession report is not deﬁned in the PPCA.  In practice 
a concession report is produced by the Bid Review Panel to present its deliberation related 
to a speciﬁc concession for the IMCC’s review.
34. See Appendix VI:  PPCA Part VI Section 81 (2).
35.  See Appendix VI:  PPCA Part VI Section 90.
36. See Appendix VI:  PPCA Part VI Section 91.
37. In February 2007, the Government began renegotiations of its agency contract with LISCR, 
LLC for the operation of Liberia’s Shipping and Corporate Registries.  Those negotiations 
were put on hold while the Government undertook due diligence of LISCR’s operations. 
Negotiations with LISCR have recently resumed and the negotiating process being followed 
mirrors the process in ArcelorMittal and Firestone. 
38. For example the Kendeja Hotel and Nubian Hotel projects.
39. For example Buchanan Renewable Energies.
40. PPCA Sections 141 (2) (c) (i) and (iv) state: (i) notwithstanding any provisions under the 
2000 Mining Law, its interpretation, operation and application in respect of concessions 
shall be subject to the Part VI of the PPCA; and (iv) any power granted any person, body or 
entity in respect of mining, exploration or the extraction of any natural resource shall be 
exercised in accordance with Part VI of the PPCA.  These provisions appear to require the 
MLME to follow the PPCA to the extent provisions of the 2000 Mining Law conﬂict with 
the PPCA.
41. ISLP review of the AmLib contract draft of late May, 2008, shows that very few ISLP 
comments have made it into the draft.  

“In the contracts covered by this 
report we were able, through our 
negotiation efforts, to secure stronger 
ﬁscal terms, increased revenues 
to the government, and additional 
employment opportunities for our 
people. … We aggressively pursued 
a better deal for Liberia, but we were 
also careful to make certain that 
the renegotiations did not threaten 
the viability of the companies’ 
investments and represented 
an opportunity for a better long-term 
working relationship between the 
companies and government.”
Ellen Johnson Sirleaf
President, Republic of Liberia
